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Essays in Financial Economics 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation presents three essays.  The first essay finds that the 
household risky ratio, the ratio of high risk assets over low risk assets directly 
owned by households, is a strong negative predictor of the equity premium on the 
US stock market.  The predictability is robust to definition of the asset classes, 
first versus second half of sample, and the finite-sample bias of Stambaugh (1999).  
The predictability is stronger than, and not subsumed by popular predictors like 
price-earnings ratios, yield spread, equity share of issues, or consumption-wealth 
ratios.  The main predictive power is decomposed into three similar parts: 1) the 
household tilt of risky assets, which is novel and generally orthogonal to known 
predictors; 2) a valuation ratio component; and 3) an issuance component of high 
risk versus low risk assets.  
The second essay uses a regression discontinuity design on Dodd-Frank’s 
say-on-pay vote to identify the impact of the vote on CEO compensation.  
Crossing the vote discontinuity from 51% to 49% drops the level of CEO pay by 
59.8% gross for the next year.  The effects are robust, statistically significant, and 
economically significant.  Despite the sharp drop in pay, crossing the vote 
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discontinuity has no statistically distinguishable impact on firm market value, 
earnings, dividends, and capital structure.   
The final essay, which is coauthored with David C. Yang, begins by 
noting the issuance of options by market makers induces hedging feedback 
demand: when the underlying price goes up, market makers are forced to buy, a 
well-known phenomenon caused by options gamma.  This essay empirically 
measures hedging feedback demand through the gamma of options above the 
baseline.  This residual gamma causes destabilization in the form of additional 
momentum.  The effect occurs quickly (within four days) and does not revert 
away rapidly (within ten days).  The effect is robust to time trends and liquidity 
effects.  The essay further uses three novel instruments for residual gamma.  
Residual gamma increases 1) near options expiration, 2) when the underlying 
price happens to be similar to past price levels, and 3) when the price of the 
underlying equity happens to be near a round number.  
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Chapter 1 
1 Household Risky Ratio and Expected Stock Returns 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last few decades, a key asset pricing finding is that the equity 
premium varies over time.  Predictors of the time varying equity premium include 
price-earnings ratios (Fama French 1988) (Campbell Shiller 1988), yield spreads 
(Fama Schwert 1977, Keim Stambaugh 1986, Campbell 1987), consumption-
wealth ratios (cay) (Lettau Ludvigson 2001), or equity share of issuances (Baker 
Wurgler 2000). 
The equity premium can be seen as a type of inverse price on the equity 
market (Gordon 1962).  In understanding time variation of prices, it seems natural 
2 
to look at time-variation of quantities.  As the difference between expected returns 
on high risk versus low risk assets, the equity premium motivates the inspection 
of the quantities associated with high risk versus low risk assets.   
Baker and Wurgler (2000) do exactly this, looking at quantities of equity 
versus debt issued by the corporate sector as a predictor of future equity market 
returns and find positive results.  In particular, the paper finds that when equity 
prices are high, and future expected returns are low, corporations rationally 
respond by issuing a higher ratio of equities versus bonds.  The results of Baker 
and Wurgler (2000) suggest that the corporate sector absorbs and optimizes to the 
demand shocks. 
A natural question to ask is, from where do the demand shocks arise?  One 
sector to examine are households, which might be a source of demand shocks due 
to either behavioral theories like extrapolative beliefs (Greenwood Shleifer 2013) 
or to consumption-CAPM theories like Campbell Cochrane (1999).  Therefore, I 
then look at the household sector’s direct holdings of high risk versus low risk 
assets.   
I draw my data from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, which 
enumerates all the instruments held by the household sector.  I find that the four 
major holdings which compose the vast majority of household direct holdings are 
equities, risky mutual funds, credits, and deposits.  The first two sum up to high 
risk assets and the bottom sum up to low risk assets. 
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Figure 1.1: Household High Risk and Low Risk Assets, 1951-2012. 
High risky (blue) and low risk (red) household holdings are from the Federal Reserve Flow of 
Funds data.  High risk assets are defined as equity held directly or risky mutual funds.  Low risk 
assets include credit instruments and deposits held directly.  All dollars figures are nominal. 
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Figure 1.2: The household risky ratio 1951-2012. 
The household risky ratio, defined as the value of high risk household assets divided by low risk 
household assets from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data.  High risk assets are defined as 
equity held directly or risky mutual funds.  Low risk assets include credit instruments and deposits 
held directly. 
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Table 1.1: Multivariate OLS Regressions for Predicting Excess Returns. 
OLS regressions of one quarter ahead excess returns on the value-weighted CRSP on one period 
lagged multiple predictors: 
𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 denotes the excess return of the value-weighted CRSP for one quarter forward; 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1 denotes the household risky ratio calculated by dividing household high risk assets over 
low risk assets, as collected from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds; 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−5 is the household 
risky ratio lagged one extra year; 𝑆𝑡−1 denotes the equity share in new issues as defined in Baker 
Wurgler (2000); 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 denotes the ten year cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio, defined 
as per Campbell Shiller (1988); 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑡−1 denotes the yield premium of ten year over one month 
federal government obligations; 𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡−1 is the consumption wealth ratio proxy defined by Lettau 
Ludvigson (2001); t-statistics are shown in brackets using Newey-West heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelation robust standard errors with 5 periods of lags.  Regression (8) normalizes all 
predictors to have unit variance (termed here by the word normed), while all other regressions use 
non-normalized predictors.  N=226. 
 
 Predictors  
Not Normalized 
 
Normed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
Intercept           
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1  -2.49 
[-4.16] 
-2.86 
[-2.69] 
-2.52 
[-4.33] 
-3.76 
[-4.20] 
-2.63 
[-3.95] 
-2.21 
[-3.52] 
-2.39 
[-1.97] 
 -1.94 
 [-1.97] 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−5   .32 
[0.27] 
       
𝑆𝑡−1    -10.49 
[-2.13] 
   -7.52 
[-1.16] 
 -.71  
[-1.16] 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡−1     .18 
[1.75] 
  .02 
[0.11] 
 .12  
[0.11] 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑡−1      -.28 
[-0.73] 
 -.31 
[-0.72] 
 -.38  
[-0.72] 
𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡−1       49.42 
[1.51] 
55.94 
[1.24] 
 .95 
[1.24] 
𝑅2 0.054 0.054 0.062 0.060 0.052 0.060 0.060  0.060 
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Table 1.2: Robustness to First and Second Half. 
OLS regressions of one quarter ahead value-weighted CRSP excess returns on one period lagged 
household risky ratio.: 
𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 denotes the excess return on the value-weighted CRSP for one quarter forward; 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1 denotes the household risky ratio calculated by dividing household high risk assets over 
low risk assets, as collected from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds.  The regression period is for 
the first half of the sample, the second half of the sample, and then the entire sample.  t-statistics 
are shown in brackets using Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors with 5 years of lags. N=241 
 
 First Half  Second Half  Entire Sample 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦  -2.94  
[-3.34] 
 -2.15  
[-2.64] 
 -2.49 
[-4.16] 
𝑅2  .066  .038  .054 
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Table 1.3: Construction of the Data. 
OLS regressions of one quarter ahead value weighted CRSP excess returns on one period lagged 
of the household risky ratio, defined in various ways: 
𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 denotes the excess return on CRSP for one quarter forward; 𝑋𝑡−1 denotes various 
household risky ratios calculated by dividing various household high risk assets over various low 
risk assets, as collected from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds.  The numerator may contain 
equities or mutual funds, and the denominator may contain credit markets or deposits.  An X in the 
table below denotes the inclusion of each variable in the definition of 𝑋𝑡 for that regression.  t-
statistics are shown in brackets using Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust 
standard errors with 5 periods of lags. N=241 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝑋𝑡−1  -2.49  
[-4.16] 
-1.21  
[-3.40] 
-1.05  
[-2.97] 
-3.22  
[-3.48] 
-2.34  
[-1.58] 
Numerator has Equities X X  X X 
Numerator has Mutual Fund X  X X X 
Denominator has Credit Market X X X  X 
Denominator has Deposit X X X X  
Adj 𝑅2 .054 .041 .034 .035 .008 
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Table 1.4: Univariate regression under different inference assumptions. 
The univariate regression: 
𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 denotes the excess return of value-weighted CRSP for one quarter forward; 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡 
denotes the household risky ratio calculated by dividing household high risk assets over low risk 
assets, as collected from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds.  The OLS method uses standard 
inferences.  The Newey-West method uses heteroskedastic and autocorrelation corrected standard 
errors with 5 years of lag.  The Kendall (1954) correction is a point estimate adjustment.  The 
Kothari-Shanken inferences use the bootstrap methodology to correct for small sample bias as 
outlined in Stambaugh (1999).  Campbell-Yogo (2006) is a hypothesis test whose implementation 
is outlined in Campbell Yogo (2005).  The Lewellen (2004) provides not an unbiased estimate but 
an upper bound for 𝛽 and the p-value, and a lower-bound for the t-statistic. 
 
 Newey
-West 
 OLS  Kendall 
(1954) 
 Kothari-
Shanken 
 Campbell
-Yogo 
 Lewellen 
Bound 
𝛽 𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡  -2.27  -2.27  -1.79  -1.89    -.92 
95% CI 𝛽 -3.43  -3.55  -3.07  -2.89  -4.32  -1.55 
95% CI ?̅? -1.11  -.993  -0.51  -1.12  -.03  -.29 
t-statistic -3.85  -3.50  -2.75      -2.88 
p value .0001  .0006  .0065  .0040  .0500  .0062 
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I then define the household risky ratio as the ratio between the two: the 
household sector’s direct holdings of high risk assets over the household sector’s 
direct holdings of low risk assets.  I find the household risky ratio is a negative 
predictor future equity premium between 1951 and 2012, which is the full sample 
of available data from the Flow of Funds.  The negative relationship is obvious in 
simple binnings of the predictor variable (Figure 1.1), and persists for years 
beyond the binning date (Figure 1.2).   
In a univariate setting, the predictability is strong: the 𝑅2 is 5% quarterly 
and higher than any single of the following popular predictors: the Campbell 
Shiller (1988) cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio (CAPE), the yield spread, 
the equity share of issues, and the cay (Table 1.1).  The predictive power of the 
household risky ratio is also not subsumed by the above popular predictors: the 
coefficient remains essentially the same in a multivariate regression alongside the 
above predictors (Table 1.2).   
The predictive power of the household risky ratio is robust to a range of 
variations.  It is robust to construction from Flow of Funds data.  Dropping any 
single component of the four mentioned above does not eliminate the predictive 
power (Table 1.3).  Adding boundary components, components that arguably 
could be categorized as either inside or outside household discretionary assets, 
also does not affect the results.  It is robust to subsamples: the coefficient in the 
first half of the sample is almost identical to that of the second half of the sample 
10 
(Table 1.4).  The effect cannot be explained by Modigilani-Miller effects (Section 
5). 
Finally it is robust to the small sample correction of Stambaugh (1999).  
The household risky ratio does experience Stambaugh bias since it has a high 
autocorrelation (quarterly 𝜌= .96) and cross correlation with returns (𝜌 = .86).  
However, correction for Stambaugh bias via the methods of Kendall (1954) and 
Kothari Shanken (1997) show that bias to be limited to about 20% of the effect 
size.  This is confirmed by the Lewellen (2004) bounds test and the Campbell 
Yogo (2006) correction method (Table 1.5).  The magnitude of this 20% drop does 
not change whether the predictor is economically or statistically significant, and is 
less than other popularly accepted predictors like dividend-price ratios. 
I also run overlapping regressions, taking care to address econometric 
issues of such regressions, and show that the household risky ratio has substantial 
long-horizon predictability.  The 𝑅2 is as high as 22% at the one year level and 40% 
at the three year level.  However, for all other regressions I still set the baseline 
prediction-horizon to be equal to the sampling-period of one quarter.  This 
follows in the theory of Harri and Brorsen (2009) and avoids the complicated 
corrections and lack of transparency of overlapping regressions. 
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Table 1.5: Dickey-Fuller GLS Test of Unit Root in the Household risky ratio. 
The table displays the Dickey-Fuller GLS (DF-GLS) test for a unit root in the household risky 
ratio (Panel A) and changes in household risky ratio (Panel B).  The household risky ratio is the 
ratio of household high risk assets over household low risk assets as reported by the Federal 
Reserve Flow of Funds data.  For both the household risky ration and changes in the household 
risky ratio, the table displays for testing 1 lag and 14 lags (the default maximum tested by the Stata 
software used) of the DF-GLS test statistic, along with the 1%, 5%, and 10% hypothesis test cutoff 
values of the test-statistic.  N=228. 
 
Number of 
Lags 
DF-GLS 
Statistic 
Rejected? 1% Critical 
Value 
5% Critical 
Value 
10% Critical 
Value 
 Panel A: Household risky ratio   
14 -1.578 No -3.48 -2.813 -2.534 
1 -2.287 No -3.48 -2.919 -2.630 
 Panel B: Changes in Household risky ratio   
14 -3.243 ** Yes -3.48 -2.811 -2.532 
1 -4.841*** Yes -3.48 -2.922 -2.633 
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Table 1.6: Comparison of the Household risky ratio, Total risky ratio, and Household Bias 
as Return Predictors. 
OLS regressions of one-quarter forward value-weighted CRSP excess returns on multiple 
predictors lagged one quarter: 
𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1) + 𝛽2 ln(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡−1  + 𝛽5𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡−1+ 𝜖𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 denotes the excess return on CRSP for one quarter forward; ln (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1) denotes 
the log household risky ratio calculated by dividing household high risk assets over low risk assets, 
as collected from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds; ln (𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑡−1) denotes the log of 
the household tilt, the quotient between the household risky ratio and total risky ratio as calculated 
by dividing economy-wide high risk assets over economy-wide low risk assets, as collected from 
the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds; 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡−1 is the linear projection of the total 
risky variable above onto CAPE and 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸2; 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡−1 is the residual from the above 
projection; 𝑆𝑡−1 denotes the equity share in new issues as defined in Baker Wurgler (2000); 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡 denotes the ten year cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio, defined as per Campbell-
Shiller (1988); 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑡−1 denotes the yield premium of ten year over one month federal 
government obligations; 𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡 is the consumption wealth ratio proxy defined by Lettau Ludvigson 
(2001).  t-statistics are shown in brackets using Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation 
robust standard errors with 5 periods lags.  N=228. 
 
Panel A: No Covariates 
   No Covariates   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ln (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1)  -6.47 
[-4.12] 
    ln(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑡−1)   -9.26 
[-2.31] 
  -14.44 
[-3.39] 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1     -3.46 
[-1.79] 
 -6.17 
[-3.14] 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1     -7.68 
[-2.39] 
-6.50 
[-2.25] 
𝑆𝑡−1       
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡−1       
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑡−1       
𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡−1       
𝑅2  .0571 .0172 .0113 .0164 .0664 
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Table 1.6 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: With Covariates 
  Covariates   
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) ln (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1)  -6.44 
[-2.11] 
    ln(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑡−1)   -9.49 
[-2.13] 
   
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1     -5.94 
[-2.75] 
  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1     -.13 
[-.03] 
-4.89 
[-1.32] 
𝑆𝑡−1  -7.73 
[-1.20] 
-10.45 
[-1.73] 
-13.50 
[-2.15] 
-11.39 
[-1.62] 
-9.70 
[-1.59] 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡−1  .02 
[.15] 
-.24 
[-2.63] 
 
 
-.20 
[-2.24] 
 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑡−1  -.36 
[-.84] 
-.00 
[.01] 
-.32 
[-.71] 
-.25 
[-.52] 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡−1  53.98 
[1.26] 
70.01 
[1.67] 
96.10 
[2.39] 
94.15 
[2.20] 
 
𝑅2  .0638 .0635 .0568 .0458 .0236 
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This paper then investigates the source of the predictive power of the 
household risky ratio.  The household risky ratio can be seen as the sum of three 
parts.  First define an auxiliary variable called the total risky ratio, the ratio of 
economy-wide high risk assets over economy-wide low risk assets.  Part one is 
then the household tilt, the ratio of the household risky ratio over the total risky 
ratio; it measures how much households tilt towards high risk assets above and 
beyond the rest of the economy.  The household tilt variable is seen to be 
generally orthogonal to known popular predictors (Table 1.6) and hence is novel. 
Parts two and three explain the total risky ratio.  The second part is the valuation 
ratio part of the total risky ratio, and captures the extent to which the total risky 
ratio can be seen as a price of risky assets, and thus a tracker of historical price 
changes.  For example, if the value of high risk assets doubles overnight, the total 
risky ratio also doubles.  The valuation ratio component captures this doubling.  
The valuation ratio part is then defined as the projection of the total risky ratio 
onto the known valuation ratio CAPE. 
The final part must mechanically be what remains from the above.  In 
particular, it is the residual from the above projection of the total risky ratio onto 
the known valuation ratio CAPE.  Since asset classes can only grow though 
capital gains and issuances, and capital gains are captured by CAPE above, the 
residual can be thought of theoretically as the component of the household risky 
ratio that arises from issuances.  In fact, empirically the final part indeed strongly 
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interacts with Baker-Wurgler issuances (Table 1.6).  For these reasons, I term it 
the issuance part.   
These empirical results can be related to the theory of demand systems for 
assets (Brainard and Tobin 1968).  Households can be seen as exogenously 
demanding more risky assets.  This causes the quantity of household high risk 
assets to increase, while at the same time increasing the price of high risk assets 
and decreasing forward returns.  This justifies the observed negative correlation 
between the household risky ratio and forward returns.  The demand system 
model can also be seen in recent work by Baker Wurgler (2000), Baker 
Greenwood Wurgler (2003), and Greenwood Vayanos (2010). 
These empirical results have welfare implications.  Since the household 
sector buys equities when future returns are lower than average, the return 
experienced by households will be less than a constant-ratio standard.  I calculate 
that households receive a Sharpe ratio of .267 from holding risky assets instead 
of .311 under a constant-ratio standard.  Both returns are far below the .533 
Sharpe ratio attainable by perfectly conditioning on predictive variables. 
This seems to be an opportune time to note this dissertation has been 
adapted by concatenating together the master versions of three papers.  Minimal 
formatting and numbering changes have been made to comply with dissertation 
format requirements.  However, textual changes may not have been made.  
Therefore, discrepancies may arise.  For example, what was called a paper or 
article is officially called in this version an essay or chapter.  Similarly, in the 
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paragraph below, Section 2 refers to the subpart labeled by 1.2.  Subsection C of 
Section 2 may likewise be 1.2.3.   This version sacrifices some clarity for format 
compliance, and therefore will not be as clear as the master version optimized 
solely for clarity, which can be requested from the author.  Nevertheless, in terms 
of content this version is nearly identical to the corresponding master copy and 
fully usable for research. 
Section 2 presents the data, definitions, and various constructions of the 
household risky ratio variable.  Section 3 presents the predictive power of the 
variable for the equity premium.  Section 4 decomposes the predictive power of 
the household risky ratio into components.  Section 5 discusses some theory and 
implications of the results.  Section 6 discusses extensions.  Section 7 concludes.   
1.2 Data 
The main data series used to construct the household risky ratio and 
related variables is the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Financial Accounts of the 
United States, or simply the Flow of Funds.  This data series reports quarterly data 
starting the fourth quarter of 1951, and continues to present day with data released 
around 60 days after the end of the quarter.  All data is collected from the Flow of 
Funds using the data download program from the quarterly series (Q series) 
measuring non-seasonally-adjusted levels (FL series).   
The Flow of Funds is organized mainly along two dimensions.  The first 
dimension is the sector, defined as a partitioning of players in the economy.  
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Sectors include households and nonprofit organizations, nonfinancial businesses, 
state and local governments, and soforth (see Figure 1.3).  The second dimension 
is instrument type, which can be seen as a class of assets or liabilities: home 
mortgages (liability), total loans (liability), treasury securities (asset), and security 
credit (asset) are just a few examples.  For both the sector and instrument 
dimension, there are varying levels of aggregation. 
To construct the household risky ratio, the numerator and denominator 
was first separately constructed from data within the household and nonprofit 
organizations sector.  The numerator consists of the sum of equities directly held 
by households (FL153064105.Q) and the risky mutual funds directly held by 
households (FL153064205.Q).  This corresponds roughly to the total amount of 
high risk assets that households hold directly with discretion, defined as assets 
that households can readily and liquidly trade to reflect their preferences and 
beliefs.  The approximation is even better in variation-space instead of levels-
space.  The denominator consists of household directly held credit market 
instruments (FL154000025.Q), and deposits which includes low risk money 
market mutual funds (FL154004005.Q).  This corresponds roughly to the amount 
of low risk assets that households hold directly with discretion. 
The household risky ratio then can be seen as approximately the ratio of 
high risk to low risk assets directly and discretionarily held by households.   Two 
items are to be discussed: what exactly does approximate mean, and what’s the 
significance of assets that are directly and discretionarily held?    
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Figure 1.3: Flow of Funds Excerpt: Size of Sectors. 
The above figure is taken directly from the first three rows of table Z.1 of the March 7, 2013 
publication of the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds.  The rows show the financial assets and 
liabilities of all sectors defined by the Flow of Funds. Within each sector “A” specifies assets and 
“L” specifies liabilities.    
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The approximation is actually quite good.  Within the class of household 
discretionary and direct low risk assets for example, credits and deposits are by 
far the largest instruments.  The next largest instruments like security credit or 
miscellaneous assets compose only less than 5% of credits and deposits, and 
similarly for risky assets.  This is improved even more once one considers that 
approximation in levels is not as important as approximation in variation.  For 
high risk assets even though some local government retirement plans are not 
measured, the variation of the unmeasured portion likely moves with the 
measured portion – which is to say with the same variation as the equities market.  
This robustness and point that the variation is what matters is demonstrated in the 
later discussion of Table 1.4 which shows that predictability barely drops even as 
large parts of the above four components are dropped.  Overall then, the 
approximation of the numerator and denominator to household discretionary and 
direct holdings is quite good. 
The second issue to discuss is why the paper limits to discretionary and 
direct holdings of the household.  In some respects, this is a fundamental issue.  
After all, the entire economy is indirectly controlled by the household sector, so 
even the definition of the household sector by the Flow of Funds assumes some 
boundary.  This paper is simply assuming a narrower boundary.   
The major theoretical reason motivating the limit to discretionary and 
direct holdings is that only assets that are readily and liquidly traded by 
households can be seen to strongly and immediately reflect their preferences and 
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beliefs.  To the extent that the household risky ratio has predictive power through 
capturing preferences and beliefs, this property is essentially.  For example, take 
the largest asset classes not included: real estate, private businesses, and life 
insurance reserves.  The first is moderately illiquid with transaction costs of 6% 
plus time, preparation, and other opportunity costs.  It is also a bundled good that 
reflects preferences for internal space, external location, commute distance, and 
school district.  Thus, sales and purchases of housing might be seen as a much 
noisier measure of household risk preferences then, say, holding the S&P index.  
This is similarly true for private businesses which suffer from heavy adverse 
selection issues in sales.  Life insurance reserves likewise are often managed by a 
portfolio manager and so less effectively measure household preferences. 
The above two points provide theoretical motivation for the construction 
of the household risky ratio variable.  Even without the above two reasons, the 
household risky ratio can be taken at face value as an empirical construct with 
predictive power.  Concerns of data snooping could be allayed by the fact that the 
4.16 t-statistic in univariate regressions corresponds to a Bonferroni correction of 
testing one thousand independent variables, whereas the Fed Flow of funds has 
much fewer, especially independent variables.  Further assurance can be realized 
in the robustness of the ratio to construction (Table 1.4). 
The other primitive variable constructed from the Flow of Funds is the 
total risky ratio, which is the exact analogue series of the household risky ratio but 
for all sectors combined instead of just the household sector.   
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Compared to other broad economic series, the Federal Reserve Flow of 
Funds is minimally affected by look-ahead bias.  Generally the series is release 
quickly after a quarter’s end: around 60 days on average, and almost never 
exceeding a quarter.  Thus, the one quarter lag used in the baseline is more than 
sufficient to account for this.  The Flow of Funds is revised from time to time.  
However, revisions are generally limited to one to two years back, and this paper 
did not find any revisions of the four broad series used to define the household 
risky ratio.   
Figure 1.2 presents the amount of household high risk versus low risk 
assets on a log scale from 1951-2012.  The high risk series, as expected, is more 
variable over time.  The high and low risk series seem to be trending up linearly, 
perhaps each following a first order autoregressive process with unit root and drift.  
The two series looks co-integrated, which is justifiable by theory: in the long run 
they might be expected to be growing at the same rate as the entire economy. 
Figure 1.2 shows the household risky ratio, the first series above divided by 
the second series.  Peaks and trends in this series are apparent.  The ratio slowly 
but steadily climbs from 1951 to about 1969, which might signify a trend where 
equities began to be seen as less a speculative asset from the aftermath of the 
great depression, into an asset that everyone could own.  As will be discussed 
later, the rise in price may have caused an increase in quantity if households have 
extrapolative beliefs, and the two effects reinforced each other.  
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Households then experienced two large price drops in 1970 and 1974, 
causing them to be more cautious about stocks for many decades ahead, up until 
the mid-90s.  It is exactly during this time that equities saw their highest returns.  
In the late 90s, as the Internet bubble got underway, households against started 
shifting into high risk assets, again to see significant wealth loss as the bubble 
burst. 
Other data sources have been compiled from sources as standard as 
possible.  The ten-year cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio (CAPE) is 
calculated as per Campbell Shiller (1988), and the data is collected from Robert 
Shiller’s website.  CAY is defined and supplied by Lettau Ludvigson (2001).  
Equity shares of issuances is from Baker Wurgler (2000).  Total stock market 
returns is the value-weighted series from CRSP.  The long rate is the GS10 rate 
collected from Robert Shiller’s website.  The short rate is the 1-month treasury 
bill rate provided by Ibbotson and Associates, Inc. and provided on Kenneth 
French’s website.  The equity premium is calculated as the difference between the 
stock market returns minus the short rate expressed in percentage points.  The 
yield spread is calculated as the difference between long rates and short rates.   
1.3 Predictive Power 
This section outlines the predictive power of the household risky ratio.  It begins 
with informal graphical analyses and then formalizes these analyses through 
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regressions.  Finally, this section checks robustness through multivariate 
regressions and additional tests. 
1.3.1 Baseline Predictive Power  
Figure 1.4 shows 1-year and 3-year value-weighted CRSP forward equity 
premia sorted by the lowest to highest quintile of the household risky ratio 
variable.  The drop in equity premia from the highest to lowest quintile is 
generally monotonic, demonstrating a somewhat continuous relationship between 
the two variables.  The magnitude of the effect is larger for 3-years, which is not 
surprising given the persistence of the household risky ratio predictor variable.   
Figure 1.5 shows forward annual risk premia with respect to the lowest, 
middle, and highest tercile of household risky ratio.  Note that there is no 
relationship between the terciles and returns before the tercile formation time.  
For the first 9 years, the lowest tercile has significantly greater returns than then 
highest tercile.   The years of predictability seems to accumulate most at the 
beginning but persist for many years.  One clear explanation for this is simply the 
fact that the predictor variable is quite persistent, so predictability a few years out 
can simply reflect this persistence.  In this way Figure 1.5 can also be seen as a 
cross correlogram between returns and the household risky ratio. 
At a glance, it seems clear that there is some negative relationship between 
the household risky ratio and forward returns.  The relationship seems to persist 
for quite a number of years afterwards.  
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Figure 1.4: Mean 1 and 3 year forward returns by household risky ratio, 1951-2012. 
Mean 1-year forward (red) and 3-year forward (blue) value-weighted CRSP excess return by 
quintile of household risky ratio.  The risky-ratio variable (228 observations) were ranked and then 
binned into quintiles.  Quintile 1 below contains the lowest fifth of the value of household risky 
ratios, and quintile 5 contains the highest fifth.  Then the excess return for the next 1 and 3 years 
on the value-weighted CRSP is calculated and plotted. 
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Figure 1.5: Mean past and future annual equity returns from t-2 to t+12 by household risky 
ratio. 
Each quarter is binned by terciles of household risky ratio – low (red), medium (grey), and high 
(green).  Annual excess valued-weighted CRSP returns from 2-years past (t-2) to 12 years in the 
future (t+12) for each bin are plotted in the bar chart below.   
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1.3.2 Univariate Regressions 
I next show the power of the household risky ratio predictor in a univariate 
regression setting.  I predict one-quarter forward returns using a variety of 
predictors.  All predictors are lagged one quarter, leaving a one quarter minimum 
gap between the measurement time of the predictors and the start of the return 
period predicted.  As standard in the literature, this gap ensures that the prediction 
is completely in the future period, and that the conditioning data is available for 
practitioners.  This is especially important because some predictors like the 
household risky ratio and the Shiller CAPE contain equity prices; common noise 
in equity price measurement would enter on both sides of the regression and 
swamp the magnitude of return predictability. 
The general regression framework for return predictions following the 
discussion above is then 
𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 
Table 1.7 shows the results of this regression against a set of regressors.  First, 
notice that the household risky ratio without additional lags is highly significant 
with a t-statistic of 4.16.  As a univariate regression, the significance of this 
statistic under these relatively transparent settings is very high.  Even more 
transparently, consider that the adjusted 𝑅2 at .054 and the correlation is 0.232.  
These figures are all substantially higher than almost all popular predictors in the 
literature.    
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Table 1.7: Univariate OLS regressions for predicting five-year-ahead market returns. 
One-quarter ahead valued-weighted CRSP excess returns are regressed on a variety of predictors: 
𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 denotes the excess returns on the value-weighted CRSP for one quarter ahead and 
𝑋𝑡−1 variously denotes the household risky ratio, defined as household high risk assets divided by 
household low risk assets; the household risky ratio lagged an extra quarter; the household risky 
ratio lagged an extra year; equity shares of issues (Baker Wurgler 2000); Campbell Shiller (1988) 
10-year cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio (CAPE); the 10-year 1-month government 
obligation yield spread; and the consumption-wealth proxy CAY (Lettau Ludvigson 2001).  t-
statistics are heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust (Newey-West) with 5 periods of lag.   
      
Predictor 𝛽 𝑡(𝛽) 𝛼 𝑡(𝑎) 𝑅2 
Household risky ratio -2.49  [-4.16] 8.05  [5.42] .054 
Household risky ratio (lagged extra quarter) -2.40  [-4.35] 7.84  [5.79] .050 
Household risky ratio (lagged extra year) -1.94  [-2.94] 6.72  [4.20] .032 
Baker-Wurgler Equity Share -7.32 [-1.34] 3.02  [2.83] .003 
Campbell-Shiller CAPE -.13  [-1.68] 4.36  [2.81] .011 
Term Spread .32  [0.87] 1.08  [0.99] .000 
Lettau-Ludvigson CAY  79.73 [2.51] 1.82  [3.49] .022 
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To examine the degree of predictability at different points in time, Table 
1.7 includes results for the household risky ratio at one quarter and one year of 
additional lag.  The coefficient noticeably decays from -2.49 to -2.40 to -1.94, but 
magnitude of the predictor even at an additional year out is only 22% less than 
originally.  The t-statistics and 𝑅2 also remain highly significant but noticeably 
decay.  As will be seen later, this is largely caused by persistence in the household 
risky ratio, and not the independent ability of different lags of the household risky 
ratio at predicting future returns.  
The next few rows of Table 1.7 examine the univariate regressions of other 
popular predictors of future equity premium.  The paper chose four of the most 
popular variables in the literature as benchmarks, following Campbell Thompson 
(2008): the equity share of issues from Baker Wurgler (2000), the Shiller 10-year 
cyclically adjusted PE (CAPE) from Campbell Shiller (1988), the 10 year minus 1 
month yield spread, and the cay proxy for consumption/wealth by Lettau 
Ludvigson (2001).   
The coefficients for all these four other predictors are significantly less 
than that for the household risky ratio.  The Lettau-Ludvigson cay is most 
significant with a t-statistic of 2.51 and an 𝑅2 of .022.  In second is CAPE with a 
t-statistic of 1.68 which is marginally significant.  The lower significance of 
CAPE in these regressions compared to the literature can mainly be attributed to 
the shorter data series.  For example, one of the most convincing works for the 
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predictive power of CAPE is Campbell Shiller (1988) which uses data back to 
1871 versus this paper’s 1951, and a specialty of Robert Shiller’s research is 
general marshaling past data to gain higher significance. 
The equity-share of issuance then has a t-statistic of around 1.34.  There 
are quite a few differences between this analysis and Baker Wurgler (2000) that 
may give rise to lower significance.  Baker Wurgler (2000) note their effect has 
most significance and their test logically has most power in equal-weighted CRSP, 
while this paper uses the value-weighted CRSP equity premium.  Baker Wurgler 
(2000) also uses different prediction periods from this paper, with predicted 
periods of one-year.  The significance does increase if the duration of the issuance 
is increased from one quarter to four quarters.  Finally, the time period matters 
again: the regressions in this paper are from beginning of the Flow of Fund data 
(1951) forward whereas Baker Wurgler (2000) used data from 1929.  The yield 
spread in this analysis barely has univariate predictability at all. 
Overall the result of this analysis is that the household risky ratio is a powerful 
predictor of future equity premium.  This is not only the case in Table 1.7 which 
compares four popular variables under this setting, but also by direct examination 
of t-statistics and 𝑅2 of the household risky ratio predictor, and comparing against 
analogous values across a wide variety of popular predictors in the setting of their 
seminal papers.  
1.3.3 Default Inferences for Regressions 
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This subsection discusses and justifies the inference assumptions used by 
default for the regressions above and the rest of the paper.  In particular, it 
discusses the focus on the one-quarter prediction horizon, as well as the choice to 
use Newey-West standard errors with five periods of lag. 
By default in this entire paper, the prediction period is chosen to be one 
quarter due to that being the unit of observation in the Federal Reserve Flow of 
Funds.  The later section on long-term predictions discusses more in depth the 
results of different periods of predictions, and econometric implications of having 
a prediction period that is longer than the data period.  As a general preview, the 
results are more or less the same with quarter returns, one year returns, or three 
year returns, but the one quarter returns are most natural and least dependent on 
model corrections. 
Also by default in this entire paper, regressions are done with Newey-
West with five periods of lags for robustness.  The Newey-West procedure 
encompasses the Eicker Huber White (EHW) heteroskedastic robust error 
correction (White 1980).  The household risky ratio regression is not especially 
hetereoskedastic, but inferences are often affected 10% or more using the EHW 
method.  Often the EHW standard errors are less than OLS due to return variance 
being concentrated near the center of the predictor.   
Newey-West also additionally takes into account time series correlation of 
error terms assuming a triangle (Bartlett) kernel for time series correlation 
structure.  The household risky ratio predictor has somewhat autocorrelated errors, 
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and inferences are often affected 40% or more using Newey-West procedures 
instead of EHW.  Often the Newey-West standard errors are less than EHW due 
to negative residual correlation.  The negative residual correlation can be verified 
by adding lagged returns in the household risky ratio regression.  However, the 
paper does not put lags into the baseline specification because the negative 
correlation is weak.  In a sample regression with ten lags, only one coefficient 
exceeds 1.5 and none are significant at the 5% Bonferroni-corrected level. 
The lag period was chosen using the procedure suggested by Newey 
(1993), and set at 3
4
𝑇
1
3 ≈ 5, with T=240.  In reality lags between one and ten 
periods generate almost the same result everywhere.  While the paper does not 
show simple EHW standard errors or OLS standard errors, neither of these two 
less-robust alternate procedures generate a univariate t-statistic of less than 3.5 for 
the household risky ratio.  More generally, econometric surveys (Harri Brorsen 
2009) have shown that Newey-West corrects many substantially critical errors, 
and almost never give estimates substantially worse than other estimators in the 
space of heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust estimators or less, including 
EHW and OLS.  For both general and situation specific reasons this paper then 
universally uses Newey-West with five periods of lag as default. 
1.3.4 Multivariate Regressions. 
The univariate regressions are useful in examining the prediction power of 
each variable, as well as cross comparisons.  However, to more fully understand 
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the structure of the household risky ratio, the source of interactions with other 
variables, the source of the prediction power, it is imperative to examine 
multivariate regressions in Table 1.1.  As above, the paper uses a one-quarter 
prediction period with a one period lag for the prediction, and Newey-West 
standard errors with 5 lags by default.  
Table 1.1 begins its multivariate regression by regressing returns on 
household risky ratio and one year of additional lag.  This regression gives insight 
into the time series structure of the predictability of household risky ratio.  Do 
lags of household risky ratio have independent predictive power for future returns, 
as is the case for cay?  This might arise if there is period-specific noise in 
measurement of the household risky ratio.  Do the two lags knock each other out, 
as might be expected if the predictability of the household risky ratio is due to low 
frequency components?  Looking at Figure 1.2 it might be tempting to suspect that 
predictability is driven completely by a few periods in which the household risky 
ratio was particularly high or low.  Also, this regression lets us see whether it’s 
the level of household risky ratio or its change that matters more, and whether 
longer lags might have more predictive power for some reason. 
Looking at Table 1.1 regression (2), and comparing against the univariate 
regression (1), a few things stand out.  First, the coefficient on the household risky 
ratio is near identical, going from -2.49 to -2.86.  However, the t-statistic drops 
significantly from 4.16 to 2.69.  Second, the coefficient on the one-year-lagged 
household risky ratio is near zero, with a t-statistic of 0.27.  That the t-statistics 
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are lower in regression (2) does suggest that household risky ratio and lagged 
household risky ratio knock each other out somewhat.  Some portion of the 
predictability then can be due to a low frequency component of the household 
risky ratio.  However, the significance of the leading household risky ratio term 
and its being equal to the univariate coefficient suggests that high frequency 
changes on the order of less than a year matter, and have the same effect on future 
returns as low-frequency changes.  The high frequency variation in the household 
risky ratio is not simply noise.   
The 𝑅2 of regression (1) compared to (2) is the same, in line with the fact 
that the marginal t-statistic of the one-year-lagged household risky ratio is near 
zero.  Adding an extra term does not increase predictability, so there is no 
independent prediction power by lags.  (This is verified but not shown with other 
periods of lags).  In a Markov-chain sense, the most recent household risky ratio 
could be seen as a state variable or a sufficient statistic for the household risky 
ratio process.  This also means it is assuredly the level of household risky ratio 
that matters, versus changes, in contrast to other predictors like the equity shares 
of issuance (Baker Wurgler 2000). 
The next regressions run in Table 1.1, regressions (3) through (6), examine 
bivariate regressions of the household risky ratio against various other predictors 
commonly used to forecast equity premia.  The paper looks to see if any 
predictors knock the other out – a sign that one predictor is subsumed by the other 
34 
better, less noisier, predictor.  To the extent both predictors still maintain size and 
significance, it is a sign that the two predictors have somewhat independent 
predictability. 
Regression (3) looks at the household risky ratio versus the equity share of 
issuances.  These two variables have some relationship because companies 
issuing equity versus debt should be expected to mechanically increase or 
decrease the household risky ratio over time.  Also, in the next section it will be 
seen that one component of the household risky ratio can be thought of as 
issuances.  Some confounds might be expected, but instead the comparison of 
regression (3) against the univarate regressions show that significance and 
magnitude of both regressors increases slightly.   
The household risky ratio coefficient increases from -2.49 to -2.52, 
significance increasing from -4.16 to -4.33.  The equity share of issues increases 
much more from -7.32 (t-statistic of -1.34) to -10.49 (t-statistic of -2.13).  The 
adjusted 𝑅2 also increases from .054 and .003 in the univariate regression to .062 
together.  This suggests not only that the two predictors have independent 
predictive power, but also that the prediction is strengthened when the two are put 
together.  This might occur if companies issue stock for two reasons: one is a 
mechanical response to the demand side of the economy, captured by the 
household risky ratio; another could be CFOs knowing to market time beyond 
demand signals.  
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Regression (4) looks at the bivariate regression of the household risky 
ratio against the Campbell-Shiller CAPE.  One immediately notes that the 
coefficient on the household risky ratio actually becomes significantly higher in 
magnitude, jumping from -2.49 to -3.76.  The coefficient on CAPE is also 
significant but now in the opposite direction: moving from -.13 to .18.  This 
shows that not only is the household risky ratio not subsumed by the popular 
valuation ratio predictor CAPE, but that it actually may be a better valuation ratio 
than CAPE.  Another interpretation might be that the household risky ratio 
captures more predictive components than CAPE, causing CAPE to act as a 
negative control.  The decomposition of the household risky ratio in the next 
section lends some credence to this idea.   
Campbell-Shiller (1988a) gives an accounting relationship between PE 
ratios, earnings growth, and expected returns.  Given this opposite response in 
CAPE along with the household risky ratio, it may be interesting to see whether 
CAPE along with the household risky ratio can finally predict earnings changes. 
Regression (5) runs the household risky ratio against the term spread.  
Neither variables are affected significantly.  The term spread is not particularly 
significant, having both univariate and bivariate t-statistics of less than one.  This 
seems consistent with a story in which the term spread is not a particularly 
powerful variable.  Regression (6) runs the household risky ratio with cay.  Both 
variables are reduced somewhat in magnitude and significance.  The bivariate 𝑅2 
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is also somewhat less that the summed 𝑅2, showing that two variables are picking 
up on some common predictability.  This is not surprising given Lettau Ludvigson 
(2001) theory of cay being a consumption wealth valuation ratio.   
Regression (7) uses all variables and covariates, except the lagged 
household risky ratio which was seen before to be near collinear with the 
household risky ratio itself.  Because many of the popular predictors tend to be 
different variations on each other, the significance and size of predictability is 
generally less than in the bivariate and univariate regressions.  This is true of the 
household risky ratio as well.  But what is striking is that the household risky ratio 
variable is still quite significant (p<.05).  Also, across all the regressions from (1) 
through (7), the magnitude of the coefficient on the household risky ratio is more 
or less the same at around -2.5.   
This remarkable consistency across the bivariate and multivariate 
regressions show that the household risky ratio is not subsumed by other popular 
predictors, or even the space spanned by other popular predictors.  Finally 
regression (8) standardizes each predictor to have unit variance.  The coefficients 
then are identically proportional to the square of the correlation and square root of 
𝑅2, and give a sense of the strength of each predictor on the same scale. 
The two main takeaways from Table 1.1 is both the empirical robustness of 
the household risky ratio as a predictor, and the point that there is something 
novel about the household risky ratio.  Further evidence will be given below that 
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there is particular significance to the household portion of the household risky 
ratio. 
1.3.5 Robustness 
One concern in regressions over large timespans is parameter stability.  
How much of the predictability at persists from the start of the sample to the end 
of the sample?  Alternately, is predictability completely isolated to one portion of 
the sample, or even worse, a few years?  If the household risky ratio process or 
the returns process has underlying long persistence, then normal inferences could 
be incorrect.  All of the above issues can be heuristically addressed by doing a 
split regression on the first and second half of the data (Table 1.2).  Such a 
procedure is model free, and while not the most powerful, provides a clear glance 
at whether the predictive power is stable.  The paper finds that the lineup between 
the first and second half of the sample is remarkable: the coefficients are quite 
close: -2.94 versus -2.15.  This gives evidence that the result isn’t driven just by a 
few years, and the inferences are not spuriously caused by persistence. 
There may be concern over what exactly is classified as components of the 
numerator and denominator of the household risky ratio.  In particular, there 
might be concerns that one component is the main driver of the result, and so the 
household risky ratio is not robust to definition.  As categorized by the Flow of 
Funds, there are four major categories in the paper’s definition of the household 
risky ratio.  The high risk component is composed of equities and mutual funds.  
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The low risk portion consists of credit market securities and deposits.  Table 1.3 
uses a jackknife-like methodology to test robustness of the household risky ratio.  
The paper runs regressions removing one component at a time, and sees whether 
predictability drops.  It seems that predictability remains in almost all case.  The t-
statistics generally remain significant, and the coefficient varies from -1.21 to -
3.22.  The robustness of regressions to removing components shows that the 
household risky ratio is robust to definition. 
1.3.6 Small Sample Bias of Stambaugh (1999) 
Stambaugh (1999) and Nelson and Kim (1993) note that in regressions in 
which predictors 𝑋𝑡 are autocorrelated, there is a possibility for a small sample 
bias.  In particular, using notation of Kothari Shanken (1997), suppose returns 
𝑟𝑡+1 is being predicted with a univariate autocorrelated variable 𝑥𝑡.
1 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡+1 (1) 
𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝛾 + 𝜙𝑥𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡+1 (2) 
Correlations between in the error term 𝑢𝑡+1 and 𝑣𝑡+1 will cause a small 
sample bias.  In the language of Lewellen (2004), the source of this bias is the 
well-known downward bias of OLS in estimating (2) equation for positive 𝜙, in 
particular 𝐸�𝜙�𝑂𝐿𝑆 − 𝜙� < 0.  This transmits over to 𝛽 in through the correlation.  
In particular: 
                                                     
1 The theory of Stambaugh bias is naturally presented without a one period gap between the 
predictors and predicted.  This does not pose a problem for us as we simply define 𝑥𝑡 ∶= 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1 
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?̂? = 𝛽 + (𝑥′𝑥)−1𝑥′𝑢  
𝜙� = 𝜙 + (𝑥′𝑥)−1𝑥′𝑣 
Which translates into, as Stambaugh (1999) notes, defining 𝛾 ≔ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑢,𝑣)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣)   
𝐸�?̂? − 𝛽� = 𝛾𝐸�𝜙� − 𝜙� ≠ 0 
Since the household risky ratio does include a significant price component, 
it is very close to the original canonical example used by Stambaugh (1999) to 
demonstrate the bias.  In particular, the predictor is quite autocorrelated with 
𝜙�𝑂𝐿𝑆 =  .956.  The error terms are of (1) and (2) are also notably correlated at 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟�(𝑢, 𝑣) = .869.   All correlations are taken at the one-quarter level.   
This paper corrects for the error below using a few methodologies: 
Kendall (1954), Kothari and Shanken (1997), and a more recent approach by 
Campbell and Yogo (2006).  The correction shows that the household risky ratio 
is indeed subject to small sample bias about 20% of the magnitude of the 
coefficient.  This bias is not enough to affect qualitatively the results in the paper, 
especially many of the baseline t-statistics are above 3 or 4.  The paper follows 
the literature and does not by default correct for Stambaugh bias in order to 
maintain regressions that are multivariate, heteroskedastic and autocorrelation 
consistent, and standardized to well-known methodologies.  However, it is 
important to keep this relative magnitude of 20% in mind when reading other 
tables, which affects not only the household risky ratio, but other popular price 
predictors that have a valuation ratio component like CAPE. 
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The first correction is a point-estimate correction suggested by Kendall 
(1954), who notes that analytically the bias in 𝜙,   𝐸�𝜙� − 𝜙�  ≈  1+𝑇𝜙�
𝑇−3
 which holds 
generally for T>50 as in this case, giving a value of -0.01598.  Then,   𝐸�?̂? −
𝛽� = 𝛾𝐸�𝜙� − 𝜙� ≈ 𝑐𝑜𝑣� (𝑢,𝑣)
𝑣𝑎𝑟� (𝑣) �− 1+3𝜙�𝑇 �  again for T>50 can be estimated, in this 
case 30.00 x -.01598 = -.479.  Thus the Kendall correction reduces the OLS 
estimate of 𝛽 from -2.27 to -1.79, a move of about 21.1%.  The Kendall method 
does not change the standard errors, leading to a t-statistic of 2.75 and p-value 
of .0065.  The reduction in significance comes solely from the move in the point 
estimate. 
Kothari-Shanken (1997) extends the Kendall (1954) method through 
bootstrap re-estimation of the standard errors.  In particular, Kothari-Shanken 
simulates the data series by taking the Kendall-adjusted values for 𝜙,𝛽  and 
drawing error terms 𝑢, 𝑣.  For each bootstrapped series, a beta is estimated.  The 
distribution of bootstrapped betas then simulates the sampling distribution of 𝛽 
and lets us do inferences.  The process results in a p-value of 0.004. 
The Kothari-Shaken methodology does not generate wider confidence 
intervals from the OLS ones.  In fact, the confidence interval is actually lower 
than OLS due to the same reason mentioned previously of EHW standard errors 
being less than OLS: the middle of the predicted variable has more residual 
variance than the edges.  Like the Kendall methodology the loss in t-statistic 
comes mostly from the point estimate moving closer to zero versus the standard 
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error increasing.  The Stambaugh bias again is about 20% of the OLS coefficient 
magnitude. 
Campbell and Yogo (2006) propose a different Stambaugh bias correction 
methodology, motivated by the fundamentals of statistical hypothesis testing.  The 
idea behind Campbell Yogo, in relation to its use in this paper, is as follows.  First, 
Campbell and Yogo arrive at an intuitively powerful and rigorous Q-test that 
accounts for Stambaugh bias.  The Q-test depends on knowing 𝜙 above, which in 
reality must be estimated rendering the original test infeasible.  Campbell Yogo 
cleverly patch this problem by using the Bonferroni procedure to merge the 
infeasible Q-test with an estimate of 𝜙 through the DF-GLS estimator. 
The rationale for the Q-test is as follows.  Suppose the autocorrelation 𝜙 
of the predictor 𝑥𝑡 was known beforehand.  The Neyman-Pearson lemma 
proposes a likelihood ratio test (LRT) as the most powerful test for hypothesis of 
𝛽 = 𝛽0 vs 𝛽 = 𝛽1.  The LRT can be conditioned on an ancillary statistic and be 
considered inside the space of invariant tests, tests that do not change in response 
to invariant changes to 𝑥𝑡 or 𝑟𝑡+1.  Then this LRT is also uniformly most powerful 
(UMP) for 𝛽 inside the above space of tests.  Call this UMP test statistic the Q-
statistic, which can be estimated easily in an OLS regression setting.   The test 
based on cutoffs of the Q-statistic is the Q-test. 
Kendall provides an intuitive first order estimate of the Stambaugh bias 
and Kothari Shanken (1997) provide intuitive first order inference corrections.  
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Neither however have foundations in rigorous statistical testing, which is what is 
provided by Campbell Yogo (2006).  Further, the construction procedure of the 
Campbell Yogo (2006) is designed towards ensuring high power while being 
rigorous.  As such, this paper considers the Campbell-Yogo correction to be the 
gold standard for comparison. 
The test is implemented via Campbell Yogo (2005).  The DF-GLS statistic 
on the household risky ratio with one period if lag is calculated at -2.287 (Table 
1.4), corresponding to a 97.5% confidence interval for c of [-21.87, 1.47] from 
Table 1 of Campbell Yogo (2005).  This leads to a 97.5% CI over phi of [.910, 
1.006].  This leads to point estimates of ?̂?(𝜙) of -3.65 and -.76 respectively.  For 
each of the two above point estimate, this paper takes another 97.5% confidence 
interval around the estimates to arrive at a 95% Bonferroni estimate for 𝛽: [-4.32, 
-.03].  An approximate 90% CI would then be [-4.06, -.30].   
As noted in Campbell, due to the Bonferroni methodology, the actual 
confidence interval coverage is guaranteed to be 95% or above.  Thus, the 
estimation above is conservative.  Even with the most conservative methodology, 
it is seen that the household risky ratio is still significant.  As a baseline, 
Campbell Yogo (2006) calculate 90% confidence intervals for D/P, E/P, T-bill 
rate, and Yield spread, and find many of their variables have 90% confidence 
intervals that cross 0, and almost all are very close to 0 with respect to the length 
of the confidence interval.  It seems likely that if 95% confidence intervals were 
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calculated, all of the other above univariate predictors would cross zero.  Keep in 
mind that much of the Campbell Yogo (2006) data set extends back to 1926 or 
even 1880.  With this as a baseline, the [-4.32,-.03] confidence interval is 
remarkably strong for the household risky ratio.   
Finally, to verify significance, this paper does one last check in the style of 
Lewellen (2004).  It seems reasonable to assume that the household risky ratio is 
not an explosive process.  Looking at Figure 1.2, the household risky ratio looks 
likely even stationary as household high risk assets and low risk assets ought to be 
cointegrated with the size of the economy.  Although it is possible it has a unit 
root, it makes little sense for the household risky ratio to be explosive.  Assuming 
𝜙 ≤ 1, the first step to re-run is the Campbell Yogo (2006) bounds.  No longer is 
the 97.5% confidence interval for 𝜙 [.910, 1.006], but rather it is instead [.910,1].  
This leads to a 95% confidence interval for 𝛽 of [-4.06,-0.217]. 
Following Lewellen (2004) more directly, consider again 𝐸�?̂? − 𝛽� =
𝛾𝐸�𝜙� − 𝜙�.  Rearranging this leads to the estimator that eliminates the bias: 
?̂?𝑎𝑑𝑗 = ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆 − 𝛾(𝜙� − 𝜙).  Assuming the largest correction possible (being overly 
conservative) under the above assumptions sets 𝜙 = 1, yielding ?̂?𝑎𝑑𝑗 = −.92.  
This is significantly less than the OLS estimate or any other estimates really 
because it is a lower bound in magnitude.  The advantage of the Lewellen method 
is that the standard errors are much reduced, from .65 in OLS to .32 here.  This 
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yields a much smaller relative confidence interval than Campbell Yogo (2006) 
and gives a larger t-statistic of 2.88. 
The Lewellen (2004) method does not provide any unbiased point 
estimates of 𝛽, but as an advantage, it does have more rigorous foundations than 
Kendall (1954) or Kothari Shanken (1997), and since the process studied here has 
an autoregressive root close to unity, it is more powerful than Campbell Yogo 
(2006). 
1.3.7 Persistence and Long-Horizon Predictions  
Table 1.5 analyzes the persistence properties of the household risky ratio 
predictor.  The analysis of this is similar to that of the persistence of D/P.  From a 
theoretical perspective, the household risky ratio should not have a unit root: as 
the economy expands it seems that the fraction of high risk assets versus low risk 
assets ought to vary around some constant.  There certainly is no theoretical 
reason to believe it has a greater-than-unit root: no model seems to justify an 
explosive process.  From an empirical perspective, if it is believed that expected 
excess returns do not have a unit root, then it makes no sense to predict it with a 
series with a unit root.  Table 1.5 Panel A shows the DF-GLS test on the 
household risky ratio: while a unit root cannot be ruled out, this may be due to the 
power of the test with only 240 quarters as input.  Table 1.5 Panel B shows the 
DF-GLS test on changes of household risky ratio: a unit root is clearly rejected.  
Thus, the household risky ratio is shown to be integrated maximally of order one. 
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In this paper, the predictive regressions are generally run on one-quarter 
forward returns, which also is the frequency of the data as provided by the Federal 
Reserve flow of funds.  The literature often considers longer-horizon returns 
(Baker Wurgler 2000, Campbell Shiller 1988) to increase the 𝑅2 of the regression 
as well as to demonstrate the predictive properties over the long term.  This 
section runs longer-dated returns using the household risky ratio and discusses the 
longer-dated results in the context of econometric theory. 
A main advantage of long-horizon returns is that the coefficients estimated 
are directly interpretable as the long-term impact of the predictor variable.  If the 
exact estimate of interest is the size of the one-year or three-year return as a result 
of a fixed change in the household risky ratio, then the most natural regression to 
run would be a long-horizon regression.   
Another purported reason for using overlapping regressions is the higher 
𝑅2 of the regressions.  However, especially for persistent predictors, the 
𝑅2 increase is mechanical.  Valkanov (2003), Hjalmarsson (2006), and Boudoukh 
et al (2008) show that increasing the prediction period does not increase the 
power of tests.  In fact, in monte-carlo simulations, the estimated coefficients of 
one period disaggregated returns and N-period aggregated returns are often 
correlated by .99 or more.   
Other reasons often cited for using overlapping regressors include errors in 
the predictor variable (Cochrane Piazzesi 2005), missing observations, and higher 
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prediction accuracy.  However, Harri and Brorsen (2009) show that for a vast 
majority of statistical reasons given for using overlapping regressions, better 
statistical predictors are possible.  They also show that the usual inference 
correction methods for overlapping regressions are quite problematic, which is 
borne out in this paper in Table 1.8.   
Turning to this paper’s specific results, in Table 1.8, regressions (1) and (2) 
report disaggregated returns, returns with one-quarter prediction periods, 
replicating the univariate and multivariate results from before.  Regressions (3), 
(4), and (5) run OLS no overlap (OLSNO) regressions with prediction horizons of 
one year or three years.  OLSNO represents the process in which intermediate 
observations are dropped and OLS inferences are used.  OLSNO is not perfectly 
efficient due to the dropped observations, but it preserves the validity of the 
inferences. 
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Table 1.8: Long Horizon Regressions. 
OLS regressions of k-period ahead value-weighted CRSP excess returns on multiple predictors 
lagged one quarter: 
𝑅𝑡,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑡,𝑡+𝑘 denotes the excess return of the CRSP value-weighted holding return for k quarters 
forward as reported by CRSP; 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1 denotes the household risky ratio calculated by dividing 
household high risk assets over low risk assets, as collected from the Federal Reserve Flow of 
Funds; 𝑆𝑡−1 denotes the equity share in new issues as defined in Baker Wurgler (2000); 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 
denotes the ten year cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio, defined as per Campbell Shiller 
(1988); 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑡−1 denotes the yield premium of ten year over one month federal government 
obligations; 𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡−1 is the consumption wealth ratio proxy defined by Lettau Ludvigson (2001).   
Regressions are divided into three categories.  For Disaggregated Returns, the prediction period k 
is always one quarter and so by construction there is both no overlap and no data dropped.  t-
statistics are shown in brackets using Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust 
standard errors with 5 periods of lags.  For OLS No Overlap, the prediction period k is always 
ranges between one year (k=4) and three years (k=12).  There is no overlap but data is dropped.  t-
statistics are shown in brackets using Eicker-Huber-White standard errors.  For Overlap Corrected 
via Newey-West, there is no data dropped but overlap.  t-statistics are calculated by Newey-West 
standard errors with 4+k periods of lags, a generalization of the number of lags used in the 
Disaggregated Returns method. 
 
 Disaggregated 
Returns 
 OLS No Overlap – 
Intermediate Data Dropped 
 Overlap Corrected via  
Newey-West 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Period  1-Qtr 1-Qtr  1-Year 3-Year 1-Year  1-Year 3-Year 1-Year 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡  -2.49 
[-4.16] 
-2.39 
[-1.97] 
 -10.22  
[-4.31] 
-23.93   
[-3.36] 
-8.58 
[-1.48] 
 -9.21   
[-4.84] 
-18.42   
[-5.91] 
-9.25   
[-2.40] 
𝑆𝑡   -7.52 
[-1.16] 
   -29.75  
[-1.03]   
   -26.76    
[-1.69] 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡   .02 
[0.11] 
   -.22  
[-.39]   
   .07 
[0.17]   
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑡   -.31 
[-0.72] 
   -1.74  
[-1.05]    
   -.44    
[1.06] 
𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡   55.94 
[1.24] 
   265.62 
[1.33]  
   153.04 
[1.08] 
𝑅2  0.054 0.060  0.223 0.401 0.031  0.192 0.365 0.236 
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Regressions (3) runs a prediction with a one-year horizon.  The coefficient 
and 𝑅2 is exactly four times that of the quarterly regression.  However, note that 
the power of the regression in terms of t-statistic does not increase, in line with 
the theory of Harri and Brorsen (2009).  Similarly, regression (4), which predicts 
a three-year horizon has about double the coefficient and 𝑅2 as regression (3), has 
slightly lower t-statistics.  That the coefficient and 𝑅2 does not triple, and that the 
power goes down, is all indicative of the fact that the horizon of the prediction 
power does start breaking down sometime between one and three years.  Three 
years is also sufficient to see substantial decay in the persistence in the household 
risky ratio predictor. 
Regression (5) runs a one-year-horizon multivariate regression.  As 
expected from theory, the coefficients and 𝑅2 of the one-year regression is about 
four times the one-quarter numbers.  The loss in efficiency from the dropped 
observations is also clearer here as the power tends to be somewhat lower. 
Regressions (6), (7), and (8) replicate regressions (3), (4), and (5) 
respectively, except instead of dropping intermediate observations and using OLS, 
it uses Newey-West regressions with 4+k periods of lag, where k is the horizon of 
the prediction expressed in quarters.  The coefficients are roughly the same as the 
OLSNO regressions since Newey-West uses OLS for point estimates; the small 
deviations are due to the fact that intermediate observations are no longer dropped.  
The t-statistics however all seem higher than OLSNO.  This is due to two reasons: 
49 
the efficiency is higher since no observations are dropped, and less desirably, the 
Newey-West standard errors are biased downwards (Harri and Brorsen 2009).  
This is evident in the fact that the t-statistic actually increases between one-year 
and three-year regressions, whereas theory dictates that it should decrease. 
To conclude, Table 1.8 demonstrates the extension of the household risky 
ratio predictor to longer-horizons.  The 𝑅2 does increase from .054 for one quarter 
to .223 for one year and .401 for three years, which as an aside is quite high for 
known predictors.  While the 𝑅2 and coefficient increases, the power of the tests 
and t-statistics are not better.  Sometimes power is worse due to dropped 
observations in the OLSNO regressions.  The Newey-West regressions illustrate 
the complexity of correcting the inferences of overlapping regressions correctly.  
To maximize power then and minimize inference assumptions, this paper chooses 
to use disaggregated quarterly regressions, in line with the recent theory of Harri 
and Brorsen (2009) 
1.4 Empirical Decomposition of the Household Risky Ratio 
This section analyzes the empirical sources of predictability that the 
household risky ratio has for forward returns.  This section decomposes the 
household risky ratio into components related to household tilt, valuation ratios, 
and issuances.  Then, I run univariate and multivariate regressions against each of 
these components to see what the source of predictability is. 
1.4.1 Define the components theoretically 
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 In the section below, I will decompose the household risky ratio into the 
following three components, with terms to be defined below: log(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡)= log(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑡) + 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡+ 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡 ⊥ 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡 
Consider again the household risky ratio, the ratio of household holdings 
of high-risk assets to low-risk assets.  The first component of this ratio is the 
portion that is specific to the household, which is termed the household tilt.  This 
can be defined as the portion of the household risky ratio that is not common to 
the economy.  To define the household tilt, this paper then first defines an 
economy-wide risky ratio, termed the total risky ratio as follows:   
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
And calculate the difference between the total risky ratio and household 
risky ratio as: 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑙𝑡 = 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  
Note that this also gives: 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑙𝑡 = % 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠% 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠 
And 
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log(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)= log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) + log (𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑙𝑡) 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑡, is then a measure of the household’s holding of high risk 
over low-risk assets relative to the entire economy.  Thus, ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑡 is 
cleansed of all economy-wide effects, effects that will be discussed later on that 
should affect high risk and low risk assets in general, having nothing to do with 
households in particular. 
In this section, preference is also given to the log version of the 
decomposition due to the additivity of the components.  Other sections use the 
raw non-log risky ratio for simplicity and transparency of construction.  As shown 
in Table 1.9, the predictive properties of the log household risky ratio are almost 
identical to the household risky ratio.  This is a natural consequence of the fact 
that the variation of household risky ratio is small relative to the neighborhood in 
which the log function is locally linear, and so log household risky ratio is nearly 
an affine transform of the household risky ratio. 
The second component of the household risky ratio, encompassed entirely 
within the log total risky ratio, is the idea of a valuation ratio or past price changes.  
If the market value of all high risk assets homogenously doubles overnight then 
the total risky ratio would double as well.  Note that this effect is completely 
subsumed in total risky ratio part of household risky ratio: there is nothing special 
about households.  Many authors in the literature (Poterba Summers 1988, Fama 
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French 1988) have demonstrated that past prices changes, especially at the three 
to four year level, are good negative predictors of future returns.  Looking at 
Figure 1.5 the predictability of different horizons, which can be seen as a type of 
cross correlogram, it is seen that indeed much of predictability of the household 
risky ratio becomes strong within the last three to four years of lags.  To the 
extent then that the total risky ratio is capturing price changes, the total risky ratio 
has predictive power. 
More fundamental than price changes are valuation ratios.   Past returns 
are only weak predictors of future returns, and really the fundamental 
predictability comes from valuation ratios like D/P, CAPE, and B/M (Cochrane 
2008).  When run in a multivariate regression, the predictive power of past price 
changes is almost always subsumed by valuation ratios.  As exposited by 
Campbell Shiller (2005), the predictive power comes from the fact that if earnings 
growth is difficult to predict, which is empirically the case, then CAPE changes 
must be attributed to future changes in expected return. 
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Table 1.9: Regression of forward CRSP return on various transformations of the household 
risky ratio. 
OLS regressions of one quarter future equity market CRSP returns on multiple transformations of 
the household risky ratio: 
𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑡,𝑡+1 denotes the one quarter forward excess return as reported by CRSP.  𝑋𝑡−1 variously 
denotes 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1 the household risky ratio calculated by dividing household high risk assets over 
low risk assets, as collected from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds; or 𝑋𝑡−1 denotes 1/ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1 
the multiplicative inverse of 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1; or 𝑋𝑡−1 denotes ln𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1 denotes the natural log of 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1.  t-statistics are shown in brackets using Newey-West heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelation robust standard errors with 5 quarters lags. N=228 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 8.05 
[5.42] 
-4.87  
[-2.68] 
7.43 
[5.53] 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1  -2.49 
[-4.16] 
  
1
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1
   15.13  
[4.12] 
 ln(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡−1)   -6.47  
[-4.12] 
𝑅2 0.054 0.059 .057 
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A similar mechanism is at work thinking of the total risky ratio as a 
valuation ratio.  Consider assets in the economy to be paying off a safe stream 
securitized into the present through low risk assets, and a high risk stream 
securitized into the present through a high risk asset.  Then as the required risk 
premium on high-risk assets decreases, this will push up the valuation of the high 
risk assets with respect to low risk assets, increasing the total risky ratio.  Thus, 
the total risky ratio acts as a valuation ratio in predicting future returns in the 
same way that CAPE does. 
To capture this portion of the household risky ratio, termed the valuation 
ratio part, this paper projects the total risky ratio onto a standard valuation ratio: 
the CAPE of Campbell Shiller (1988): log (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡2 + 𝜖𝑡 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 ∶= log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝚤𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡) �  
Note then risky valuation as defined here is just an affine transform of CAPE and 
its square.   
To arrive at the final component of the predictive power of household 
risky ratio, consider that the valuation ratio analysis above considers only the part 
of total risky ratio with a fixed quantity of assets.  In reality, issuances and 
redemptions play a role in both the composition of the total risky ratio and its 
predictive power.  In particular, Baker Wurgler (2000) studies corporation 
issuance of assets.  They show that when corporations issue a higher fraction of 
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equities in a given period, there are lower future real returns on the equity market.  
After this seminal work, many other papers confirm that issuance, especially by 
corporations, are biased towards assets that are overvalued and will return less in 
the future.   
Then in the projection above, a final component risky issuance can be 
defined: log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡2 + 𝜖𝑡 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 ≔ 𝜖𝑡 
The issuance part reinforces the valuation ratio part even further.  During 
good times, high-risk assets are overvalued and thus already have a large total 
valuation.  Exactly during this time, corporations are issuing even more high-risk 
assets that are overvalued.  The high-risk asset valuation measure then receives 
two reinforcing shocks during this time: a positive price shock and a positive 
quantity shock. 
Putting all three components together, the accounting relationship below 
holds: log(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡)= log(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑡) + 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡+ 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡 ⊥ 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡 
56 
Thus, the log household risky ratio can be thought of as composed of three 
components: a household tilt variable, a valuation ratio part, and an issuance part.  
The last two are guaranteed to be orthogonal by mechanical construction.  All 
three variables turn out to be decently orthogonal empirically as well.   
1.4.2 Estimation of Components 
In this subsection, I estimate the predictive powers of the components as 
defined above, which allows me to decompose the predictive power of the log 
household risky ratio.  Table 1.6 displays the results of predicting future equity 
premium using the log household risky ratio and its decomposition above: the log 
household tilt, the valuation ratio part, and the issuance part.   
Regression (1) replicates the baseline univariate regression, this time with 
the log household risky ratio.  Regression (2) runs the same regression with log 
household tilt variable.  The predictive power of the log household tilt variable is 
quite significant (t=-2.32) and has decent predictive power (𝑅2 = .018).  The 
predictive power of log household tilt is actually quite high on an absolute scale 
(compare to Table 1.7), and is about a third of the of the entire log household risky 
ratio.    Also, note that the coefficient on the household risky ratio is -6.47 while 
the coefficient on log household tilt is -9.26.  Thus the log household tilt is a 
relatively stronger driver component of the log household risky ratio.  Unlike the 
entire log household risky ratio, the log household tilt component is much more 
orthogonal to the other predictors, both in theory and also can be seen by the lack 
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of interaction between regression (2) and (7).  Thus, the household tilt variable is 
that theoretically novel part of the household risky ratio predictor.  It is the 
component of household risky ratio’s power that cannot be explained empirically 
by previous variables.   
The next regression (3), looks as the predictive power of the valuation 
ratio part of the household risky ratio.  The t-statistic is moderately significant 
(t=1.79), and the 𝑅2 is decent at .0113, about a fifth of the predictive power of the 
log household risky ratio.  The coefficient is -3.46, which is about half that of the 
log household risky ratio.  This all suggests that the valuation ratio part is a 
relatively weaker driver of the predictive power of the household risky ratio.  Also 
by construction, the valuation ratio is a linear combination of CAPE and 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸2, 
so all the predictive properties of CAPE carry over.   Therefore, even though the 
t-statistics are not large, it is known from myriad of studies with longer term data 
(Campbell Shiller 1988) and rolling predictions (Campbell Thompson 2008) that 
the valuation ratio part must be a good predictor of the equity premium.   
Regression (4) looks at the predictive power of issuance part.  This 
variable is significant with a t-stat of 2.39, and an 𝑅2 of .0164, again about a third 
of the predictive power of the log household risky ratio.  The coefficient at -7.68 
is also slightly higher than that on the log household risky ratio, demonstrating 
this is an important component of the predictive power of the household risky 
ratio.  By construction, it is also orthogonal to the valuation ratio part.  In the 
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above dimensions, the issuance part is quite similar to the log household tilt 
variable.   
However, unlike log household tilt, the issuance part is not orthogonal to 
known predictors.  Regression (9) adds the equity share of issuances to a 
regression with the issuance part.  Both the magnitude and t-statistic of the 
issuance part are halved by equity share of issuances, showing the close 
interaction of the two terms.  Also, by adding all other covariates in regression 
(10), it is seen that the predictive power of the issuance part is nearly driven to 
zero.  Thus, the issuance part can be seen to be picking up the predictive power of 
already known predictor variables, chiefly equity shares of issuance. 
The valuation ratio part by definition is a function of CAPE.  However, 
compare univariate regression (3) with a multivariate regression with all 
covariates besides CAPE, regression (8).  It is seen that adding covariates does 
not reduce the predictive power of risky valuation.  If anything, it is increased 
somewhat.  This is to be expected from the fact that none of the other covariates 
are valuation ratios. 
Finally, consider regressions (6) and (7), which are multivariate 
regressions with a full set of covariates.  Regression (7) only contains the log 
household tilt portion of the household risky ratio, while regression (8) contains 
the entire log household risky ratio, but note that the adjusted 𝑅2 is nearly 
identical, as well as the t-statistics.  This provides evidence once again that the 
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marginal predictive power of the log household risky ratio on top of the four 
covariates is isolated mainly to the log household tilt.  
In summary, it is possible to decompose the log household risky ratio into 
three components: log household tilt, a valuation ratio part which is a function of 
CAPE, and the remaining issuance part.  In a univariate sense, all three 
components are important and significant.  With respect to known predictors, the 
predictive power of the log household risky ratio arises marginally from the log 
household tilt. 
1.5 Discussion 
A. Ruling Out the Modigliani Miller Explanation 
One possible explanation of the household risky ratio predicting future 
lower equity premium could be simple Modigliani Miller, as pointed out by Baker 
Wurgler (2000).  In particular, Modigliani Miller posits that weighted average 
cost of capital is the same regardless of how corporations fund themselves.  
Therefore, as the amount of high risk assets in the economy increase with respect 
to low risk assets, the high risk assets effectively become less risky and command 
a lower return.  Thus the household risky ratio could predict negative future 
equity returns just as an accounting artifact.   
However a rough calibration shows that Modigliani Miller cannot explain 
anywhere near the size of the effect observed.  Between the lowest and highest 
terciles, the household risky ratio doubles.  Modigliani Miller would predict a 
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halving in excess returns.  However, in reality excess returns drop about ten times.  
This order of magnitude difference is similar found in the equity share of 
corporate issuances in Baker Wurgler (2000).   
1.5.1 Welfare Effects 
The empirical result that the household risky ratio negatively predicts the 
equity premium does not take a stand on whether this predictability reflects a 
rational risk factor or a misoptimization.  Assume the latter case.  Then what is 
the Sharpe ratio lost to the household sector from sizing out of the equity market 
exactly when it is performing well?  What is the loss compared to a constant-
fraction-hold benchmark, or the optimal conditioning on predictors benchmark?  
If it is also assumed that households have log utility and no exogenous sources of 
time-varying utility then return loss can also be calculated.   
I calculate three investment possibilities.  The first is the actual returns and 
Sharpe ratio realized by the household sector assuming the fraction of high risk 
assets is the fraction households invest in the market index at any given moment, 
and the fraction of low risk assets in the fraction households invest in treasury 
bills in any given moment.  This gives a Sharpe ratio of .267 and annualized log 
excess returns of 3.26% assuming log utility.  The next possibility assumes that 
households always hold 70% equities and 30% treasury bills, the unconditional 
average amount of high risk assets versus low risk assets held by the households.  
This results in a Sharpe ratio of .311 or excess log returns of 3.76%.  This 
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represents an increase of 50 bps over the baseline, or 14% increase over the base 
amount.      
If households instead were to scale in optimally assuming log utility, then 
formula (14) of Campbell Thompson gives an increase of about 3x the current 
baseline rate. 
2.9 = � 𝑅21 − 𝑅2��1 + 𝑆2𝑆2 � 
With 𝑆2 = (. 31)2  = 0.0967.  𝑅2 = .206.   
This represents a return of 11% assuming log utility and a Sharpe ratio 
of .533.  Compared to actual outcomes, in case of optimal conditioning on 
predictors, the returns are more than triple, and the Sharpe ratios are more than 
double.  While 11% may seem high, this is not out of line with the strength of the 
predictor.  Also, the actual amount that could be realized by a real agent 
estimating out of sample would be less than this optimal ideal (Welch Goyal 2008, 
Pastor Stambaugh 2009).  Thus, mistiming represents a substantial welfare loss 
for the household sector.   
1.6 Extensions 
1.6.1 A theory for demand systems 
This paper has examined the empirical phenomenon of the prediction 
power of the household risky ratio and decomposed the prediction power into 
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various empirical components.  Here, I explore some ideas behind why the 
household risky ratio might have such predictive power in theory.   
One approach to the theory is to see high risk assets and low risks assets as 
being cleared in markets or demand systems with different players, each with a 
net demand curve.  Market clearing happens at the price and quantity that sets 
total net demand to zero.  Such demand system view goes back to the seminal 
work of Brainard and Tobin (1968).   
In this view, the household sector has a demand curve for high risk assets.  
The demand curve receives shocks that are exogenous, the source of which I will 
examine below.  After a positive demand shock, households demand a higher 
quantity of the high risk asset for the same price.  Assuming the remaining sectors’ 
demand curves remain constant, this translates to higher prices on the high risk 
assets, or lower future expected returns.  In this way, higher quantities and 
valuations of high risk assets held by the household translate to a negative 
relationship to future returns. 
Recent literature like Baker Wurgler (2000) speaks to this demand system 
view of high risk versus low risk assets.  They show that corporations’ supply 
curve of high risk versus low risk (equity versus debt) rationally responds to 
prices.  When equity prices are high, and hence future expected returns are low, 
corporations supply more equities.  Baker Greenwood Wurgler (2003) show a 
similar phenomenon between maturities in the debt market: when the yield of a 
maturity is particularly low, and hence the price particularly high, corporations 
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tend to issue at that maturity.  Greenwood Vayanos (2008) is more along the lines 
of this paper, in showing that government issuances of bonds are supply shocks: 
when the government exogenously issues excess bonds at a certain maturity 
prices go down, and yields are higher in the future. 
It is important to note that in such a system a demand shock generally 
should cause both price and quantity responses, but the relative amount of each 
must be determined by the elasticity of the supply curve.  That the response is not 
purely in price as evidenced here and in Baker Wurgler (2000) shows that 
securities are not in perfectly inelastic supply.  A theoretical basis for this is 
apparent in that corporations can always start new real projects that are funded.  
That the response is not purely in quantities suggests that the supply is not 
perfectly elastic.  Corporations need time to put new projects online, and new 
projects have aggregate diminishing returns in the economy as in the model of 
Solow (1956). 
The fact that Baker Wurgler (2000) and this paper examine similar sets of 
markets explains why in the tables the issuance share of equities is so related to 
the issuance component of the household risky ratio.  They examine flows by 
corporations, a subset of the supply side, while this paper examines stocks by 
households, a subset of the demand side. 
On a first order then, some theoretical sense can be made out of the 
empirical phenomenon present in this paper by using a theory of demand systems 
and price pressure. 
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1.6.2 What Drives Demand Shocks? 
Following the above idea that variation in household risky ratio is caused 
by demand shocks, this motivates the question of what causes the demand shocks.  
One possibility is rational time variation in risk premiums and preferences.  
The underlying cause could be the same as that behind business cycles.  A 
proximal model might include Campbell Cochrane (1999) habits.  In particular, as 
stock returns receive a positive shock, excess consumption increases and effective 
risk aversion decreases.  This justifies both a quantity shift from low risk to high 
risk assets as well as price increase as future required returns decrease.  To test 
this model, a model of habit and surplus consumption could be calibrated, and 
habit can be correlated with the household risky ratio to see if a relationship exists.   
Another strand of thought might explain the demand shocks as arising 
from sentiment.  It is known that perfect optimization often does not describe 
individuals and even the firm (Laibson et al 1998; Zhang 2013).  This may be 
seen as untestable as if the causes are fundamentally from outside the economy, 
then no immediate predictors are available, besides perhaps survey evidence, to 
validate such model.  However, many behavioral models accept economic factors 
as the driver of psychology.  For example Greenwood Shleifer (2013) posit that 
people have extrapolative beliefs: they believe that stocks will go up more 
following a move upwards.  This case is testable as past prices can be used to see 
whether they relate to the household risky ratio.   
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1.6.3 Further Data 
 A central point of this paper is the empirical predictive power of the 
household risky ratio.  A clear and transparent way to extend the empirical power 
would be to extend the duration of the data series as much as possible, in the style 
of Robert Shiller.  Currently the results are based on more than 60 years of data, 
so if the data series were doubled, the series would extend back to around 1890.  
A first-order advantage of such a dataset extension is that it serves as a true out-
of-sample test of the hypothesis above, since this paper is uncontaminated by 
observation of data before 1951.  The true out-of-sample test can be used to 
validate the predictor in a way immune to any claims of data snooping, as well as 
test the stability of the coefficient estimated.  The predictive properties can be 
understood much better by using the entire expanded series with rolling out-of-
sample predictors. 
 Of course, data expansion has limitations.  As is generally the case, data 
further back in history are noisier due to less advanced data collection 
technologies and more data that has been lost through time.  Even common price 
series such as equity returns and price-earnings ratios become significantly lower 
quality before the 1920s.  Quantity data such as that used in this paper would be 
even rarer.  Further, for dates far enough back, one must question even the 
existence of equity markets accessible to households.  As a raw method of 
increasing power, historical data extension is less fruitful, especially with the 
already high t-statistics observed here.   
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 Another possible extension is to extend the predictability results here to 
other datasets.  If the value of household holding of risky assets predicts future 
returns on risky assets, then it might stand to reason that the household holding of 
other asset classes might negatively predict future returns on those areas as well.  
Preliminarily, this seems to hold with government bonds and corporate bonds.  In 
this way, the ideas and evidence presented in this paper can be developed into a 
general theory of household tilt. 
 Finally, this paper can be seen as an extension of the usual price predictors 
into quantity space.  One way to generalize this more is to look at how all the 
price and quantity variables flow into each other economy-wide.  High risk and 
low risk assets are just two components of what is the household sector’s savings 
stock.  The savings stock is affected by investment flows, which is known to be 
highly procyclical.  Tracing investment back to output gives the GDP as the 
source of this flow.  In this space itself, GDP depends on factor prices paid to 
labor and capital, the latter of which household total assets forms a component.  
On the capital markets side, there are corporations who are issuing the securities 
and financial assets being used in the household risky ratio.  These corporations 
translate funds raised to real investment and real projects with payoffs and risk 
profiles. 
 Financial economics often centers around theories of prices in the 
economy and how they relate to each other, especially theories involving the 
efficient market.  Household high risk and low risk assets then is a first step of a 
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journey towards looking at more quantity-type predictors and looking at the entire 
economic system to provide macroeconomic foundations for finance. 
1.7 Conclusion 
This paper shows that the ratio of high risk assets to low risk assets held 
by the household sector, termed the household risky ratio, is a negative predictor 
of future equity premium.  The predictive power is robust and strong: the 
univariate t-statistics are above 4, and the annualized 𝑅2 is above .20.   The 
predictive power remains even after variation in construction of the variable, 
first/second half of the time series, and adjustment for the bias of Stambaugh 
(1999).  The predictive power also is not subsumed by popular predictors like 
CAPE, equity shares of issuances, term spread, and the cay. 
The paper empirically decomposes the predictability into three roughly 
orthogonal components.  First is a household tilt component representing the 
preference of households for high risk assets above and beyond the entire 
economy.  The second is a valuation ratio part that is a function of the Campbell-
Shiller CAPE.  And the third is an issuance part that is the residual from the 
decomposition above.  All three components play important roles in the 
predictability of the household risky ratio: the 𝑅2 is divided generally evenly 
between them and the coefficient size is the same order of magnitude.  The 
second and third components reflect known predictors in the literature, while the 
first, the household tilt, seems orthogonal to known predictors. 
68 
This paper adds to the literature understanding time variation in equity 
premia by looking at Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data.  It follows the footsteps 
of Baker Wurgler (2000) in going beyond price predictors to quantity data.  
Additionally, this paper looks at economy-wide household sector quantity data in 
a first step at connecting the variation in equity premium to economic 
fundamentals.  
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Chapter 2 
2 Does Say-on-Pay Affect the Firm? Causal Evidence from a 
Regression Discontinuity Design 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay provisions require practically all significant 
public companies from 2011 onwards to hold regular say-on-pay votes, votes in 
which investors express general approval or disapproval of the compensation 
package proposed by the board for the executive team.  This paper provides 
evidence on the causal effects of Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay vote by drawing on a 
novel source of investor censure of executive pay.  Specifically, I exploit variation 
in investor censure that results from the Say-on-Pay vote-fraction discontinuity.  
That is, the vote passes discretely above 50% and fails discretely below 50%.  
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Random selection of firms at the boundary into the passing or failing group 
provides identification.  
The field of corporate governance, particularly executive compensation, 
has burgeoned in the last two decades (Murphy 1997).  However, relatively few 
studies have focused on causal identification.  Studies often just rely on regression 
control variables, and the few that use instruments often use ones that are not 
clean, and leave doubt on the validity of the exclusion restriction.    This paper 
aims to provide causal evidence through a regression discontinuity design (RDD) 
with excellent internal validity properties.   
Specifically, this paper identifies the impact of say-on-pay vote fraction 
using a regression discontinuity design, in the style of Lee and Lemieux (2009).  
The say-on-pay votes pass statutorily at 50%, and this cutoff can be used for 
identification.  The usage of corporate votes as the discontinuity variable is in line 
with previous work by Cunat Gine Guadalupe (2012b).   
To understand this identification, suppose the executive compensation 
vote contains random voter noise, at least some of which is independent of all 
other variables in the system.  The random noise arises from a variety of sources: 
a voter forgetting to vote or missing an airplane to the meeting due to a weather 
delay.  Due to such random noise, companies at the 50% cutoff are essentially 
randomized into being approved at 50.1%, and being disapproved at 49.9%.  
Outcomes from the two groups can be compared, and the difference in outcome 
can be attributed to random assignment.  
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The RDD above provides a strong and internally valid method for 
identifying the causal impact of passing versus failing say-on-pay.  This estimate 
can directly answer the question of whether say-on-pay is causally effective at all 
at reining in CEO pay.  The point estimate from the RDD for total CEO pay 
change is directly interpretable as the average causal effect of passing the vote for 
a company who would have received around 50% vote share.  This provides a 
lower bound of the causal effect of say-on-pay, whose degree of censure 
monotonically increases as vote share decreases from 100%.  This paper finds that 
say-on-pay does indeed causally rein in CEO pay. 
As a second step, this paper identifies the causal impact of the vote cutoff 
on other company characteristics, such as financing policy, payout policy, and 
firm performance.  This can be seen as the causal result on CEO behavior of 
receiving censure from failing say-on-pay and having his or her pay reduced.  
This paper finds no significant impact on company characteristics as a result of 
the vote cutoff. 
 
2.1.1 Background on Say-on-Pay and Executive Compensation 
 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 is a wide set of reforms targeting the 
financial industry after the crises in 2008.  One part of Dodd-Frank is mandating 
an advisory say-on-pay for all public companies above a certain size.  This 
mandate was not solely motivated by the crises.  Its inclusion in Dodd-Frank was 
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an opportunistic way of remedying perceived longstanding agency issues amongst 
companies’ investors, boards, and executives.   
A common view in this line is that the executives capture the board.  
Executives wield their influence over the board to increase their own pay beyond 
the optimum (Yermack 1997; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Bebchuck and 
Fried 2004; Kuhnen and Zwiebel 2006).  For example, Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker (1999) show that measures board-of-director control and ownership 
structure has high 𝑅2 for CEO pay levels, and signs are consistent with a story of 
board capture.  Say-on-pay provisions allow investors to express dissatisfaction 
with excessive pay to signal investor preferences and to apply soft pressure to 
reduce pay (Bebchuk 2007). 
In the efficient markets first-best optimum, the board should already pay 
executives the net present value maximizing sum.  Even with agency costs and 
other structural issues, the company should endogenously structure their board 
and voting rules to maximize the second-best optimal value (Fama 1980).  Under 
these efficient theories, mandating say-on-pay should not impact the firm.  
Even some theories of inefficient pay also predict that say-on-pay would 
not have an impact.  Kaplan (2007) and Bainbridge (2008) argue that shareholder 
advisory votes are likely to be bypassed by a compromised board.  Cunat Gine 
Guadalupe (2012a) finds that when firms start holding say-on-pay votes, this by 
itself has no causal impact on CEO pay.   
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On the other hand, Bebchuck (2007) supports more corporate controls, 
arguing that making investors’ opinion more salient to the board induces the 
board to represent investors better.  (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker 2002) suggest 
that say-on-pay would increase the outrage costs of overpaying the CEO, and thus 
reduce pay.  Further, reputational concerns and enhanced shareholder voice, 
formalized by say-on-pay votes, will cause boards to overcome barriers to 
negotiating with CEOs on behalf of shareholders. 
This paper also looks at the causal response of firm characteristics as CEO 
pay drops at the boundary.  If performance suffers, then the argument can be 
made that wages were efficient before, and this meddling by investors is non-
optimal.   Many papers (Murphy 1999, Baker Jensen Murphy 1990, Joskow et al 
1996, DeAngelo 1991) argue that due to political pressure, CEOs may be 
underpaid and under-incentivized.  In such under-compensation theories, a 
reduction on CEO compensation should result in a reduction of firm value.  
Alternately, a CEO might be overcompensated, perhaps due to the inability of 
boards to evaluate the true cost of pay (Hall and Murphy 2003; Jensen, Murphy 
and Wruck 2004).  In this case, firm value should not decrease and generally be 
close to zero2 – which is what this paper observes.  
  
                                                     
2 Under the weak assumption that incentives are non-decreasing in CEO compensation, then a 
reduction in pay should result in firm value increasing an amount weakly between 0 and the NPV 
of CEO compensation itself, both a small percentage of firm value.   
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Figure 2.1: Change in CEO Total Compensation Binned by Vote fraction. 
The change in Total CEO Pay from fiscal year 2010 to 2011 versus the 2011 Dodd-Frank Say-on-
Pay vote fraction.  Firms are grouped into 5 percentage-point bins.  Votes that just pass are 
assigned to the 0.525 bin and votes that just fail are assigned to the .475 bin.  95% confidence 
intervals based on ordinary standard errors for the bin mean are given by the error bars.  0.50 is the 
pass-fail transition for say-on-pay votes.  The red vertical line indicates the cutoff at 50%.  
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2.1.2 Preview of Results 
The paper finds that say-on-pay has significant impact on subsequent 
executive pay.  Barely failing the Dodd-Frank say-on-pay vote in 2011 has a -59.8% 
gross impact on next-year total CEO pay level, a jump that is clearly visible in 
Figure 2.1.  This amount is equal to 1.3 times the standard deviation of the annual 
CEO pay change.  Thus, boards do react to say-on-pay votes through the natural 
mechanism of changing CEO pay. 
In order to reach this identification, this paper compiles a novel data set of 
Dodd-Frank say-on-pay executive compensation vote results from raw SEC data.  
The data was manually compiled from over 5000 SEC filings with no systemic 
format.3  Riskmetrics also complies say-on-pay data, but there are large 
differences.  The Riskmetrics data are about shareholder proposals for a firm 
which starts having say-on-pay votes.  Riskmetrics currently has no data on the 
outcome of say-on-pay itself.  These votes are from before 2009 and are sparse: 
only hundreds of such votes have occurred over all firms in a decade.  These votes 
are also not mandatory: investors from a firm chose to propose starting say-on-
pay votes, causing selection bias in the votes.  Cunat Gine Guadalupe (2012a) run 
a regression discontinuity on the Riskmetrics vote and find shareholder proposals 
to start having say-on-pay votes have no impact on pay but do affect firm value 
through announcement returns.   
                                                     
3 Not only did the data format vary wildly, but even the reporting of vote results varied.  Some 
companies preferred tables, others lists, and still some narrative paragraphs or images of vote 
results.   
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This paper uses the regression methodology to further examine the impact 
of the vote cutoff on other firm characteristics.  First, the announcement-day 
return is slightly positive but not significantly different from zero.  A 95% 
confidence interval for the price impact of failing say-on-pay is [-1.4%, 1.6%].  
This is a surprisingly small impact on the value of the firm given the substantial 
impact on CEO pay.  It also provides evidence against the theory that at the 
margin CEOs are undercompensated due to political constraints.  If that were the 
case, the large lowering of pay caused by say-on-pay would be expected to 
destroy significant value and result in a significant negative market reaction. 
 This paper contributes in two ways: first by providing causal identification 
in the field of corporate governance and executive compensation by using an 
interesting RDD vote cutoff.  Second, this paper contributes by creating a novel 
dataset of Dodd-Frank say-on-pay vote results from the primary source manually.   
 Section II provides a literature review.  Section III reviews data collection 
and dataset construction.  Section IV looks at a descriptive OLS analysis of the 
data.  Section V describes the RDD methodology both generally and the specific 
case that is implemented in this paper.   Section VI provides argument that a 
treatment effect exists.  Section VII provides the main result of the impact of vote 
cutoff on CEO pay.  Section VIII discusses extensions.  Section IX concludes. 
2.2 Literature Review 
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Seminal work in CEO compensation include Roberts (1956), Baumol 
(1959), and Lewellen and Huntsman (1970).  However, many empirical papers in 
this literature do not apply rigorous identification strategies to isolate causal 
inferences.  Agency theory views of CEO pay arose around the 1980s.  
Holmstrom (1979) highlight the tradeoff between risk aversion of CEO versus the 
need to reward them with high-powered contracts.  Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1987) arrive at a linear solution to the problem.  Jensen Meckling (1976) 
formalizes the agency issues and analyzes it in terms of financing needs, optimal 
incentives, and monitoring.  Murphy (1997) reviews the empirical literature of 
CEO pay and provides a thorough description of pay practices, compositions, and 
setting procedures.   Murphy also highlights the rapid increase in CEO pay in the 
1990s, which Gabaix and Landier (2008) explain using extreme value theory.    
While Fama (1980) espouses the theory that CEOs should have optimal 
pay set already, many papers also argue for a “skimming” view of CEO pay 
(Yermack 1997; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Bebchuck and Fried 2004; 
Kuhnen and Zwiebel 2006).  That there are inefficiencies in the CEO labor market 
may not be a surprise given inefficiencies in thick, public, and relatively 
arbitragable financial markets.  Shleifer (2003) reviews divergence of paid price 
from fundamental value.  In price divergence, Lamont Thaler (2003) provide a 
general overview and Zhang (2013) provides a specific example on options.  
Calvet Campbell and Sodini (2006) and Zhang (2013) suggest that households do 
make mistakes in asset allocation.  Baker Wurgler (2006), Fuster Laibson Mendel 
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(2010), and Greenwood Shleifer (2013) demonstrate investor sentiment and 
psychology plays an important role beyond fundamental value.   
Many of the original empirical studies on say-on-pay come from United 
Kingdom data, which was the first country to require say-on-pay in the form of a 
Directors’ Remuneration Report resolutions.  Conyon and Sadler (2010) find that 
most shareholders are generally satisfied with executive pay in this dataset.  Ferri 
and Maber (2009) fail to find any across-the-board differences in pay policy 
comparing before and after the UK mandate.  They do find that the few firms that 
received negative say-on-pay votes subsequently adjust down the magnitude of 
the pay and shift pay towards higher powered incentives.  Alissa (2009) find that 
low say-on-pay vote predicts future reductions in excess compensation and 
increases CEO turnover. 
In the United States Say-on-Pay evidence is more recent, but analogous 
studies of public and shareholder opinion stretch back further in time.  Core et al. 
(2008) find that firms generally do not respond to negative press, while Ertimur et 
al (2011) find that firms do respond to shareholder pressure by reducing pay.  The 
difference between public versus shareholder opinion seems to be sharp.  Balsam 
and Yin (2012) use Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay data and show that firms that receive 
more disapproval reduce pay and increase the performance sensitivity of that pay.  
Cai and Walkling (2009) show that the market reaction to the House of 
Representatives passing Dodd-Frank say-on-pay was positive for firms with high 
abnormal CEO pay, suggesting say-on-pay creates value for some firms.  The 
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general consensus of these non-causal studies seems to be that say-on-pay 
changes pay when a firm receives especially negative votes, but say-on-pay does 
not change pay across the board.  There does not seem to be any causal studies of 
the impact of say-on-pay votes on compensation.   
 Thisltlewaite and Campbell (1960) set out the framework the regression 
discontinuity design (RDD) strategy.  Lee and Lemieux (2010), Imbens and 
Lemieux (2008), and Hahn Todd Van Der Klaauw (2008) have advanced the 
theory of RDD into the current best practices used today, including the use of a 
non-parametric kernel regression as optimal.  Imbens and Kalyaranaman (2009) 
provide a method for optimal bandwidth selection for that kernel.   
Due to the sharp cutoff often seen in votes of all types, voting has been a 
common application of RDD, with some notable examples being electoral 
competition on policy (Lee Moretti, Butler 2004), the effect of gender on 
legislator behavior (Rehavi 2007), the effect of mayoral party identification on 
policy (Ferreria and Gyourko 2009).  The application of RDD to corporate voting 
is more novel.  Cunat Gine Guadalupe (2012b) use RDD to show that firm values 
casually increase by 2.8% when the firm implements proposals that increase 
shareholder control.   
This paper is most similar to Cunat Gine Guadalupe (2012a), which looks 
at the causal impact of firms that decide to start holding say-on-pay votes.  They 
attain causal identification since many firms only start holding say-on-pay as a 
result of a shareholder proposal.  They use the vote cutoff on these proposals in 
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Riskmetrics data.  They mainly conclude that only starting to hold say-on-pay is 
similar to implementing other positive shareholder control provisions: there is no 
executive compensation change and firm value increase around 2%.   
This paper differs from Cunat Gine Guadalupe (2012a) in a few important 
dimensions.  Most critically, Cunat Gine Guadalupe 2012a uses shareholder 
proposal votes on whether to start holding say-on-pay, while this paper collects 
novel data and uses the say-on-pay votes themselves.  Thus, Cunat Gine 
Guadalupe 2012a causally identifies the overarching impact of implementing say-
on-pay, while this paper identifies the specific impact of the say-on-pay vote itself.   
This fundamental difference gives rise to a host of other differences.  
Cunat Gine Guadalupe (2012a) uses shareholder proposals about implementing 
say-on-pay from 2006-2010, while this paper uses votes mandated by Dodd-Frank 
from 2011, reducing selection bias.  Cunat Gine Guadalupe (2012a) uses 
Riskmetrics data on shareholder proposals, while this paper compiles a novel data 
set manually across a wide variety of formats.  Since the vote is different, the 
results are also different.  Cunat Gine Guadalupe (2012a) finds no impact on CEO 
compensation, while this paper finds large differences.  Cunat Gine Guadalupe 
(2012a) finds a positive impact on firm value, while this finds no impact on firm 
value. 
2.3 Data Collection 
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Data was collected from a variety of sources.  Most of the data collection 
effort went into manually collecting vote data.  Observations in the data set are 
generally firm-year pairs, although the bulk of the study focuses on the 2011 vote 
year and so some variables are associated with firms instead of firm-years.   Table 
2.1 provides a summary of the data.  The universe consists of all members of the 
Russell 3000 subject to Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay4.  The data is restricted to Dodd-
Frank say-on-pay firms because the main dependent variable studied is Dodd-
Frank say-on-pay vote, and the restriction to Russell 3000 is not significantly 
limiting: the vast majority of firms subject to Dodd-Frank say-on-pay lie inside 
the Russell 3000.  The restriction is done to minimize data absence due to 
covariates, as here limiting the inference to the Russell 3000 is preferable to 
possible selection bias at the margin.   
Table 2.2 provides a timeline overview of data sources.  Returns data for 
individual stocks was collected from CRSP.  Daily frequency data from CRSP is 
used directly for announcement day returns.  Monthly frequency data from CRSP 
is rolled up to the annual level for yearly return variables.  All returns in this 
paper are in log terms. 
CEO compensation data is collected from EXECUCOMP.  This paper 
examines only CEO compensation, and so filters for the CEO flag.  Data is 
collected both for the current year and the past year to track changes.  The leading 
                                                     
4 For the first year of Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay this consists of all firms with more than $75 million 
in market capitalization. 
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compensation figure this paper uses is SEC total compensation, which refers to 
SEC Form DEF 14A compensation, giving us the advantage of being able to cross 
validate the numbers manually and being free from model assumptions used to 
calculate other EXECUCOMP pay variables.  Salary, options, and other 
compensation components are also selected to match the SEC Form DEF 14A.  
The compensation variable is always selected to be the grant-day value 
instead of realized value.  There is robust discussion encompassing Murphy (1999) 
to present day about whether grant or realized value is more appropriate in 
different situations.  For example, for studying inequality, realized pay is quite 
relevant.  This paper choose grant value both because it is easier to collect, being 
available contemporaneously, as well as because it is the more appropriate value 
for this study.  After all, this paper studies how the board changes their package in 
response to votes, and how the CEO responds to the granted package.  Using 
realized value would subject the study to unneeded noise due to stock market 
movements.   
To minimize look-ahead issues, the compensation data from 
EXECUCOMP is always from the contemporaneous year’s DEF 14A.  The paper 
does not use data that is later revised for consistency.  Data on company 
characteristics is collected from COMPUSTAT, which is ultimately from the SEC 
10-K filing forms.   
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Vote Data, CEO Pay, and Firm Characteristics. 
The summary statistics below describe the 2010 and 2011 data for all 2188 firms of the Russell 
3000 which has 2011 vote data.  Pay data and firm characteristic data are collected for both 2010 
and 2011.  Variables including pay are reduced to the circa 1,300 firms for which EXECUCOMP 
pay data exists.  Panel A summarizes variables associated with each firm in the dataset, while 
Panel B summarizes variables associated with each firm-year.  Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay vote 
fraction is collected manually from SEC 8-K forms.  A high vote fraction indicates more approval.  
All pay relates to the CEO and is computed from EXECUCOMP: Total Pay as reported on SEC 
form DEF 14A (TOTAL_SEC), base salary paid to CEO (SALARY), bonus paid to CEO – 
usually tied by rule to performance metrics (BONUS), value of options  awarded to the CEO 
(OPTION_AWARDS_FV).  Accounting variables are obtained from Compustat Annual: earnings 
before interest and tax (EBIT), dividends paid that year (DVC), an indicator for whether the firm 
pays dividends I(DVC>0), book value of equity (CEQ), book value of assets (AT).  Institutional 
Ownership is pulled from Yahoo Finance.  Returns data in logs and market cap are from CRSP: 
Stock Return in 2010 (termed R here), Market Cap (Shares Outstanding x Price on Jan 1, 2010, 
termed M here), and Announcement Day Return is computed from market close before the 
announcement to the next day’s market close.   
 
All monetary amounts are in current year dollars.  K stands for thousands and M for millions.  All 
changes between two years use the average of the two years as the base.  Note that the number of 
observations changes due to missing values for certain data sources and variables.  SD denotes 
standard deviation, and Corr w/ Vote denotes correlation with Vote %.  For correlations, OLS 
significance is calculated with significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels indicated by *, †, and ‡, 
respectively.  
 
Panel A: Firm Variables 
Variable N Mean SD Corr w/ Vote 
Vote fraction (%) 2,188 89 12 1.00‡ 
Total CEO Pay Change 2010-2011 (%) 1,310 7 47 .10‡ 
Institutional Ownership 2010 (%) 2,091 69 24 -.10‡ 
Return in 2011 (%) 2,181 -8 35  .08    * 
Return in 2010 (%) 2,162 22 31 .18‡ 
Return in 2009 (%) 2,056 34 50 .03     . 
Return in 2008 (%) 1,994 -59 61 .10  †    
Announcement Day Stock Return % 2,189 0 6 .02     . 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Firm-Year Variables 
  2010     2011   
Variable N Mean SD Corr 
w/ 
Vote 
 N Mean SD Corr 
w/ 
Vote 
          
Total Pay ($K) 1,325 5,726 6,101 -.25‡  1,311 6,153 6,732 -.16‡ 
Salary ($K) 1,325 807 451 -.16‡  1,311 846 432 -.15‡ 
Bonus  ($K) 1,325 272 1,109 -.09‡  1,311 272 1,159 -.09‡ 
Options Value 
($K) 
1,325 1,191 2,676 -.17‡  1,311 1,188 2,361 -.12‡ 
          
EBIT ($M) 2,175 635 2,559 -.08‡  2,172 717 3,003 -.07† 
Market Cap ($M) 2,174 5,605 19,670 -.02        2,172 5,725 20,779 -.05 
Dividend ($M) 2,175 107 488 -.07†  2,172 118 538 -.07† 
Paying 
Dividends (%) 
2,175 48 50 -.01.  2,172 50 50 -.05 . 
Book Equity 
($M) 
2,175 2,579 9,804 -.09‡  2,172 2,730 10,309 -.09‡ 
Book Assets 
($M) 
2,175 11,481 81,102 -.05*.  2,172 12,155 82,394 -.05* 
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Table 2.2: Timeline of Data Collection and Votes: Exxon Mobile Corporation. 
The below shows the timeline of release of various SEC Forms.  The table lists the year name as 
used in the paper, the release date of the form, the subject period of the form, and the subject 
matter of the form for Exxon Mobile Corporation.   
 
This paper uses the convention that years always refer to year of the direct subject period and not 
the release date.  For example, note that the Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay vote released on 5/31/2011 is 
referred to as the 2011 say-on-pay vote and not 2010, despite the vote being about 2010 pay.  This 
is because the vote itself occurred in 2011 and is the direct subject of the data release. 
 
Year Name SEC Form  Release Date Subject Period Subject Matter 
2010 10K 2/25/2011 FY 2010  Accounting Data 
2010 DEF 14A 4/13/2011 FY 2010 Proposed Executive 
Compensation 
2011 8-K 5/31/2011 5/26/2011 Reporting the Results of 
the say-on-pay held a 
few days ago on 
FY2010 Proposed 
Executive 
Compensation 
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Data on votes were manually collected from SEC 8K filings on the 
EDGAR databases online, and collecting this data is one contribution of this 
paper.  Companies have a wide variety of filing formats.  Some file the data 
within multiple tested Tables in a highly structured HTML file, while others write 
the vote results narratively in a flatter text-like file, and formats exist in the entire 
spectrum in between.  Despite the inability of such disparate data to be 
automatically processed, the vote results and interpretations are almost always 
straightforward. 
For each company participating in Dodd-Frank say-on-pay in that year, I 
record the number of FOR votes, AGAINST votes, ABSENTIONS, and 
BROKER NON VOTES.  I calculate the vote passage percentage as the number 
of FOR votes over the total of FOR, AGAINST, and ABSENTIONS.  With the 
majority of firms, the nominal vote fraction required for passage is 50% of FOR 
votes over FOR, AGAINST, and ABSTENTIONS.  For votes around the cutoff 
(40-60%), I manually check the company’s bylaws or voting statements to ensure 
this is the case.  For the minority where the denominator does not include 
ABSTENTIONS in the denominator, the ratio is updated to reflect that.  No 
company in the data set crosses the pass/fail boundary due to this adjustment, as 
the adjustment is on average very small at a few basis points.  I also note the date 
of record (the vote date) and the date of filing/report.  The date of filing is used as 
the announcement return date as it is the date on which vote results are made 
public and can be publically traded on. 
87 
Table 2.2 provides intuition about the sequence of events and data.  
Consider one observation: Exxon Mobile Corporation (XOM) for year 2011.  The 
lagged subject year then is fiscal year (FY) 20105 and the current year is XOM’s 
FY2011.  Both fiscal years coincide with the calendar year, with FY2010 closing 
12/31/2010.  The SEC requires XOM to first produce an annual report of FY2010 
financial activities, which XOM does on 02/25/2011: this provides all the lagged-
year company characteristic data we collect through COMPUSTAT.  Then the 
SEC requires XOM to hold an annual shareholder meeting, the details of which 
are announced in Form DEF 14A on 04/13/2011.  Form DEF 14A is perhaps the 
one most affected by say-on-ay, as it contains the compensation committee’s 
proposal for the lag year 2010.  This is the data that we collect through 
EXECUCOMP. 
Observing performance and compensation, shareholders then vote in 2011 
with respect to the FY2010 pay package.  The voting may happen via proxy (mail 
or online), or during the in-person meeting on 05/25/2011.  The results of the 
meeting are then announced a few days later on 05/31/2011 in Form 8-K.  It is 
this Form 8-K data that we manually collect to form 2011 vote data.   
The two SEC Forms, 10K, DEF 14A are released in calendar year 2011 
but speak to FY2010 data.  By convention, this paper associates data with the year 
it directly describes.  Thus both these forms contain 2010 data.  The final SEC 
                                                     
5 Fiscal years are numbered after the year in which they end.  For example, years ending on the 
following dates would all be called FY2010:  January 15, 2010, June 30, 2010, and December 31, 
2010. 
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Form, the 8-K, reports a vote that occurred in 2011 and so contains 2011 data.  
Table 2.2 provides an outline of the year naming conventions. 
To get changes, this paper needs to collect data for the next year.  For 
XOM, the 10K for 2011, released in 02/24/2012, provides information on changes 
in company characteristics and performance.  The DEF 14A for 2011, released on 
04/12/2012, provide data on compensation response to the 2010 say-on-pay vote.   
Note here that for year 2011, the penumbra of our data actually spans three 
years.  The lagged year for accounting and compensation is 2010, while the 
current year 2011 data is needed to obtain changes.  Note that 2011 data is 
released well into 2012, giving three relevant years.   Even though Dodd-Frank 
was enacted as a law in 2010,  only the 2011 year is complete, with 2012 data still 
arriving well into 2013, the writing of this paper.  For the 2011 data year, the say-
on-pay vote is held in 2011 and is actually for shareholder approval of the 
FY2010 pay package, which is generally already fixed.  Rarely is the 
compensation committee recalled to determine 2010 pay again.  Rather the model 
here is that the board receives feedback on the investor’s dissatisfaction of the 
past year’s compensation, and then adjusts the next year’s compensation 
accordingly.   
2.4 Data Overview and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Results 
This paper begins its analysis by examining the data descriptively in an 
ordinary-least-squares setting.  OLS gives up good identification for higher power, 
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which is a large advantage and worth considering.  First, determinants of CEO 
pay are examined, particularly in the context of its correlation with Dodd-Frank 
Say-on-Pay vote fraction.  The paper finds that while CEO pay is quite 
predictable, there is serious reverse causality issues in an OLS regression of CEO 
pay against vote fraction.  Then, determinants of CEO pay change are examined 
to minimize reverse causality issues.  Vote fraction is shown in this setting to 
have the same correlation as in regression discontinuity design (RDD) case.  
Finally, determinates of vote fraction are examine, and this paper finds that pay, 
firm characteristics, and firm performance contribute similar magnitudes to this.  
2.4.1 Magnitude of CEO Pay 
Table 2.3 presents log total CEO pay as the left hand side variable, and 
examines its covariates.  The paper examine 2011 pay only. Three standard 
groups of covariates are selected from standard CEO pay predictors in the 
literature.  The first group consists of size measures like market value, total assets, 
and total sales.  The second group consists of stock performance measures 
including last one and three year returns.  The final group consists of firm 
performance measures like book to market, equity ratio, and ROA.  Further, the 
paper examines lagged pay and vote fraction as special covariates.  These 
variables are chosen to be the standard predictors in the literature and their 
variations, as set out originally in Murphy (1997), and described in more detail in 
Balsam and Yin (2011).   
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Table 2.3: OLS Determinants of CEO Pay. 
OLS regressions of Log 2011 total CEO pay (TOTAL_SEC) on Log 2010 total CEO pay , vote 
fraction (DFSOP), Market Cap (M), Book Asset (AT), Sales (SALE), 1-year and 3-year past log 
returns, Book to Market (AT/M), Equity ratio (CEQ/AT), and ROA (EBIT/AT). 
 log(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝑆𝐸𝐶2011)𝑖  = 𝑎 + log�𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝑆𝐸𝐶2010,𝑖� + 𝑐 𝐷𝐹𝑆𝑂𝑃𝑖 + 𝑑𝑀𝑖 + 𝑒𝐴𝑇𝑖 + 𝑓𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖 + 𝑔𝑅2011,𝑖+ ℎ�𝑅2011,𝑖 + 𝑅2010,𝑖 + 𝑅2009,𝑖� + 𝑖 �𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑀𝑖 � + 𝑗 �𝐶𝐸𝑄𝑖𝐴𝑇𝑖 � + ℎ �𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝐴𝑇𝑖 � + 𝑢𝑖 
 
All variables are for the year 2011 year unless otherwise specified.  All variables in the formula 
above are defined as in Table 2.1.  Log 2010 total CEO pay is the natural log of the 2010 SEC 
reported total pay.  Vote fraction is the Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay vote fraction expressed as a 
fraction.  Market cap is market value at the start of the year in millions of dollars.  Book Assets is 
total book assets in millions.  Sales is annual sales in millions. 1-year return is defined as 2011 
year returns for a stock, while 3-year returns is 2009 to 2011 returns inclusive for a stock.  Book to 
market is total book assets over total market value expressed as a fraction.  Equity ratio is book 
value of equity over book value of total assets as a fraction.  ROA is EBIT over total assets as a 
fraction.  T-statistics displayed in parenthesis below each estimate and are heteroskedasticity 
robust.  Bold coefficients are significant at the 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Regressions (1) to (6) 
 Standard Literature Covariates  Lagged Pay 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
N 1117 1290 1281 1150  1309 1116 
𝑅2 .2487 .2532 .0065 .0475  .6739 .7043 
        
2010 Pay      .939 
(16.62) 
.957 
(9.50) 
Vote Fraction        
        
Market Cap .029 
(0.29) 
.129 
(1.98) 
    -.027 
(0.39) 
Book Asset .171 
(2.48) 
.072 
(2.23) 
    .038 
(0.70) 
        
Sales .203 
(6.27) 
.204 
(7.80) 
    -.013 
(0.48) 
1-Year Return -.135 
(1.57) 
 .225 
(2.41) 
   .255 
(3.13) 
3-Year Return .139 
(2.12) 
 .061 
(1.06) 
   -.023 
(0.59) 
        
Book to Market -.154 
(1.47) 
  .011 
(0.15) 
  .006 
(0.06) 
Equity ratio -.048 
(.29) 
  -.473 
(8.08) 
  -.051 
(1.05) 
ROA .043  
(1.26) 
  .148 
(3.99) 
  .009 
(0.40) 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Regressions (7) to (10) 
 Including Vote Fraction 
Variable (7) (8) (9) (10) 
N 1309 1116 1310 1117 
𝑅2 .6747 .7045 .0293 0.2751 
     
2010 Pay .947 
(16.37) 
.961 
(9.19) 
  
Vote Fraction .258 
(1.67) 
.125 
(0.56) 
-1.540 
(6.55) 
6.850 
(11.93) 
     
Market Cap  -.029 
(0.41) 
 .053 
(0.54) 
Book Asset  .039 
(.71) 
 .152 
(2.29) 
     
Sales  -.012 
(.47) 
 .183 
(5.89) 
1-Year Return  .256 
(3.13) 
 -.121 
(1.42) 
3-Year Return  -.027 
(0.66) 
 .177 
(2.78) 
     
Book to Market  .009 
(.09) 
 -.183 
(1.78) 
Equity ratio  -.048 
(1.02) 
 -.059 
(0.91) 
ROA  .009 
(0.40) 
 -1.654 
(7.42) 
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Looking at Table 2.3 regression (1), the 𝑅2 of CEO pay on all three groups 
of variables is .25.  Regression (2) shows that almost all the predictability can be 
accounted for by size measures – which have an 𝑅2 of .25 as well.  This is not 
surprising given the importance of firm size to CEO pay.  Most literature on CEO 
pay include firm size as a components, and all analysis find strong and robust 
relationship between the two variables, including the seminal work by Murphy 
(1997) .  To reword Gabaix and Landier (2009), one reason firm size affects CEO 
pay so much is because CEO ability can be seen as a multiplier on the firm’s 
market cap.  Therefore, larger companies gain from skillful CEOs an amount 
proportional to their size.   
In the size regression (2), it is seen that all measures of size positively 
predict pay.  This suggests that market value, total assets, and sales can all be seen 
as noisy measures of a fundamental size variable, which increases pay.   
Table 2.3 part (3) regresses CEO pay against stock performance.  There 
generally seems to be a positive relationship between performance and subsequent 
year pay, but comparing (1) and (3) shows these figures are heavily affected by 
covariates.  This suggests that regression (3) is interacting heavily with size 
variables, that much of the explanatory power of returns is coming through the 
mechanical impact of returns on size.  Regardless, the predictability is low with 
an 𝑅2 of .01 showing that returns are not great predictors of CEO pay. 
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Table 2.3 part (4) regresses CEO pay on firm characteristics.  The 𝑅2 is 
moderate at .05, with a significant negative loading on the equity-ratio and 
positive loading on ROA.  One interpretation of this result is that ROA is a 
measure of accounting performance, and CEOs who do well on this metric are 
rewarded more.  In fact, Murphy (1997) mentions ROA as an explicit bonus term 
in many CEO’s compensation schedules. This doesn’t explain the equity ratio 
though.  Also, these effects are much lower in the total regression (1), suggesting 
another explanation: omitted variable bias for firm size.  It seems likely that only 
large firms can obtain low equity-ratio, and large firms tend to be run better in a 
way that yields high ROA.  Thus, equity ratio and ROA are simply weak proxies 
for firm size in the absence of an explicit size variable.  This omitted variable 
story is strongly supported by comparing the 𝑅2 of (1), (2), and (4) and noting 
that firm characteristics have negligible residual 𝑅2 on top of firm size. 
Up to this point, this section has only reported some standard determinants 
of CEO pay.  To get towards the question of the impact of say-on-pay on CEO 
pay, consider regression (9), a univariate regression of CEO pay on the most 
recent say-on-pay vote.  Here the coefficient on vote fraction is negative.  Taken 
causally, this would seem to imply that receiving a low say-on-pay vote actually 
causes CEO pay to be higher – opposite to the intuition that say-on-pay is a 
disciplining mechanism.  However, this fails to take into account an important 
factor: reverse causality.  High CEO pay in 2011 is likely very related to high 
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CEO historical pay in 2010.  It is high historical pay that causes vote fraction to 
be so low in 2011, explaining the negative sign.  In other words, high 2011 pay is 
likely a correlated of 2010 overpay, which causes low 2011 vote fraction. 
Regression (10) adds the three groups of covariate back in along with vote 
fraction.  The sign on vote fraction is still negative.  This is not surprising as well 
– the same critique as regression (9) applies.  Namely, 2011 CEO pay is a positive 
residual predictor of historical overpay.  The historical overpay generate reverse 
causality on vote fraction. 
Regression (8) attempts to solve this problem by adding lagged CEO pay.  
Lagged pay clamps down on the reverse causality channel by controlling for pre-
existing overpay.  Sure enough, the sign on vote fraction flips signs to the 
intuitive forward causal one: high vote fraction results in higher pay next year 
controlling for last year’s pay.  Regression (7) shows again the importance of 
controlling for historical pay, especially in comparison to regression (9): just 
controlling for the reverse causality channel by adding historical pay to the 
univariate regression causes vote fraction to flip signs. 
The previous few regressions show that OLS regressions provide poor 
identification for the question of the causal effect of vote fraction on CEO pay.  
Reverse causality is shown to be a substantial issue here.  Even with reverse 
causality eliminated, there are problems of pre-existing differences between firms 
that receive high and low vote fractions.  As Table 2.1.2 amply shows say-on-pay 
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vote fraction is quite predictable on previous data, highlighting serious omitted 
variable bias issues. 
To wrap up the analysis on Table 2.3, note from regression (5) that last 
year’s pay alone has incredibly high predictability for this year’s CEO pay, with 
an 𝑅2 of .67.  This is substantially more than all the other factors combined in 
regression (1).  Further, once a regression includes previous pay, all other 
variables matter little.  The 𝑅2 of all other variables plus past pay in regression (7) 
is only .70.  Of course, past pay is not included in the standard literature on CEO 
pay because the standard literature is attempting to predict pay from other 
variables.  However, for the purposes of this paper, past pay is a legitimate 
covariate that demonstrably helps control for omitted variable issues.  Historical 
pay is so important that in the next OLS analysis, this paper explicitly differences 
out historical pay by looking at changes in pay.  
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Table 2.4: OLS Determinants of CEO Pay Change. 
OLS regression of change in CEO pay (PAY_CHANGE) on Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay vote 
fraction (DFSOP),  2009 to 2011 log returns (R), and 2010 and 2011 values of: market cap (M), 
book asset (AT), sales (SALE), book-to-market (AT/M or B/M), equity ratio (CEQ/AT), and 
return on asset (EBIT/AT or ROA).  
 
𝑃𝐴𝑌_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸2010−2011,𝑖  = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝐷𝐹𝑆𝑂𝑃 +  𝑐 𝑀2011,𝑖 + 𝑑 𝐴𝑇2011,𝑖 + 𝑒 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸2011,𝑖 + 𝑓 �𝐴𝑇2011,𝑖𝑀2011,𝑖 �+ 𝑔 �𝐶𝐸𝑄2011,𝑖
𝐴𝑇2011,𝑖 � + ℎ �𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇2011,𝑖𝐴𝑇2011,𝑖 � + 𝑖 𝑀2010,𝑖 + 𝑗 𝐴𝑇2010,𝑖 + 𝑘 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸2010,𝑖+ 𝑙 �𝐴𝑇2010,𝑖
𝑀2010,𝑖 � + 𝑚 �𝐶𝐸𝑄2010,𝑖𝐴𝑇2010,𝑖 � + 𝑛 𝑅2011,𝑖 + 𝑜 𝑅2010,𝑖 + 𝑝 𝑅2009,𝑖+ 𝑞 �𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇2010,𝑖
𝐴𝑇2010,𝑖 � + 𝑢𝑖 
 
Change in CEO pay (PAY_CHANGE) is defined as the difference between 2010 and 2011 total 
SEC reported pay, divided by the average total SEC reported pay over the two year as a fraction.  
All other variables are defined the same as in Table 2.1 and 2. T-statistics are heteroskedasticity 
robust.  Bold coefficients are significant at the 10% level. 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
N  1020  1020  1310 
𝑅2  .0502  .0520  .0104 
  b [t]  b [t]  b [t] 
Vote Fraction     .170 (1.05)  .3717  (3.25) 
          
2011 Market Cap  .152  (1.29)  .152 (1.29)    
2011 Book Assets  .340 (3.03)  .337 (2.99)    
2011 Sales  .022  (0.14)  .018 (0.12)    
2011 B/M  .037  (0.28)  -.137 (0.73)    
2011 Equity ratio  -.032  (0.58)  -.033 (0.61)    
2011 ROA  .004  (0.15)  .004  (0.20)    
          
2010 Market Cap  -.191  (1.47)  -.189  (1.46)    
2010 Book Assets  -.308  (2.45)  -.306  (2.43)    
2010 Sales  -.016  (0.10)  -.009  (0.06)    
2010 B/M  -.145  (0.78)  -.137  (0.73)    
2010 Equity ratio  .072  (1.06)  .075  (1.12)    
2010 ROA  -.041  (0.34)  -.043  (1.81)    
          
2011 Return  .061  (0.52)  .053  (0.44)    
2010 Return  -.015  (0.24)  -.027  (0.42)    
2009 Return  -.085  (2.37)  -.085  (2.38)    
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Table 2.5: OLS Determinants of Vote Fraction. 
OLS regression of Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay vote fraction (DFSOP) in 2011 on last year 
(2010) values of total CEO pay (TOTAL_SEC), change in total CEO pay (PAY_CHANGE), 
market cap (M), book assets (AT), sales (SALE), book-to-market (AT/M), equity ratio (CEQ/AT), 
ROA, and institutional ownership (IO), as well as 2008 – 2010 inclusive annual log returns.   
 
𝐷𝐹𝑆𝑂𝑃2011,𝑖  = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝑆𝐸𝐶2010 + 𝑐 𝑃𝐴𝑌_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸2009−2010 +  𝑑 𝑀2010,𝑖 + 𝑒 𝐴𝑇2010,𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸2010,𝑖 + 𝑔 �𝐴𝑇2010,𝑖𝑀2010,𝑖 � + ℎ �𝐶𝐸𝑄2010,𝑖𝐴𝑇2010,𝑖 � + 𝑖 �𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇2010,𝑖𝐴𝑇2010,𝑖 � + 𝑗 𝑅2010,𝑖+ 𝑘 𝑅2009,𝑖 + 𝑙 𝑅2008,𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
 
Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay vote fraction is a vote taken in 2011 regarding 2010 pay.  All regressors 
are chosen to be the latest possible data that is known by the time of the vote.  Change in CEO pay 
(PAY_CHANGE) is defined as the difference between 2009 and 2010 total SEC reported pay, 
divided by the average total SEC reported pay over the two year as a fraction.  IO is institutional 
ownership percent as a fraction defined in Table 2.1. All other variables are defined the same as 
in Table 2.1 and 2. T-statistics are heteroskedasticity robust.  Bold coefficients are significant at 
the 10% level. 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
N  1077  1198  1920  1988 
𝑅2  .1841  .0641  .0592  .0637 
  b [t]  b [t]  b [t]  b [t] 
Total CEO Pay  -.028 (2.53)  -.028 (5.10)  .372  (3.25)  .372  (3.25) 
Change in Pay   -.021 (2.82)  -.010 (1.47)       
             
Market Cap  -.016 (1.33)     -.013 (1.32)    
Book Assets  .023 (1.92)     .007 (0.72)    
Sales  -.002 (0.44)     -.002 (0.65)    
B/M  -.065 (2.21)     -.063 (3.01)    
Equity ratio  .000 (0.01)     .005 (0.57)    
ROA  .141 (1.84)     .097 (4.02)    
IO  -.060 (3.01)     -.078 (6.49)    
             
2010 Return  .109 (5.97)        .085 (8.52) 
2009 Return  .052 (4.41)        .031 (4.82) 
2008 Return  .054 (5.86)        .042 (7.67) 
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2.4.2 Changes in CEO Pay 
 This paper proceeds by examining predictors of CEO pay changes.  As 
argued previously, CEO pay change is the more appropriate variable on which to 
measure the impact of say-on-pay: it suffers much less from reverse causality 
issues.   
 Regression (1) runs a baseline regression of the change in CEO pay on 
both the 2011 and 2010 values of the standard predictors of CEO pay levels.  
These predictors were examined in the previous subsection and Table 2.3.  This 
includes 2011 and 2010 values for size variables, firm characteristics, and stock 
performance.  Two items to note is that the 2011 variables have generally the 
same signs as in the regression (1) from Table 2.3, while the 2010 variables have 
the opposite sign.  This is expected as the left hand side variable here is CEO pay 
variables difference across two years: 2011 minus 2010.   
However, the 𝑅2 is significantly lower on this regression than regression 
(1) from Table 2.3.  This suggests that differencing CEO pay between two years 
eliminated most of the predictable components of CEO pay.  This could be 
expected from realizing that most of the predictor variables like Total Asset or 
Market Value do not significantly change over the period of a year.6  Further, this 
result is not a surprise given the low residual predictive power demonstrated 
between regressions (5) and (6) in Table 2.3. 
                                                     
6 While a firm might easily halve or double in value over a given year, this change in market cap is 
a small fraction of the distribution of market caps across our universe of the Russell 3000. 
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In regression (3) of Table 2.4, this paper examines the straight up 
univariate regression of vote fraction on CEO pay change.  The sign here is 
significant and in the positive direction, showing that high vote fraction is 
correlated with positive pay changes.  Taken directly, this seems to say that firms 
do react to low vote fraction by reducing pay.  Regression (2) adds on the controls 
to vote fraction, which results in the same sign on vote fraction, although a 
smaller magnitude.  The smaller magnitude is not completely a surprise because 
as Table 2.5 will show much of the variation on vote fraction is predictable using 
the same covariates as those added in Regression (2).   The difference between (2) 
and (3) suggests that much of the predictable variation on vote fraction is still 
affecting pay.  This would be in line with the role of say-on-pay in reminding the 
board of the true cost of pay, and increasing the salience of their dissatisfaction 
(Hall and Murphy 2003; Jensen, Murphy and Wruck 2004).   
2.4.3 Dodd-Frank Say on Pay Vote fraction 
 Finally, this paper uses OLS regressions to descriptively explore vote 
fraction and how it correlates to other variables.  Table 2.5 includes as regressors 
the standard regressors as described in Table 2.3 for CEO compensation.  In 
addition, it includes as regressors past pay, motivated by its use in standard say-
on-pay studies (Cai and Walkling 2009).  The pay variables include pay levels as 
well as pay changes.  Institutional ownership is also added as it generally is highly 
affected by voting. 
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 This results in three natural a priori categories for covariates.  The first 
category consist pay measures: both levels and changes.  The second category 
consists of firm characteristics, including size, book-to-market, equity ratio, return 
on assets, and institutional ownership.  The final category consists of past returns 
for three year (See Table 2.5). 
 Regression (1) predicts vote fraction using all variables, while (2), (3), and 
(4) regress on each individual group described above.  Note that there are minimal 
interactions between all four regressions.  Comparisons of any regression with the 
all-in regression (1) do not show large changes in any variable’s value.  This 
signifies that the groups of variables are jointly orthogonal with each other.  This 
makes sense – returns are generally orthogonal with everything else.  Further, pay 
seems to be not strongly related to firm characteristics.  This is verified in Table 
2.3 where the only real predictors of pay is firm size, and even that had an 𝑅2 
of .25. 
 Further, note that the 𝑅2 of the total regression (1) is .18, and the 
regressions of each of the groups of variables are .06.  That they add up is a 
consequence of the orthogonality discussed above.  That they’re about the same in 
magnitude demonstrates that these factors almost equally contribute to vote – 
each component is similarly important. 
 Total pay negatively predicts vote fraction – this makes sense as historical 
overpay upsets investors and decreases their say-on-pay approval.  Note that this 
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was the reverse causality result of Table 2.3 regression (9).  Similarly, increase in 
pay in the last year predicts a lower vote fraction the following year.  Investors 
may see the increase in pay as excessive or arbitrary.   
  Firm size variables don’t seem to have a strong relationship with say-on-
pay.  Book to market is negatively related, which would be expected if a high 
B/M indicates a low market value from management leading the firm astray.  
ROA is similarly positively related to vote fraction, perhaps as a measure of CEO 
ability.  The equity ratio itself does not affect vote fraction.  Institutional 
ownership is negatively related to vote fraction, not surprisingly.  It is a well-
known result that institutional owners tend to wield more influence and express 
more displeasure with firms. 
 Finally, past returns are surprisingly good, robust, and consistent 
predictors of vote fraction.  Each year’s performance is positively related to vote 
fraction, and the magnitudes are nearly equal amongst the years.  Each year is 
highly robust as well.  The textbook goal of investors trying to maximize net 
present value seems right (Brealey Myers 2006).  Investors do normatively and 
positively see firm market value as the key objective for executives to maximize, 
insofar as they consistently censure CEOs that fail on that metric.   
 Overall, the OLS regressions shown in Table 2.1, Table 2.2, and Table 
2.7give significant insight into the relationship of the variables of each other.  
Primarily, it is seen that CEO pay levels are predictable mainly by size, but suffer 
from reverse causality if run against say-on-pay vote fraction.  CEO change levels 
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are less predictable and have a positive sign with respect to vote fraction.  Vote 
fraction itself is somewhat predictable, with equal predictability arising from past 
pay behavior, firm performance characteristics, and past returns of the firm. 
2.5 Regression Discontinuity Design Methodology 
This paper follows the theory of Van der Klaauw (2002) for regression 
discontinuity (RDD), and implements estimation of the discontinuity using local 
linear regressions due to its optimal rate properties (Porter 2003).  The bandwidth 
of the local linear regression is selected using the algorithm designed for this 
purpose in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009).  This RDD strategy is the gold 
standard implementation in the Stata software used. 
 
2.5.1 Basic Theory of Regression Discontinuity Design 
Let 𝑆 ∈ [0,1] be scoring variable, in the case of this paper, the Dodd-
Frank Say-on-Pay vote fraction, a continuous variable.  Also let 𝑇 ∈ {0,1} be a 
binary treatment variable be completely determined by the scoring variable.  In 
particular, define 𝑇 = 𝐼(𝑆 ≥ .5).  Here, the interpretation would be statutory 
passing the say-on-pay vote.  Let 𝑌 be any treatment variable.  In this paper, the 
treatment variable would include pay change, announcement day returns, change 
in company characteristics, and so forth.  The leading case will be percent year-
on-year change in compensation. 
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The causal variable that this paper will try to estimate is the impact of 
treatment on outcome.  A starting point would be a straight-up OLS estimator: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽 + 𝛼 ⋅ 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  (3) 
The variable of interest would then be𝛼.  However, 𝑇𝑖 is nonrandom and 
endogenous, and generally 𝐸[𝑢|𝑇] ≠ 0.  If the treatment effect depends on 
individuals, then the coefficient has no causal meaning (versus being 𝐸[𝛼𝑖] in the 
randomized case).   
 In this paper, the discontinuity is sharp, meaning that 𝑇 is identically 0 on [0,0.50) and 1 on [.50,1].  It is not fuzzy, with just a jump in treatment 
probability at .50 but not necessarily from 0 to 1.  This is a direct consequence of 
the definition of treatment here as statutory passing of say-on-pay vote.  The 
identification strategy will be based on the observation that a sample of firms 
within a small interval around the cutoff is similar to a randomized experiment at 
the cutoff.  One way to see this would be to interpret the randomization as the 
independent noise that might arise from voter noise such as a block voter missing 
a train to the company meeting.   
However, such independent randomization is not the only possible 
interpretation of RDD.  Firms right above and below the cutoff of .50 have 
essentially the same vote S, so on average the firms right above are very similar to 
the firms below when receiving treatment T.  Thus, as this interval decreases, 
there are vanishing confounds between the group to the left and group to the right 
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other than treatment.  The treatment effect then can be isolated by comparing the 
difference in average of the two local groups.   
 This logic leads to strong internal validity of the estimate.  The difference 
between the two groups can be highly attributed to the causal impact of 
treatment𝑇.  For treatments that vary between individuals, the estimate will 
converge to the average around the treatment 𝐸[𝛼𝑖|𝑇 = 𝑆].  The conditional 
operator indicates that since identification occurs with 𝑆 around 𝑇, inference 
outside this neighborhood will not necessarily be valid.   
 However, reducing the estimation neighborhood comes at the cost of 
increasing variance., as it decreases the sample size.  An alternative is to model 
the background impact of the vote fraction 𝑆 on outcomes 𝑌 directly.  The 
weakest possible assumption is that the direct impact of 𝑆 on outcomes 𝑌 is 
continuous (if it were not, the intuition above for comparing borderline groups 
would not be correct).  Thus the theory makes the following assumption: 
Assumption 1: The conditional mean function 𝐸[𝑢|𝑆] is continuous at the 
cutoff .50.   
This immediately gives that the causal effect of passing the vote is 
identified by: lim
𝑆↓.50 𝐸[𝑌|𝑆] − lim𝑆↑.50 𝐸[𝑌|𝑆] 
As a regularity assumption, since the cutoff is defined as being on the left-hand-
side of .50, it is also required that the theory has  
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Assumption 2: The mean treatment effect 𝐸[𝛼𝑖|𝑆] is right continuous 
at .50.   
However, in practice the entire premise of the RDD estimation is 
problematic if the treatment effect depends heavily on 𝑆.  Thus, an implicit 
underlying practical assumption here needed for economical meaningfulness of 
the estimate is that the average treatment is valid for a wide neighborhood around 
the cutoff. 
 Stronger assumptions about the conditional mean function, termed the 
“control function” 𝐸[𝑢|𝑇, 𝑆] increases the power of the test by allowing more data.  
If the control function 𝑘(𝑆𝑖) could be known perfectly, then the estimating 
equation 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽 + 𝛼 ⋅ 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑘(𝑆𝑖) + 𝜔𝑖    (5) 
would identify the causal treatment effect 𝛼 efficiently.  However, the control 
function itself is not known and needs to be estimated.  Original methods of 
estimating the control function include a simple linear function, suggested by 
Goldberger (1972) and Cain (1975).  Concerns about differential linear effects on 
both sides of the cutoff motivate differential estimation on each side.  Concerns 
about higher order effects further motivate higher order polynomial estimation.   
 In cases where control functions are estimated, misspecification is a 
serious concern.  Components of the control function that is orthogonal to 
estimation may load heavily on the discontinuity.  For example a cyclic control 
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function estimated with polynomials would show a discontinuity where none 
existed.  The discontinuity estimate varies strongly with specification, opening 
serious data snooping concerns.  The state of the art technique, which this paper 
uses, is non-parametric estimation, which minimizes specification error.  In 
particular, this theory uses a local linear regression, with optimal bandwidth for 
this purpose as proposed by Imbens and Kalyaraman (2009).   
 Due to the local linear regression used to estimate the control function, we 
impose a stricter Assumption 1’: the control function 𝑘(𝑆𝑖) is continuously 
differentiable.  In the equation above, differential treatment effect 𝐸[𝛼𝑖|𝑆] is 
rolled into the control function, so this paper imposes a stronger Assumption 2’: 
the treatment effect function 𝐸[𝛼𝑖|𝑆] is continuously differentiable.  For power in 
practical estimation using locally linear regressions, it is important that the 
functions not only be continuously differentiable, but that the continuity be 
uniform.  Ideally if we define the modulus of continuous differentiability as: 
𝜔 ≔ sup
𝑥,𝑦 |𝑘′(𝑦) − 𝑘′(𝑥)||𝑦 − 𝑥|  
Then the modulus should be low with respect to the number of data points present.  
The magnitude of this modulus directly affects the power of discontinuity 
estimator. 
 More intuitively, the baseline effect 𝑘 not at the discontinuity . 50  should 
be decently linear and well behaved.  For this paper’s leading case of looking at 
the effect of say-on-pay on change in pay, refer to Figure 2.1.  The linearity of 
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bins heights before and after the discontinuity provides suggestive evidence that 
the control function is well-estimated by a locally linear function.  Proceeding 
with this estimation, this paper arrives at a graph in Figure 2.2 of a discontinuity.  
With these assumptions, this paper goes ahead and uses estimator (5) with 
nonparametric locally linear functions for 𝑘(𝑆𝑖) to estimate many other treatment 
effect at the discontinuity.   
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Panel A: 1.0x Optimal Bandwidth 
 
 
Panel B: 0.5x Optimal Bandwidth    Panel C: 2.0x Optimal Bandwidth 
 
Figure 2.2: Kernel Regression Discontinuity Plot of Total CEO Pay Change vs Vote Fraction. 
Plots of Total CEO Pay Change (%) between 2010 and 2011 versus 2011 vote fraction.  The grey 
scatter plot show the raw data, while the superimposed lines show a non-parametric kernel 
regression above (green) and below (red) the cutoff.  The kernel regression allows a discontinuity 
at 0, and the optimal bandwidth is defined as in Imbens and Kalyaranaman (2009).   
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2.6 Defining the Treatment 
The treatment in our paper, the binary variable corresponding to 𝑇𝑖 in our 
theory above, is whether a firm receives approval in its Dodd-Frank say-on-pay 
vote.  The vote is advisory, so unlike a shareholder vote for a director or a bylaw, 
there is no mandatory action that occurs between passing and failing.  Failing a 
vote mandates neither a reconvention of the compensation committee nor any 
docking of CEO pay.   
Therefore, the paper first sets out to establish that a discrete effect might 
indeed be expected to occur at the cutoff.  The evidence for this will come from 
language on the SEC form, the discrete effect on publicity from failing, and the 
voluntary emphasis of firms themselves on the passage or failure of say-on-pay.   
First, we show that there is indeed a statutorily discrete change that occurs 
at the 50% cutoff.  SEC Form DEF 14A serves as the official authoritative and 
detailed instructions for investor voting.  DEF 14A presents material information 
on which investors may rely for their votes, such as the compensation package 
being offered to the CEO for the past year.  DEF 14A also defines the exact 
statutory meaning of the vote.  As demonstrated in Figure 2.3 Panel A, most firms 
have language precisely stating that for passage of the advisory vote, “a majority 
is required”.  In the context of DEF 14A this is precise language meaning 50% 
exactly or above, the same language used for binding votes like voting in board 
members.  Some firms further state whether abstentions count in the denominator 
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when calculating this precise 50% Figure. In practice, almost no firm’s say-on-
pay passage is affected by abstentions.  A copy of the proxy vote form is shown in 
Figure 2.3 Panel B.   
Firms then report the results of the vote in SEC Form 8-K.  The wording 
of the results has very wide latitude, with some firms opting to use data tables, 
and others describing the results.  Many firms use a standardized table which 
shows either “Approved” or “Not Approved” as a standard column (Figure 2.3 
Panel C).  This format of report again emphasizes the discreteness of passing 
versus not.  Even firms that do not use the column format will mentioned their 
votes were approved somewhere, perhaps in paragraph form.  Even though few 
firms emphasize disapproval, the inability to say the vote was approved is a 
discrete change. 
On the media front especially, disapproval has special meaning.  The Wall 
Street Journal hosts a “shame list” of all firms that have failed say-on-pay.  Many 
law firms, such as Semler Brossy and Sullivan Cromwell, have lists of all failing 
companies on their website.  More than a dozen lawsuits have been filed against 
companies relying on the finding that the company failed its say-on-pay vote 
(Hickok and Rainville 2013).  While these lawsuits often do not succeed due to 
the advisory nature of the votes, that the suits mainly rely on say-on-pay failure as 
the basis is significant.  One example of a USA Today article that named and 
emphasized all failing firms within a certain scope is shown in Figure 2.4 Panel A.  
111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Vote Instructions from SEC Form DEF 14A 
 
Proposal 11 (advisory “say on pay”):    This proposal requires the approval of a majority of votes 
cast at a meeting at which a quorum is present. 
 
 
Panel B: Proxy Vote Form from SEC Form DEF 14A 
 
 
Panel C: Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay Vote Results from SEC Form 8K 
 
Figure 2.3: Vote Instructions, Forms, and Results. 
This figure shows three facsimile excerpts of various Dodd-Frank say-on-pay voting documents 
from Exxon Mobile Corporation (XOM).  Panel A excerpts vote instructions written by a firm for 
its investors on SEC Form DEF 14A.  Panel B excerpts the proxy vote form itself.  This form is 
contained in SEC Form DEF 14A and is physically used by investors to vote on Say-on-Pay.  
Panel C excerpts the firm reporting Say-on-Pay vote results through SEC Form 8K 
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Panel A: USA Today Names Companies that Failed Say-on-Pay 
 
 
Panel B: USA Today Names Companies that Failed Say-on-Pay 
 
“We held our first advisory stockholder vote on executive compensation at our annual stockholder 
meeting in 2011. We received an affirmative advisory vote, with over 53% of the shares voted 
casting votes in favor of our say-on-pay proposal. While we received a positive vote, the 
Compensation Committee strives to receive as high a vote as possible from the stockholders with 
respect to advisory approval of executive compensation. The Compensation Committee 
considered whether changes needed to be made mid-year to 2011 compensation, and decided not 
to make changes in 2011 in light of the affirmative vote.” – Rigel Pharmaceuticals (DEF 14A 
2012/04/12) 
 
“Following the annual shareholders’ meeting in 2011, the Board agreed that simply rethinking and 
redesigning our compensation programs was not enough to address shareholders’ obvious 
concerns about lack of profitability and the Company’s executive compensation policies. Instead, 
the Board decided it was crucial to start at the Company’s very foundation.” After 48% approval 
rate, Stewart Information Services.  Following this announcement, the firm fired a CEO, created 
an independent board, and made the Chief of HR independent from the CEO. 
Figure 2.4: Citations of Approval or Rejection of Say-on-Pay. 
The facsimiles below show citations of when a company’s Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay vote is 
approved versus rejected.  Panel A shows a USA Today story naming companies that failed the 
vote.  Panel B shows companies citing the vote approval or rejection as reason behind certain 
actions.  The companies in Panel B were selected to be right near the cutoff. 
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Finally, the companies themselves cite approval or failure as explicit 
reasons in changing their compensation policy.  Figure 2.4 Panel B shows a 
particularly striking example, where one firm that barely passed emphasized the 
passage of say-on-pay as approval for their current compensation plans, and 
continued with their package.  On the other hand, another firm saw its failure of 
say-on-pay as reason to massively shake up the executive team.  Many such 
examples exist, and a large portion of firms around the vote cutoff of 50% cite 
approval or failure for specific actions that they take. 
While it is possible that such citation may not be causal, and instead be 
rhetorical, the fact that it is emphasized so much does suggest that there is discrete 
impact at the cutoff, whatever the cause.  And further evidence goes to show that 
it is likely not all rhetorical.  Table 2.6 shows that besides discrete changes in 
citing approval or regret, there are large differences in structural pay changes or 
off cycle pay changes on the two sides of the cutoff.  For both pay change types, 
the majority of firms right above the payoff did not make changes, and the 
majority of firms to the left did, with large differences in the two groups.  
By examining SEC forms, the discrete effect on publicity from failing, and 
the voluntary emphasis of firms themselves on the passage or failure of say-on-
pay, we have shown that there is likely reason to believe that a discrete effect 
would occur at 50%.  The data on CEO pay and other outcomes supports this 
hypothesis strongly.  
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Table 2.6: Pay Policy around Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay Vote Cutoff. 
Comparison of payout policy of the 10 companies immediately above and below the 2011 vote 
cutoff.  The Table examine whether the DEF 14A 1) mentions the word “approved” or “favored” 
for last year’s vote 2) mentions the word “regret” for last year’s pay policy 3) explicitly mentions 
a change in pay structure, and 4) explicitly mentions a pay change off-cycle.   
 
 Mentions Approved or 
Favored 
Express Regret Structural 
Pay Change 
Off Cycle-Pay 
Change 
Below Cutoff 0 of 10 9 of 10 9 of 10 6 of 10 
Above Cutoff 7 of 10 3 of 10 4 of 10 2 of 10 
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2.7 Main Results: Impact of Votes 
2.7.1 Graphical Evidence of Impact on Total Pay 
Figure 2.1 shows the percentage change in total pay from 2010 to 2011 as 
the Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay vote fraction varies.  To be non-parametric about the 
dependency of pay change on vote fraction, the firms are assigned to 5% bins at 
round cutoffs.  Observe that generally the dependency of pay change on vote 
fraction is continuous.  However, at the 50% cutoff point, there is a discrete jump 
in pay.  In fact, the bins below and above the 50% mark are the only ones where 
the 95% confidence intervals do not overlap.   
Also note that the relationship between vote fraction and pay change does 
not seem monotonic.  While we do not run any formal tests, non-monotonicity is 
not a surprise.  An immediate explanation is that firms already have some idea of 
their say-on-pay vote fraction before it occurs.  They can predict using surveys of 
investors, news articles, as well as econometric regressions.  Balsam and Yin 
(2012) provide strong evidence of vote predictability.  Thus 2010 pay is set 
conditional the company’s prior expectations for the vote fraction.  A 48% vote 
then can be worse news than a 30% vote; in the 48% vote case the company may 
have thought they would have passed, whereas a 30% vote firm likely knew they 
would fail.  Analogously, a 52% vote could be better news than a 70% vote.  This 
then would explain the non-monotonicity in pay change, especially the non-
monotonicity observed around the 50% cutoff. 
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Simple bins like Figure 2.1 provide graphical evidence of the discontinuity 
and give a sense of the size of discontinuity.  However, it is not rigorous – the 
boundary of the bins do not account for optimal bandwidth.  Bins can be too large 
and suffer from bias if the effect of the score variable is no longer constant across 
the bin.  Bins can be too small and lose power.  Thus this paper proceeds run 
optimal-bandwidth non-parametric estimates. 
 
2.7.2 RDD Regression of Total CEO Pay and Robustness 
The graphical output of say-on-pay vote fraction on change in Total CEO 
Pay is shown in Figure 2.2.  Here this paper again sees a large discontinuity before 
and after 50%.  There is again also non-monotonicity.  The theorized reason of 
non-monotonicity above, that it comes from outcome surprise, is again validated 
here, as the non-monotonicity is confined to around 50%, and is more obvious for 
smaller kernel bandwidths.   
Table 2.7 shows that the estimate of the change in pay is quite significant: 
corresponding to a 59.8% rise in pay at the 50% cutoff.7  The t-stat is also strong 
at above 4.0, providing evidence against data snooping.  While this may seem like 
a large change, note that CEO pay changes as a baseline are quite variable.  A 
                                                     
7  Note that to calculate the 59.8% figure, this paper uses as the denominator the average of the 
two years.  By way of example, a drop from $100,000 to $50,000 would be calculated 
as$100,000−$50,000$100,000+$50,000
2
= 67%.  All changes are thus bounded between +200% and -200%.  The paper 
calculates changes this way to avoid outlier effects on estimates, and changing the calculation base 
year to either the first year or the second year does not qualitatively change estimates. 
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majority fraction of all CEO pay comes from non-salary components, which 
allows for this variance.  In fact, as the Table 2.1 summary statistics shows, the 
standard deviation of CEO pay change is itself 47%.  Thus, the pay rise at the 
cutoff represents about 1.3 standard deviations of CEO pay change.  Further, the 
59.8% rise in pay matches the magnitude of the OLS estimate of CEO pay change 
as the vote fraction changes by a standard deviation (see Table 2.4), providing 
validation that the magnitude is correct. 
This paper further verifies the regression through a few more robustness 
checks.  First, this paper tests against the main misspecification possible with non-
parametric estimates, bandwidth selection.  Using both double and half the 
optimal bandwidth, Table 2.3 Panel B shows that the total pay change % is still 
large and significant (t>3).  In fact, all estimates lie within the original estimate’s 
95% confidence interval, providing a measure of internal validation.   
Figure 2.1 Panels B and C show the graphical plot of these alternate-
bandwidth regressions.  For the 0.5x optimal bandwidth estimate, the non-
monotonicity around 50% is clearer, and the non-parametric fit to this non-
linearity gives a higher estimate of the discontinuity.  For the 2.0x optimal 
bandwidth, other than a linear fit, the two sides of the discontinuity are treated as 
approximately constants.  As expected, a broader bandwidth goes more towards 
the naïve regression case as shown in equation (3). 
The next robustness check that this paper runs is dummy tests at the 45% 
and 55% cutoff.  Unlike the suggestive a priori evidence for the 50% cutoff, there 
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is no reason to believe that these two points should have any special significance.  
Indeed, we see that for both cases in Table 2.7 Panel B, the t-stats are well below 1.  
Thus, running cutoffs at these points provides a baseline giving suggestive 
evidence to the validity of the 50% result, much like a bootstrap.  Additionally 
these baselines provide evidence against a mere round-number effect as well. 
As a final robustness check, the paper tests to see whether there is a 
discontinuity at the 50% cutoff for pre-existing variables like market 
capitalization, levels of CEO pay, SIC code, and past year pay changes.  No 
discontinuity are found in any such pre-existing variables, although given the 
small sample size, this robustness check does not have a large amount of power. 
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Table 2.7: Main Results: Changes in Company Characteristics at the Vote Threshold. 
This Table presents univariate discontinuity regressions of changes of various independent 
variables (𝑌𝑖) on Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay using discontinuity kernel regressions (function 𝑘) with 
optimal bandwidth.  The sample is the same as Table 2.1.  The coefficient 𝛼 on the discontinuity 
indicator is shown below.  The regression run is: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽 + 𝛼 ⋅ 𝐼(𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸 > 50%) + 𝑘(𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸) + 𝜔𝑖     
Base variables from Table 2.1 & 2 are differenced between 2010 and 2011 to obtain 𝑌𝑖.  Percent 
(%) differences for a base variable 𝑋 is calculated as (𝑋𝑡+1 − 𝑋𝑡)/((𝑋𝑡+1 + 𝑋𝑡)/2).  Percentage 
point (pp) differences for a base percent variable 𝑋 is 𝑋𝑡+1 − 𝑋𝑡. Panel A regresses against CEO 
Pay Variables. Panel B checks the robustness of CEO pay results; 0.5x and 2.0x indicates a kernel 
regression with half and double the optimal bandwidth; and 45%,55% indicating redefining the 
cutoff from 50% to those points.  Panel C extends the data to 2012 for the plus or minus 20% 
region around the ctuff.  Panel D regresses against company accounting and other variables.  
Unless specified otherwise, the cutoff is defined at 50%, and the kernel bandwidth is 1x the 
optimal.  t-statistics in parenthesis are calculated via Nichols (2007), with p<10% bold. 
  N  Pass (𝛼) 
  Panel A: CEO Pay   
 Total CEO Pay Change 2010-2011 (%) 1,325  59.8% 
  (4.05) 
 Salary as fraction of Total Pay (pp) 1,325 -13.1% 
  (2.47) 
 Bonus as fraction of Total Pay (pp) 1,325   -7.9% 
  (1.81) 
 Options as fraction of Total Pay (pp) 1,325    6.4%  
  (0.67) 
  Panel B: Robustness of CEO Pay   
 0.5x Optimal Bandwidth 1,325 70.7% 
 (3.88) 
 2.0x Optimal Bandwidth 1,325 47.5% 
 (3.35) 
 45% dummy cutoff 1,325 11.7%  
 (0.44) 
 55% dummy cutoff 1,325   0.5%  
 (0.03) 
  Panel C: Extension of Data to 2012   
 Total Pay Change 2010 to 2012, -20%; +20% around cutoff 116 48.0% 
 (1.98) 
 Total Pay Change 2011 to 2012, -20%; +20% around cutoff 116 44.8% 
(1.65) 
  Panel D: Company Financials   
 Announcement Date Return (pp) 2,188 -0.0%  
  (0.11) 
 EBIT (%) 2,175 -35.9% 
  (1.82) 
 Dividend (%) 2,175    0.2%  
  (0.31) 
 Paying Dividends (pp) 2,175   -4.3%  
  (1.28) 
 Equity ratio (pp) 2,175  18.6%  
  (1.11) 
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2.7.3 Extension to Further Years 
Finally, one strong piece of validity comes from extending the data year to 
2012, much of which is being reported during the writing of this paper (and such 
data releases will occur up until the end of calendar year 2013).   I manually 
collect 2012 data, including the portion of accounting, compensation, and other 
data that is missing from databases to construct a 2012 data set.  I collect two 
datasets.  The first consist of firms who are within 20 percentage points the 2011 
vote cutoff for which full 2012 data is available.  The second dataset consists of 
firms who are within 20 percentage points of the 2012 vote cutoff for which full 
2012 data is available. 
On this dataset, I run two RDDs.  The first RDD looks at the same 2011 
50% cutoff as the rest of the paper, but with the predicted variable being total 
CEO pay change between 2010 and 2012 (versus 2010 to 2011).  As Table 2.7 
Panel B show, the 2010 to 2012 total CEO pay change as a result of passing say-
on-pay is 48% and statistically significant.   
This provides evidence for the robustness of the 2010-2011 result, and 
also goes on to show that the pay results do not revert away.  One concern with 
the pay drop at the 50% cutoff is whether the change in pay is temporarily put in 
place just to appease investors.  Even worse would be the case where the board 
implicitly delays pay to give the impression of next year pay drop, while the NPV 
of pay stays in same.  The extension of the result from one to two years shows no 
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such inclinations.  The pay drop seems to stay in place, with minimal statistical 
evidence of further pay drops or reversions. 
 The second RDD on the new data set looks at a different set of firms.  
Instead of the firms around the same 2011 vote cutoff as the rest of the paper, the 
regression examines firms around the 2012 vote cutoff, generally a different set of 
firms.  The predicted variable is the 2011 to 2012 change in total CEO pay.  This 
is the analogue of our baseline 2011 regression shifted up by one year.   
 As Table 2.7 Panel B shows, the regression coefficient is significant at the 
10% level with an estimated increase in total CEO pay at the cutoff of 44.8%.  
The low power may be attributed to the much smaller data-set, less than 1/10th the 
full sample size due to limitations in the number of companies who have released 
2012 data, especially in redistribution databases like EXECUCOMP.   
 In terms of size, 44.8% is in line with the baseline data.  The ability to 
reproduce the result in future years provides external validation of the baseline 
result – especially since the 2012 data was created after the first draft of this paper 
and thus being truly out of sample. 
 Further, that the effect works in 2012 data shows that the effect is not 
limited to the first year of implementation.  This may be thought to be the case 
since Dodd-Frank was only signed into law in the middle of 2010, and so the 
surprise of such a reinforcement system might be limited to the first year.   
 That the magnitude is lower than in the first year is in line with the 
informal theory that previous-year pays are already adjusted for company 
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expectations of say-on-pay vote fraction.  For 2011, with more data, companies 
might make more accurate predictions of next year’s vote fraction.  This would 
reduce future year’s pay changes, if pay changes are partially seen as a measure of 
censure surprise from say-on-pay.  Thus the lower magnitude from 2012 data may 
have a common explanation from the non-monotonicity around the 50% cutoff. 
 
2.7.4 Composition of Salary 
Ample evidence above shows that say-on-pay has causal impact on Total 
CEO Pay.  The total CEO pay clearly changes at the cutoff.  However, what about 
the composition of CEO pay?  It seems unlikely that composition would stay 
exactly the same.  If that were the case, then salary, bonus, and options would all 
see the exact same 59.8% increase.  There is much reason a priori to believe some 
pay terms (bonuses) are more flexible than others (salary).   
On one front, salary, bonus, and options have different incentive 
properties.  One might imagine the cut that the board implements as the vote 
fraction falls from 50.1% to 49.9%.  To maintain the same power of incentive for 
CEOs to work, the board might shift the composition of pay from low-powered 
components like salary to high-powered components like options and bonuses.  
This would be in line with later results this paper, which show that pay cut from 
failing say-on-pay does not cause a drop in firm value or accounting measures: 
CEO pay cuts reduce average pay while maintaining incentives.  This would be 
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the type of pay change advocated by Murphy (1999) and Bebchuk and Fried 
(2007). 
However, such a pay shift is not observed in the data.  The fall from 50.1% 
to 49.9% does not cause a drop in salary and an increase in high power incentives, 
as observable in Table 2.7 Panel A8.  Instead, the effect is exactly the opposite: 
salary is the most stable, getting cut the least.  Bonuses are second most stable 
getting cut more than salary but still less than proportionately.  Options and other 
compensation are the least stable, getting cut more than proportionately.   This 
does not align with the incentives theory: the highest-power components of pay 
are cut the most.  As an econometric note, I calculate components of total pay as a 
fraction instead of a level because the division controls for large common noise in 
total pay to improve the power of the tests. 
However, this pattern of pay cuts lines up well with another consideration.  
Salaries are often the least flexible portion of pay.  It is set out beforehand in 
many contracts, or otherwise expected to match some historical amount.  Also, it 
is precisely because salaries don’t depend on the vagaries of performance or 
circumstance that it is the most secure.  From an agency-tradeoff point of view, it 
is the portion of pay that is most valuable to the CEO for a fixed expected value 
(Gabaix and Landier 2008).  Thus, as pay is cut, in order to meet a minimum 
threshold to keep a CEO onboard, it makes sense to shift pay into more stable 
                                                     
8 The Table shows the transition in the opposite direction, from 49.9% to 50.1%.  To match the 
verbal analysis to the table then simply take the negative sign. 
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portions like salary (Hölmstrom and Kaplan 2001, 2003) .  In this sense, the shift 
from high power to low powered incentives indicates that maintaining the IR 
constraint takes precedence over maintaining the IC constraint.  Conversely, 
portions of pay like bonuses, and especially options, are incredibly volatile.  Not 
only do they respond to the CEOs effort, but they also vary based on items that 
are outside of the CEO’s control like the decline of the industry, and they are 
highly positively correlated with other parts of a CEO’s implicit wealth, like job 
prospects. 
Thus, the risk-based explanation highlight the fact that for the same 
expected dollar, a fixed salary is worth a lot more to the CEO than as part of an 
options package.  When pay is cut, to keep the CEO onboard, it is natural in this 
framework to cut the options portion.  Combine this with the institutional 
observation that boards often have a lot more year-to-year discretion over non-
salary portions, and this paper arrives at an explanation for why pay cuts come 
mostly from non-salary portions. 
2.7.5 Announcement Date Returns and Other Company Financials 
The previous section shows that say-on-pay vote fraction has high impact 
on pay.   What is the impact of the vote fraction on other characteristics of the 
firm, either through the pay channel or directly?   
The first variable to examine is the announcement day return from say-on-
pay passing.  After the meeting in which the say-on-pay vote is taken, a few days 
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later the result is announced via SEC Form 8-K.  The announcement day return is 
defined as the stock return from the last close-of-market stock price before the 
announcement to the first close-of-market stock price after the announcement.   
The announcement day return generally spans a single market day, and so has low 
unconditional variance and high power.  
Table 2.7 Panel D shows that there is no announcement day return to 
passing or failing say-on-pay.  The 95% confidence bounds are quite narrow at 
spanning [-1.4%, 1.6%].  This is significantly different from the 2.8% Figure that 
Cuñat Gine Guadalupe (2012b) finds for the passage of a generic vote.  This 
implies that even though CEOs are paid significantly less on failing say-on-pay, 
the market did not predict that the lowered pay would have a significant adverse 
impact on firm value.  This suggests that CEOs at the margin are indeed overpaid 
if their pay can be cut without harming firm value.  This provides evidence 
against a Murphy (1999) story of politically induced underpayment of CEO 
salaries.  At the same time, the zero announcement day result also suggests that 
investors are voting optimally.  A consistent positive or negative effect would 
prove that investors are either consistently over voting or under voting.  A zero 
result suggests investor efficiency in voting. 
Such an interpretation is borne out in examining the impact of the say-on-
pay vote cutoff on other company accounting variables.  Table 2.7 Panel D shows 
that the cutoff has no impact on other company accounting variables for the year 
forward as well.  The insignificant announcement day stock reaction is correctly 
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predicting that real accounting variable changes in the next year will be 
insignificant as well.  As total CEO pay is drastically reduced under the vote 
cutoff, this paper finds no evidence that at the same time of any reduction in 
dividends, probability of paying dividends, finance policy, or earnings. 
In these results, it is important to note that earnings does seem marginally 
significant.  Being below the cutoff reduces CEO pay while at the same time 
raising next year’s earnings.  Both failing say-on-pay and the subsequent pay cut 
are signals to the CEO that his or her job is at risk.  One interpretation is that the 
CEO as a result works harder to raise real earnings.  That would suggest that 
failing say-on-pay improves the value of the firm.  However, this contradicts the 
tight bound around zero of the announcement date stock return.  Likely an 
alternate story is happening: the CEO responds to this increased pressure through 
earnings management.  He or she delays depreciation, channel stuffs, and employs 
other standard accounting tricks.  The CEO has discretion on when to recognize 
bad news and may simply be delaying that.   
Another important note is that company accounting variables are 
particularly noisy because they are measured over the course of a year.  The low 
power is exacerbated by the RDD identification only occurring at the margin, 
reducing effective sample size even more.  The lack of accounting variable 
significance should not be taken as strong proof that say-on-pay has no effect, but 
rather lack of proof of any effect.  Announcement day returns suffer much less 
from this power issue due to its low noise to start out with. 
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Another possible analysis with this data is in the instrumental setting.  If it 
can be assumed that say-on-pay failure operates solely through reducing CEO pay, 
then this can be seen as an exclusion restriction.  Say-on-pay can then serve as an 
instrument in estimating the elasticity of firm characteristics with respect to CEO 
pay.  Under this interpretation, no firm characteristics have significant elasticity 
with respect to pay, except earnings which has negative elasticity.  There is 
substantial reason to believe that exclusion restriction might not hold.  Primarily, 
changes in CEO pay over a year cannot be seen as equivalent to having a lower 
overall level of pay – the first lowers pay but also sends a signal to the CEO that 
his or her job is at risk.  This confound muddles elasticity estimates. 
2.8 Extensions 
As this paper relies on recent data, there are many obvious extensions, 
including both the data and the content being tested. 
2.8.1 Data Extensions 
 The baseline data set here consists of two years of data: 2010 and 2011.  
Because the regressions require a lagged year for changes, there is only one year’s 
worth of regression data.  The paper makes an attempt at extension into 2012 for 
three years of data (and two years’ worth of regression data).  The results of this 
selective extension can be seen in Table 2.7 Panel C.  However, since say-on-pay 
votes will happen annually, even in the next few years, it is expected that the 
relative amount of data available for analysis will increase tremendously.  The 
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standard error on total CEO one-year pay change rests at about 14-20% right now, 
even with two years of data.  In another decade, the data set will have increased to 
more than 12 years, giving us much smaller standard errors of less than 5%.  
While this paper already shows great t-stats of above 4 for some tests, new data 
will rapidly increase the power of the test and identify the exact size of the total 
CEO pay effect.  This observation is not a trivial one that applies to all papers: it 
applies to this one especially because of the low number of years of data it relies 
on, and the guarantee of more annual data for the foreseeable future. 
 With more power, a few extra questions might be answered.  Is the pay 
effect different between small firms and large firm?  Historical studies of pay 
show large differences in composition and nature of pay between the firm types 
(Murphy 1999).  Further, many theories of increasing CEO pay depend crucially 
on firm size (Gabaix and Landier 2008).  This question can be answered by 
running an interaction of the treatment variable with log firm market cap.  Similar 
studies can be done on industry, value, and other covariates. 
 One arena that extra power would especially help on is identifying 
company characteristic changes.  As mentioned before EBIT, dividend, and 
financing policy are noisy measures.  The magnitudes estimated in Table 2.7 Panel 
C are not small economically: a -4.3 percentage point drop in firms paying 
dividends would be economically interesting, and more data would help identify 
that.  Similarly, EBIT which seems marginally significant can either be confirmed 
or denied for sure.  The identification of other firm characteristics seems like one 
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of the most interesting uses of the extra power from future years.  Under the 
instrumental interpretation of these firm characteristics, one can finally answer the 
question of the causal elasticity of firm behavior based on pay change.  How do 
CEOs run their firms differently when pay changes? 
 Another arena to be verified with more data is the permanence of the total 
CEO pay change on the vote cutoff.  With that high initial magnitude, an 
interesting question is how quickly it reverts away.  Is the pay just shifted to a 
later date, or is failing a say-on-pay vote a reminder to the board that the general 
level of their pay is much too high, and so when they cut pay, the cut is permanent?  
Evidence from two years of data shows no reversion in pay, suggesting the later 
explanation, but it would be useful to still confirm the fact. 
 Extensions of the impact on failing say-on-pay to multiple years are 
especially important because generally pay contracts are set well ahead of time.  
Consider the 2011 Dodd Frank say-on-pay vote: the board is technically asking 
for investor approval of the past year’s (2010) pay, but because the compensation 
committee has already done its work, rarely is the pay backwards-modified even 
on heavily negative vote.  As can be logically induced and also gleaned from 
reading the SEC DEF 14A, most boards take the 2011 feedback on 2010 pay into 
account when setting 2011 pay.  Even then some boards note that their hands are 
tied to changing pay due to past contracts.  Thus, it may take many years for the 
full impact of Dodd-Frank say-on-pay to be felt.  Hence, multiple-year predictions 
will be able to tease this distinction out. 
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 A similar case exists for looking at company accounting variables and 
stock returns.  If markets are not efficient, announcement-day returns are not 
sufficient for capturing the value change.  CEOs may act with a lag, so to see the 
real impact of a pay cut on company performance, it may take more years of data.   
 Regardless of the case, the primary extension of this paper would involve 
collecting more data as it arises, and then using that extra data to 1) obtain more 
precise estimates 2) obtain estimates of interaction terms and 3) obtain longer 
duration change estimates. 
2.8.2 Method Extensions 
 On the content front, one main result of this is that Dodd-Frank say-on-
pay votes have real impact on CEO pay.  Do other mandates have such impact?  
For example, Dodd-Frank also has a provision that requires firms to hold votes 1, 
2, or 3 years depending on the desire of the shareholders.  Does that provision 
impact pay or company valuation?  If one imagines that CEO pay is generally too 
high, then being randomized into the 1-year group might immediately reduce pay 
and increase stock value.  Future votes mandated by law can be used by in a RDD 
setting for these purposes as well. 
 Also, another area that this paper attempts to delve into is the impact of 
pay on firm performance.  To that end, other instruments can be discovered that 
affect pay.  One might believe for say-on-pay that perhaps there might be random 
noise in which block voters (institutions) votes in a given year.  Since most say-
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on-pay failures are related to institutional voters (see Summary Statistics Table 
2.1), and institutional voters often follow ISS recommendations, instruments 
might be found in the ISS recommendation procedure.  For example, if the ISS 
itself uses scoring, then a RDD can be run on the ISS internal score.   
 Finally, more power can be obtained if approval of Dodd Frank say-on-
pay requires a higher number of votes.  Since the median approval rate is much 
higher than 50%, having an approval cutoff of say even 70% would substantially 
increase the test power.  Of course, the vote fractions might endogenously shift if 
the cutoff changes.  Investors might vote more favorably knowing that the cutoff 
is higher.  As long as the compensation effect is not one-for-one, the data can 
obtain higher power. 
2.9 Conclusion 
Few studies in executive compensation and corporate governance have 
strong identification.  This is a particular issue with CEO pay, which is often set 
far in advance and whose impact manifests over a larger number of years.  This 
paper obtains identification on both topics by exploiting a novel variation: that 
from voter noise around the 50% cutoff on the Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay vote. 
The paper began by looking at non-identified OLS studies of CEO pay, 
CEO pay change, and say-on-pay vote fraction.  These regressions show that 
reverse causality and omitted variables seriously confound the OLS analysis.  At 
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the same time, the regressions revealed descriptive insights into what other 
variables commove with these three. 
When a firm receives just slightly below 50% of votes versus above, that 
firm statutorily fails say-on-pay and experiences discretely increased censure and 
thus discretely decrease next year CEO pay.  This paper first verifies that such an 
effect does occur by examining media announcements, SEC DEF 14A narratives, 
vote forms, SEC 8-K vote results, and next-year SEC DEF 14A commentary on 
past years votes. 
This paper then exposits the theory of optimal-bandwidth kernel 
regression discontinuity design, and uses this design to estimate the magnitude of 
the decrease at 59.8%.  This estimate causal, economically substantial, and is 
robust to variation of the kernel estimation bandwidth.  The paper further 
validates this number using next-year data (2012), and by showing that this 
decrease is sustained for two years (2010-2012), the entire data span available as 
of this writing. 
Like many regression discontinuity studies, the causal identification has 
excellent internal validity.  However, there is no guarantee of external validity.  
The causal effect is completely estimated on firms that receive around a 50% vote 
fraction.  These firms may have unique properties that are specific to them – like 
have overpaid CEOs whose salary can be cut without hurting the firm.  In taking 
all causal inferences from this study, it is worthy to keep in mind the local average 
treatment effect nature of the estimate (Imbens and Angrist 1994). 
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This paper then looks at the percentage point of total CEO pay that 
consists of salary, bonus, and options.  This paper deduces that the cut comes less 
from salary more from bonuses, and most from options.  This is in line with a 
risk-based compensation theory where the most risky dollars are cut first due to 
their relatively lower value to the CEO.  The data also lines up with the fact that 
boards often have more discretion on non-salary portions of pay. 
Finally, this paper uses the RDD to estimate the impact of the cutoff on 
other firm characteristics.  The paper finds no statistically significant impact on 
announcement day returns, EBIT, dividends, or company financing policy.  Taken 
together, this suggests CEOs at the say-on-pay 50% margin could be overpaid, 
and their pay may be reduced without hurting performance.   
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Chapter 3 
3 Do Options Impact the Stock Market? 
 
3.1  Introduction 
In frictionless settings, standard options are redundant securities and can 
be synthesized from dynamically trading equities.  The seminal works of Black-
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) (BSM) show that any derivative that depends 
in a general fashion on continuous equity prices can be reconstituted through a 
dynamic hedging strategy on that equity.  Thus, not only are options spanned by 
the space of equities, but each option is spanned by its single underlying equity.  
Many follow-on works to BSM provide specific implementations of their strategy.  
In the frictionless BSM theoretical framework, whether options exist as 
independent products should not matter. 
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However, the real world deviates from the frictionless ideal.  Trading is 
not costless and losses arise from transaction costs.  Thus rebalancing is not 
continuous, and often occurs at the daily to weekly frequency, according to 
current practitioners.  There is heterogeneity in firm skill in reducing these 
frictions, leading to specialization.  Empirically, end-users are generally net 
demanders of both puts and calls (Garleanu Pedersen Poteshman 2009).  Market 
makers that take the other side do not desire the bet but synthesize it at a premium 
(Bates 2003).   This is consistent with a story where end-users are unskilled at 
dynamic hedging and market makers are skilled, leading market makers to 
specialize in using dynamic hedging to synthesize options that are then purchased 
by end end-users. 
To fix ideas, let us sketch the basic mechanism. Consider the risk 
exposures of market makers.  End-user demand of both puts and calls respectively 
generate positive and negative equity exposure (the option delta). Because end-
users purchase both puts and calls, most of the delta exposure cancels out in large 
samples. To the extent delta risk is not cancelled out, market makers can always 
hedge options delta risk by purchasing or shorting in the underlying stock market.   
However, both puts and calls are also long concavity exposure (the options 
gamma).  When end-users demand puts and calls, they are then consistently long 
gamma risk exposure, and market makers are short gamma risk exposure.  Unlike 
delta risk, the gamma risk of puts and calls do not cancel out, since both 
derivatives have positive gamma exposure.  Also unlike delta risk, gamma risk 
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cannot be simply hedged with a single trade in the underlying stock: the 
underlying stock has zero concavity and so hedging does not change gamma at all.  
Since options market makers are stuck being short gamma, dynamic hedging 
forces market makers to have upward sloping demand curves. That is, as a stock’s 
price rises, market makers must mechanically buy that stock; similarly, when a 
stock’s price falls, market makers must sell that stock.  Thus, the issuance of both 
puts and calls causes a feedback effect where quantity demanded moves in the 
same direction as the previous price move.  We term this theoretical phenomenon 
hedging feedback demand in this paper.   
A natural and readily available empirical measure of hedging feedback 
demand is the total amount of gamma outstanding on a given equity on a given 
day.  This can be calculated from databases like OptionMetrics by summing up 
the gamma over all options contracts.  While not all options are between end-
users and market makers, Garleanu Pedersen Poteshman (2009) give evidence 
that total gamma is a good proxy for the degree to which market makers are 
dynamically hedging to produce options for end-users.     
We measure the resulting impact on hedging feedback demand through 
momentum.  Since hedging occurs in practice on a daily to weekly frequency, our 
methodology examines a stock move on day zero, and then measures momentum 
one to ten days out.  The underlying concept is as follows.  On day zero, suppose 
the price of the underlying stock exogenously increases. Because market makers 
have short gamma exposure, they have upward sloping demand curves with 
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respect to the underlying stock. Hence, when the price of the underlying stock 
increases, hedging feedback demand forces market makers to buy more of the 
stock over the next few days (the exact time frame depends on often they hedge). 
The positive quantity demand then causes positive price effects through price 
impact.  This price effect gives rise to measurable momentum.  In other words, 
since hedging feedback demand is not directly observable, we measure its effect 
in price space through momentum. 
However, total gamma and momentum should not be linked one-to-one.  
For example, a fixed amount of total gamma might cause minimal momentum 
effects in a large-cap company, which is highly liquid and has a tremendous 
amount of baseline volume.  That same amount gamma might cause high 
momentum in a micro-cap that is thinly traded.  Some controls on total gamma 
are needed.  Hedging feedback demand is more accurately represented by total 
gamma controlled for baselines like size, liquidity, and other factors to be 
discussed in Section V.  We term the resulting controlled measure of gamma 
Residual Gamma, which is intended to map directly to momentum. 
We indeed find then that hedging feedback demand impacts the 
underlying equity; specifically we find that residual gamma does indeed causes 
positive momentum effects.  After a day-zero uptick, momentum is experienced 
within one to four days and does not revert away within ten days (see Table 3.4), 
the furthest horizon that we test due to statistical power.  This effect is robust to 
liquidity effects and time trends (see Table 3.5 and Table 3.6).   
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Causal identification of this effect is possible using instruments related to 
options expiration.  The general principle behind all instruments considered is that 
options are issued with certain idiosyncrasies.  For example, options expire at an 
arbitrary part of the month, or options tend to accumulate around past price paths 
of the underlying equity, or option strike prices tend to be round numbers.  These 
idiosyncrasies can be seen as exogenous drivers of Residual Gamma, leading to 
identification. 
The first instrument is that Residual Gamma decreases dramatically at the 
same point in a monthly cycle, generally options expiration around the 18th date 
of each month.  On one day, an entire month’s worth of options disappears and 
market participants do not immediately compensate.  This leads to a sharp drop in 
Residual Gamma near the 18th of each month, and then a buildup again as time 
passes until the next drop.  This causes a noticeable cycle in Residual Gamma 
(see Figure 3.1).  The advantage of this instrument is that it is powerful and 
consistent across all stocks, although a disadvantage of this instrument is that it 
might inadvertently capture any monthly cyclic variation in momentum. 
The second novel instrument this paper exploits is the fact that options are 
generally issued with strikes around current equity prices.  As equity prices 
change, option purchasers either do not unwind past positions or do so with 
substantial lag.  As a result, the option issuance structure is heavily affected by 
prices as far as months back (Figure 3.2).  A stock that drifts away substantially 
from past prices will have relatively low exogenous Residual Gamma, and a stock 
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that maintains prices will have relatively high Residual Gamma (Figure 3.3).  One 
may be concerned about the interaction between price moves and volatility.  A 
stock that has moved a lot recently likely also has experienced higher volatility.  
We address this using volatility controls.   
Finally, perhaps the most novel of instruments for Residual Gamma 
utilizes the fact that options are struck around round numbers (Figure 3.4 and 
Figure 3.5 ).  A few days before options expiration, the Residual Gamma caused 
by an option is very closely clustered around the strike price.  Therefore, if the 
underlying equity price happens to be round, Residual Gamma will be unusually 
high, and if the equity price is not round, Residual Gamma will be low.  This 
instrument has little potential confound and provides a novel way of identifying 
our result. 
In this paper, we utilize all three instruments to provide estimates of the 
causal effect of Residual Gamma on momentum.  We find that the three 
instruments agree generally with each other and with the OLS estimate.  This 
suggests options creation and issuances causes extra hedging feedback demand to 
destabilize the underlying stock through additional momentum.  The momentum 
effect occurs within one to four days and does not revert away.  The effect is 
visible in the baseline OLS regressions, as well as OLS regressions with controls.  
The magnitudes agree across three very different instruments with minimal 
confounds, and almost no common confounds.  This cross verification provides 
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strong evidence for the existence and causality of this relationship between 
Residual Gamma and momentum. 
This paper contributes 1) by expositing the feedback effect of options on 
equity prices, and 2) by presenting novel instruments for options that can be used 
in other settings as well. 
Section II briefly reviews motivating literature and related research.  
Section III describes hedging feedback theory, aggregation amongst different 
players in the market, and the resulting price impact.  Section IV describes the 
data collection procedure.  Section V discusses the main OLS results.  Section VI 
discusses the instrument regressions, a large contribution of our paper.  Section 
VII discusses extensions and interpretations of the data.  Section VIII concludes.  
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Figure 3.1: Instrument #1 (Time to Expiration): Cyclical Variation due to Options 
Expiration. 
Gamma summed over all stocks and equities for a given date over an illustrative period in 2005.  
The figure shows monthly cyclicality of Gamma caused by options expiration.  Gamma is 
aggregated by taking the sum of open interest for an option contract multiplied by the gamma 
specific to that contract calculated via OptionMetrics using its internal Cox Ross Rubinstein (1979) 
binomial tree model. 
  
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
To
ta
l G
am
m
a 
Date 
142 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Instrument #2 (Past Price Path): Theoretical Illustration of Gamma For An 
Equity as a Function of Stock Price. 
The following graph illustrates how historical prices affect Gamma. In the case below, the stock is 
assumed to have maintained a price of around 100 for the past many weeks.  Thus options are 
generally issued around the historical stock price of 100, leading to a tent shape in Gamma as a 
function of stock price.  If prices move significantly, to say 80, Gamma will drop sharply.  Gamma 
is scaled to an arbitrary normalizing constant for illustrative purposes.  Humps at 90, 100, and 110 
simulate empirical observations of excess Gamma near round numbers (Instrument #3).   
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Figure 3.3: Instrument #2 (Past Price Path): Total Gamma as a Function of 20-Day Price 
Move on SPX. 
Total Gamma as a function of the last 20 days price move on the SPX (S&P 500 index).  A red 
optimal bandwidth (0.8) nonparameteric lowess regression line is fit through the data sample.  The 
regression line is tent shaped, being linear on both sides of zero with similar magnitude of slope.  
Price move is expressed in dollars, with the S&P 500 index valued in the thousand dollar range.   
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Figure 3.4: Instrument #3 (Distance to Round Numbers): Residual Gamma as a Function of 
Stock Price, for Options Close to Expiration. 
The following graph plots theoretical gamma generated by near-expiry options for a given equity 
as a function of underlying stock price.  The graph assumes recent prices near 100, and an 
exchange which mechanically only allows options to be struck near round prices.  Observe that 
Gamma has a regular pattern that peaks at regular points.  Price is expressed in dollars, and 
Gamma is normalized against an arbitrary constant for illustrative purposes.   
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Figure 3.5: Instrument #3 (Distance to Round Numbers): Open Interest as Function of 
Strike Price on SPX. 
Aggregate open interest in S&P 500 options for all days in our sample period between 1996 and 
2013 as a function of that option’s strike price.  Prices like 1000, 900, 1100 have the most open 
interest, followed by less round numbers like 950.  Non-round prices like 982 see very few options 
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3.2 Literature Review 
The seminal work in options pricing is due to Black and Scholes (1973) 
and Merton (1973) (BSM).  They show that any option on an underlying 
instrument is essentially made redundant by the underlying instrument as long as 
the underlying instrument can be traded continuously.  Their redundancy theory 
holds in the first order: options traders today use the equivalency theories and 
formulas to value options and to replicate options.   Many works offer a complete 
treatment of the subject – for an example see the relevant section in Campbell, Lo 
Mackinlay (1997).  Substantial work has gone into providing implementation 
details in various situations. 
As much as Black Scholes Merton (BSM) is a standard, if the equivalency 
is taken to the extreme, the implication would be that options needed not exist at 
all.  That options do exist and in fact are actively traded demonstrates that the 
second order effects of frictions, jumps, and non-equivalencies are important in 
options trading.   
Bates (2003) shows that there are numerous options pricing anomalies 
with respect to BSM.  In line with our paper, a large literature recognizes option 
pricing anomalies as the interaction between end-user demand for options and 
market makers.  In particular, index options appear to be more expensive than 
predicted by BSM due to especially high end-user demand; low moneyness 
options also are more expensive than predicted due to high demand by end-users 
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who use these options for leverage (Rubinstein 1994; Longstaff 1995; Bates 2000; 
Jackwerth 2000; Coval and Shumway 2001; Bondarenko 2003; Amin, Coval and 
Seyhun 2004; Driessen and Maenhout 2008).   
In the options literature, a paper that is close in topic to us is Garleanu, 
Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009).  They give evidence that demand pressure from 
end-users affects options prices.  In particular, they develop a model where 
options have risk factors that are unhedgeable in the underlying security, and 
these risk factors are consistently priced across the options space.  Thus, high end 
user demand for a certain option will increase its price above the BSM standard, 
to compensate market-makers for bearing more risk.   
The idea of demand pressure causing price effects is more general and 
includes stock index additions (Shleifer 1986, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya 2002, 
Greenwood 2005), mortgage-backed securities (Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, 
Vigneron 2007), option end-users (Stein 1989; Poteshman 2011), household risky 
asset holdings (Zhang 2013), and bonds (Greenwood and Vayanos 2009).  
Evidence of supply side catering is well supported in the literature (Baker 
Wurgler 2000, Baker, Greenwood Wurgler 2003, Greenwood Hanson Stein 2010).  
That sentiment plays a role in such demand has been studied both theoretically 
and empirically (Baker Wurgler 2006, Baker Stein 2004). 
In terms of mechanism and style, this paper is closest to the strand of 
literature exposited by Cheng and Madhaven (2009) although they do not use 
instrumental variables.  They show the analogue of our result in the leveraged 
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ETF industry.  In particular, Cheng and Madhaven (2009) demonstrate levered or 
inverse ETFs must purchase the underlying when prices go up mechanically due 
to their dynamic hedging obligations, and vice versa.  They argue that the 
dynamic hedging of ETFs causes destabilization by both increasing volatility of 
the underlying and increasing the amount of price impact and momentum 
experienced by trades in the market.  This paper also argues a view of mechanical 
hedging feedback demand but applied to options instead of ETFs.  In particular, 
we test momentum caused by the Residual Gamma of options.   
To quantify the level of destabilization though momentum, this paper 
utilizes previous technical work in the momentum and price impact literature.  
Ferraris (2008) gives industry models of permanent price impact as stocks are 
traded.   We account for baseline momentum as well: Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001) show that there is short term reversion on the one month span.  Asness 
(2008) shows that there is long run momentum on the one month to seven month 
span. 
As far as we know, this paper is one of the first treatments of the feedback 
effects of BSM hedging of options back onto the price patterns of the underlying 
stock.  
3.3  Theory 
This paper examines the frictional effects of the implementation of BSM 
through dynamic trading.  To start, it is natural to build a theory of BSM dynamic 
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trading. We first analyze the trading needed to hedge out a single options contract, 
then we aggregate amongst players in the market, and finally we motivate an 
empirical test of hedging through price effects. 
3.3.1 Risk Properties of a Single Contract 
First, for a fixed equity, consider the value of an option with strike 𝐾 when 
the stock price is 𝑆, with C a binary indicator for whether the option is a call, 
𝑉𝐶,𝐾(𝑆).  Assume for now that K is close to S and that the option is a call option.  
An option generally depends on many other parameters such as volatility, time to 
expiration, and risk-free rate.  However, for simplicity of exposition, and because 
only a few parameters are key to the theory, we fix all other parameters as 
constant in the comparisons below. 
BSM and related theories give us the following two properties for this call 
option: 
Δ ≔  ∂𝑉
𝜕𝑆
> 0 
Γ ≔  𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝑆2
> 0 
Mechanically, this means that the value of the call option is increasing and 
concave in the stock price.  Intuitively, this means 1) a call is worth more as the 
price goes up and 2) the degree of relationship between a call’s price and the 
stock’s price increases as the price goes up.  These two properties hold under 
broad theoretical conditions and are almost never violated empirically. 
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Suppose a market maker sells such a contract while the underlying price is 
𝑆0. Then, the market maker’s exposure can be approximated by the following 
second-order Taylor series: 
−𝑉𝐶,𝐾(𝑆) ≈ −(𝑆 − 𝑆0)Δ(S0) − (𝑆 − 𝑆0)22 Γ(𝑆0) 
Now let two periods occur.  In the first period, the market maker may 
hedge by buying/shorting 𝛼 contracts of the underlying.  After the hedging, the 
price jumps from 𝑆0 to 𝑆1.  The jump takes negligible time, thus not affecting 
option valuation through the time-to-expiration channel.9  In the second period, 
the market maker may again hedge 𝛼′, and then the price moves again. 
The market maker incurs exposure in the two periods respectively of: 
−𝑉𝐶,𝐾(𝑆) + 𝛼𝑆 ≈ (𝑆1 − 𝑆0)(−Δ(S0) + α) − (𝑆1 − 𝑆0)22 Γ(𝑆0) 
−𝑉𝐶,𝐾(𝑆) + 𝛼′𝑆 ≈ (𝑆 − 𝑆1)(−Δ(S1) + α′) − (𝑆 − 𝑆1)22 Γ(𝑆1) 
For all utility functions that are risk averse everywhere (including CRRA 
and CARA utility) the optimal hedging in both periods is: 𝛼∗ = Δ(S0), 𝛼′∗ =
Δ(S1).  The quantity the market maker must purchase between the two periods to 
minimize risk of holding the option is 𝛼′∗ − 𝛼∗ = �Δ(S1) −  Δ(S0)�~ Γ(𝑆0)(𝑆1 −
𝑆0).  Thus, the key quantity to recognize is that the quantity of hedging feedback 
demand is Γ(𝑆0)(𝑆1 − 𝑆0). 
                                                     
9 For a realistic calibration of timescales, the period between 𝑆0 and 𝑆1 might be a day, while 
expiration might be three months out. 
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3.3.2 Aggregation Properties 
Now let us consider the above for not just one single contract, but for 𝑞 
call contracts issued across strike prices 𝐾 of both puts and calls 𝐶.  A 
representative end-user demands 𝑂𝐼𝐶,𝐾 contracts of the option with strike price 𝐾, 
of call type 𝐶 which is in zero net supply.  A market maker fills the demand by 
selling 𝑂𝐼𝐶,𝐾 contracts.  Now the market maker is short exposure by 
−∑ 𝑂𝐼𝐶,𝐾 Δ𝐶,𝐾(𝑆)k .  Since market makers must hedge out their linear exposure, 
the market maker must buy  ∑ 𝑂𝐼𝐶,𝐾 Δ𝐶,𝐾(𝑆)k  shares of the underlying stock. 
Now we arrive at the main feedback trading aggregation.  As prices 
increase from 𝑆0 to 𝑆1, the market maker must purchase shares of underlying 
equity equal to: 
�𝑂𝐼𝐶,𝐾 Δ𝐶,𝐾(𝑆1)
k
− 𝑂𝐼𝐶,𝐾 Δ𝐶,𝐾(𝑆0)  
= (𝑆1 − 𝑆0) ⋅�𝑂𝐼𝐶,𝐾Γ𝐶,𝐾
k
 
= (𝑆1 − 𝑆0) ⋅ 𝐺0 
Where 𝐺0 ≔  ∑ 𝑂𝐼𝐶,𝐾Γ𝐶,𝐾k  can be interpreted as total gamma outstanding 
on an equity.  In other words, as more options are issued by market makers across 
all puts, strikes, and expirations, 𝐺0 the total gamma of the option system 
increases.  𝐺0 can be seen as a measure of magnitude of hedging feedback 
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demand, which is also the coefficient of the quantity of feedback trading as a 
result of a price move.   
3.3.3 Price Impact of Feedback Trading 
As we see above, a dollar price change of 𝑆1 − 𝑆0 causes approximately a 
mechanical quantity feedback demand of (𝑆1 − 𝑆0) ⋅ 𝐺0.  The impact of this 
feedback quantity in how much it destabilizes prices should naturally be measured 
in price space.  Thus we need to translate quantities into prices.  There are a 
number of possible measures such as increased volatility, increased bid ask 
spreads, decreased liquidity, and others as exposited in Madhaven and Cheng 
(2009).   
We choose here a very natural measure of feedback impact: price 
momentum.  We imagine the mechanism as follows: on day zero, price 
exogenously increases.  Feedback hedging causes positive quantity demand on 
day one, which also pushes up the price on day one.  Thus higher 𝐺0 causes more 
feedback hedging which causes more momentum. 
Our method to map quantities to price changes follows the market 
microstructure literature.  𝐺0 reflects the absolute quantity of feedback trading in 
the system.  To translate this price into price impact, it is necessary to use a price 
model.  This paper follows the price model posited by Ferrais (2008) and divides 
total gamma by trading volume to reach a normalized measure of gamma:  𝐺0
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
.  
The division by volume is the result of the intuition that the same size trade will 
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cause much stronger movements in a thinly traded stock than a thickly traded 
stock.  We take logs and define Residual Gamma = Log Gamma – Log Volume.  
This definition of Residual Gamma says that total gamma must be controlled by 
the liquidity of the trading volume to arrive at a measure of impact in price space.   
Residual Gamma then can be directly mapped into price space: 
𝑆2 − 𝑆1 = 𝜆 �∑ 𝑂𝐼𝐶,𝐾 Δ𝐶,𝐾(𝑆1) − 𝑂𝐼𝐶,𝐾 Δ𝐶,𝐾(𝑆0)k � ⋅ 𝑆0𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑      (1) 
≈ 𝜆𝑅1 ⋅ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎    (2) 
𝜆 here is a normalizing constant and 𝑅1 is first period returns.  While many price 
models treat 𝜆 as constant we explore the possibility that 𝜆 itself depends on other 
factors like size through third order interactions in Table 3.3.  Residual Gamma 
can be calculated theoretically as well as empirically and the two match closely as 
seen in the Section V. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Daily Level Equity Information. 
The summary statistics below describe all dates and equities for which OptionMetrics price data 
exists as of construction of the dataset: from the start in 1996 to January 31, 2013.  Each of the 
11,266,998 observations is an equity-date pair and reflects the status of that equity at the end of 
that trading day.  All options data is collected from OptionMetrics, which is originally in option-
date pairs and has been summed into equity-date pairs: Open Interest of all options 
(OPEN_INTEREST), Gamma times Open Interest (GAMMA * OPEN INTEREST).  All equity 
data is collected from CRSP: Return from holding the stock between two closes of trading days 
(RET), Close Price at end of trading day (PRC), Volume of shares traded that day (VOL), and 
Shares Outstanding at the end of that day (SHROUT).  The remainder of the variables are 
computed as follows: Date Serial Number starts at one for the first date data exists, and increments 
by one every trading day; Dollar Volume is Close Price times Volume; Market Cap is Close Price 
times shares outstanding; Log Dollar Volume is the natural log of Dollar Volume; Log Market 
Cap is the natural log of Market Cap; Total Open Interest is the total number of open interests for 
all options across all equities for that day; Log Total Open Interest is the natural log of Total Open 
Interest; Day of Month is a integer from 1 to 31 of the day of that month; Last 20 Day Return is 
the sum of the 1st to 20th lags of Return; Last 20 Day Volatility is the square root of the sum of 
squares of the 1st to 20th lags of Return.  
 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Date Serial Number 11,266,998 2,349.739 1,247.693 1.000 4,278.000 
Open Interest (thousands) 11,266,998 51.827 336.695 .000 30,800.00
0 
Gamma * Open Interest 
(thousands) 
11,266,998 2.801 25.988 .000 6,301.253 
Return (%) 11,263,869 .044 3.712 -94.891 625.925 
Close Price 11,264,218 29.166 29.317 .000 3540.000 
Volume (millions) 11,264,215 1.586 8.1446 .000 1897.900 
Shares Outstanding (millions) 11,266,778 157.239 494.596 .000 29,206.40
0 
Dollar Volume ($millions) 11,264,214 50.988 384.227 .000 93,188.09
0 
Log Dollar Volume 11,260,436 15.872 1.972 4.388 25.257 
Market Cap ($billions) 11,264,218 5.340 18.613 .000 658.153 
Log Market Cap 11,260,440 13.978 1.659 4.812 20.305 
Total Open Interest (millions) 11,266,998 170.475 105.719 .000 372.427 
Log Total Open Interest 
(millions) 
11,259,870 18.647 .901 15.937 19.735 
Day of Month 11,266,998 15.744 8.749 1.000 31.000 
Last 20 Day Return (%) 11,013,012 .903 15.774 -306.419 701.251 
Last 20 Day Volatility (%) 11,013,012 13.213 9.854 .000 627.684 
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Table 3.2: Baseline Determinants of Log Gamma. 
OLS regression of Log Gamma, defined as the log of the sum of all gamma times open interest 
across all options for an equity-date pair, on Log Volume traded for that equity-date, Log Shares 
Outstanding for that equity on that day, the Price for the equity at the end of the trading day, the 
Log NASDAQ Volume for that equity traded on NASDAQ on that day, the Time Serial an integer 
that starts with one and is incremented by one for each trading day, Log Open Interest the sum 
across all options for that equity on that day, and Log Total Open Interest the total open interest 
across all equities and options on that day.    
 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑆h𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑄 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
All logs are natural logs.  t-stats are Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust.  The residual 
from regression (3) is defined as Residual Gamma for the remainder of the paper.   
 
 
Panel A: Regressions (1) and (2) 
Variable  (1)  (2) 
N  10,834,255  10,834,255 
𝑅2  .5053  .5282 
  b [t]  b [t] 
Log Volume  .951158 (3086.7)  .743272 (1701.4) 
Log Shares Outstanding     .363015 (679.9) 
Price       
Log NASDAQ Volume       
Time Serial       
Log Total Open Interest       
 
Panel B: Regressions (3) and (4) 
Variable  (3)  (4) 
N  10,834,211  10,834,211 
𝑅2  .5347  .5403 
  b [t]  b [t] 
Log Volume  .755658  (1734.0)  .714132  (1504.5) 
Log Shares Outstanding  .365671 (679.9)  .391373 (691.4) 
Price  -.203234 (-353.2)  -.185148 (-315.0) 
Log NASDAQ Volume     .006525 (49.3) 
Time Serial     -.000244 (-191.5) 
Log Total Open Interest     .468826 (273.7) 
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Table 3.3:The Impact of Residual Gamma on Momentum with Market Cap Interaction. 
OLS regressions of equity-date Returns on 10 lags of: Returns (R) expressed as a net fraction; 
Residual Gamma defined in Table 3.2, shares outstanding, or volume; Demeaned Log Market 
Cap; and all higher order interactions of the previous variables.   All variables besides Residual 
Gamma are defined as in summary statistic Table 3.1.  Residual Gamma is defined as in Table 
3.2.  N = 10,531,923.  R2 =0.0016.  T-stats are clustered by dates.  Coefficients are multiplied by 
100. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘�𝛽1,𝑘 + 𝜆1,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ 𝜆2,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 ⋅ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ 𝛽2,𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑘�+ Σ𝑘=1𝐾 �𝛾1,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ 𝛾2,𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛾3,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
⋅ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑘� + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
Panel A 
  Return (R)  R * Residual 
Gamma 
 R * Residual 
Gamma * 
Demeaned Log 
Market Cap 
 R * Demeaned 
Log Market Cap 
 
  100𝛽1,𝑘 𝑡(𝛽1,𝑘)  100𝜆1,𝑘 𝑡(𝜆1,𝑘)  100𝜆2,𝑘 𝑡(𝜆2,𝑘)  100𝛽2,𝑘 𝑡(𝛽2,𝑘)  
Date              
t - 1  0.606 (0.90)  0.787 (5.00)  0.042 (0.62)  -0.237 (-1.99)  
t - 2  -1.592 (-1.81)  0.342 (2.07)  0.112 (1.65)  -0.514 (-3.71)  
t - 3  0.196 (0.27)  -0.071 (-0.47)  -0.078 (-1.24)  -0.102 (-0.84)  
t - 4  -0.087 (-0.11)  0.109 (0.71)  0.043 (0.68)  -0.157 (-1.27)  
t - 5  -1.227 (-1.55)  0.161 (1.03)  0.037 (0.58)  -0.190 (-1.36)  
t - 6  -0.651 (-0.84)  -0.128 (-0.8)  0.011 (0.17)  -0.281 (-2.07)  
t - 7  -0.124 (-0.15)  -0.047 (-0.32)  -0.051 (-0.82)  -0.093 (-0.63)  
t - 8  -0.061 (-0.08)  -0.184 (-1.22)  -0.114 (-1.85)  -0.075 (-0.56)  
t - 9  0.097 (0.13)  0.087 (0.59)  0.002 (0.03)  0.047 (0.32)  
t - 
10 
 
0.703 (0.90) 
 
0.053 (0.37) 
 
0.038 (0.63) 
 
0.072 (0.48) 
 
 
Panel B 
   Residual 
Gamma 
 Demeaned Log 
Market Cap 
 Residual Gamma * 
Demeaned Log Market Cap 
   100𝛾1  𝑡(𝛾1,𝑘)  100𝛾2,𝑘 𝑡(𝛾2,𝑘)  100𝛾3,𝑘 𝑡(𝛾2,𝑘) 
Date           
t - 1   -0.070 (-3.57)  -0.574 (-1.86)  0.025 (5.34) 
t - 2   0.030 (1.61)  0.374 (0.99)  -0.005 (-0.98) 
t - 3   0.015 (0.78)  -0.155 (-0.49)  -0.003 (-0.56) 
t - 4   0.002 (0.12)  0.090 (0.29)  -0.002 (-0.34) 
t - 5   -0.015 (-0.84)  0.034 (0.11)  -0.006 (-1.35) 
t - 6   0.031 (1.57)  0.023 (0.08)  0.005 (0.99) 
t - 7   -0.016 (-0.89)  -0.053 (-0.18)  -0.009 (-1.86) 
t - 8   0.008 (0.42)  0.164 (0.47)  0.002 (0.40) 
t - 9   -0.028 (-1.6)  -0.093 (-0.26)  -0.003 (-0.6) 
t - 
10 
  
0.024 (1.43) 
 
0.185 (0.68) 
 
0.004 (0.89) 
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3.4  Data 
This paper uses panel data on two levels, the first of which is nested in the 
second.  On the first level, an observation is an option-date pair.  For example an 
observation might be the Exxon Mobile (XOM) call contract with strike of $42.50 
and exercise date of 1/22/2005 as observed on 11/17/2004.   First-level data is 
obtained from OptionMetrics IvyDB for all options in the database.  This includes 
all observations from the start of the database in 1996 to the writing of this paper 
in 2013.  The first-level data we process is 90 gigabytes in size and contains 
898,578,403 records.  We consider the comprehensiveness of our study, and the 
implicit computational non-trivialities and hurdles in processing such a dataset to 
be a second-order contribution of the paper. 
 Characteristic information of first-level data includes observation date, 
the underlying stock’s CUSIP, the strike price, the exercise date, and a designator 
for whether the option is a call or a put.   Substantive first-level data for each 
option-date includes open interest, delta, and gamma.  The delta, gamma, and 
other greeks are calculated by OptionMetrics using a Cox Ross Rubinstein (1979) 
binomial tree method.   
Again, processing and running regressions on such a large dataset on 
present-day commodity computational hardware requires substantial manual 
programming of many otherwise standard regression functions.  For example, 
directly estimating fixed effects and per-equity coefficients  on the 8108 equities 
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present in our dataset would normally require terabytes of memory, thousands of 
times more than readily available on machines today.  Therefore, manual 
functions are often needed to improve computational tractability, and even then 
many subroutines have runtimes of days on a modern desktop computer.  Despite 
these substantial difficulties, we believe having comprehensive data is critically 
important.  It minimizes external validity concerns that often occur in studies that 
examine only a small fraction of the most liquid equities.  It gives results that are 
true across the entire population of equities.  It also maximizes the power of our 
tests.  Therefore the comprehensiveness of our data processing can be seen as an 
auxiliary contribution of the paper. 
On the second-level of data, an observation is an equity-day pair.  Across 
the 17 years, our dataset of 898,578,403 option-level observations rolls up into 
11,266,998 equity-level observations.  These 11,266,998 equity-level 
observations are distributed across 8108 equities.  A sample observation analogue 
to our example before would be Exxon Mobile (XOM) observed on 11/17/2004.  
This paper will mainly work on the equity-date level because both the main 
predictor variable (Residual Gamma) and the main predicted variable (equity 
level momentum) exist on this level.  While first-level data might be useful for 
revalidating some instruments like distance to round numbers (our third 
instrument), we mainly work on the second-level even with these instruments 
because we believe the intuition, validation, and instrument first-stages are much 
clearer on this level.   
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We aggregate first-level data into second-level data through aggregating 
an empirical total gamma 𝐺0, from now on known simply as the Total Gamma 
associated with an equity-date:  
𝐺0 ≔  ΣC,K𝑂𝐼𝐶,𝐾Γ𝐶,𝐾 
The right hand side variables of open interest and gamma are available from 
OptionMetrics IvyDB.  This differs from the theoretical total gamma in Section 
III in that not every contract is necessarily between a market maker and end end-
user, but Garleanu Petersen Poteshman (2009) give evidence that the two are 
highly correlated. 
This paper obtains other equity level data directly from CRSP.  From this 
database, the primary key is a CUSIP and date pair, and data includes open price, 
close price, volume, and holding period return – a value which includes splits, 
dividends and other adjustment factors.  For summary statistics, please refer to 
Table 3.1.   
3.5 Main Empirical Results. 
We proceed in our empirical analysis in the following steps:  (1) we 
calculate Residual Gamma from theoretical and empirical models.   (2) we 
compare baseline momentum of the entire sample and subsamples conditional on 
Residual Gamma.  This gives us straightforward results on the impact of Residual 
Gamma on momentum.   (3) we formalize this by running an OLS interaction 
regression of the impact of Residual Gamma on momentum.  We discuss 
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dynamics and magnitude of the price impact.  (4) we discuss possible confounds, 
and show the impact is robust to specification and a battery of liquidity and trend 
controls.   
3.5.1 Defining Residual Gamma: theoretically and empirically 
As described in section III, absolute total gamma should not be used 
directly as a predictor of momentum: equities with larger size and liquidity will 
respond less in momentum space to the same amount of total gamma.  To get at a 
sense of market impact on the scale of price returns, it is important to normalize 
by a factor of price impact, namely volume.  Ferrais (2008) suggests using 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
 
as a measure, or in natural log form, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 − 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒.  The Residual 
Gamma defined this way would be the theoretical approach answer to the problem. 
A more empirical approach to the problem is to consider total gamma as 
factor that increases momentum but only in excess of a natural baseline.  For 
example a firm that is ten times larger might mechanically have ten times more 
total gamma.  To reduce such issues, comparisons ought to be made for gamma 
differences only on comparable firms – firms with similar size, volume, and other 
characteristics.  The residual from such a regression could be defined as the 
Residual Gamma that would predict increased momentum. 
It turns out that the theoretical and empirical approaches above give nearly 
identical answers, as Table 3.2 shows.  Running a regression of Log Gamma on 
Log Volume (Table 3.2 Regression 1) gives a coefficient of near unity with an 𝑅2 
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of .5053.  The Residual Gamma from this definition is 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 −  .951 ⋅
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒, almost identical to the theoretical value.   
It is of course possible to add on further predictors.  Price and size as 
measured by shares outstanding is a popular parameter in price impact models 
(Table 3.2, Regressions 2 and 3).  Log Nasdaq Volume, Time Serial, and Log 
Total Open Interest can be added as well, as seen in Table 3.2 Regression 4.  It 
turns out however that these additional covariate models have essentially the same 
𝑅2 as the baseline regression: .52-.54 for regressions (2), (3), and (4) vs .50 for 
the baseline regression (1).  Thus the Residual Gamma calculated from all these 
regressions would be nearly identical as measured by correlation.  We arrive at 
the remarkable result that the theoretical formula for Residual Gamma is nearly 
the same as the empirical formulae for Residual Gamma.   
The standard price impact models generally include volume, shares 
outstanding, and price, thus matching up most with regression (3) of Table 3.2.  
While all models give nearly identical measure of Residual Gamma, we choose 
Table 3.2 regression (3) as the standard definition for the remainder of the paper.  
However, the results are not significantly changed by any of the definitions above. 
3.5.2 Subsample Regressions 
The fundamental empirical question of this paper is how Residual Gamma 
affects momentum.  First, consider the simplest way to measure momentum, serial 
correlation.  The estimation equation for this might looks like 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +
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𝛽𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 with 𝛽 being the baseline amount of momentum.   We can 
generalize to k periods with 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘𝑘=1,𝐾 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 and observe the 
cumulative momentum through the cumulative coefficients.   
As a baseline, equity returns are known to exhibit some serial correlation 
in returns. In fact, it is well known that on the order of a few days, there is 
generally reversion (Froot and Perold 1995).  This reversion can be caused by bid-
ask bounce (McInish and Wood 1992) amongst other factors.  Figure 3.6 confirms 
this stylized fact, which shows the average momentum of the entire sample (solid 
line) to be slightly negative.   
As a first look at the impact of Residual Gamma on momentum, we 
simply run the above analysis on two subsamples.  The first subsample consists of 
the top ten percentile of Residual Gamma.  The momentum on this sample is 
shown to be significantly positive in Figure 3.6 (green line).  The second 
subsample consists of the bottom ten percentile of Residual Gamma.  The 
momentum on this sample is shown to be more negative than average in Figure 3.6 
(red line).   Both subsamples have their means outside the 95% confidence 
interval of the sample average. 
Thus, the rough glance provided by Figure 3.6 suggests a generally positive 
relationship between Residual Gamma and momentum.  
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Figure 3.6: Cumulative Momentum in Equities and Percentiles of Gamma. 
This figure shows the cumulative momentum from 1 to 10 days after a unit move in equity return.  
95% confidence intervals are given by error bars.  Momentum is calculated via the OLS regression 
clustered by date: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝛽𝑘𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
The graph depicts three samples: 
• All equity-date pairs in the sample (black line) 
• Top ten percentile of Residual Gamma (green line) 
• Bottom ten percentile of Residual Gamma (red line).   
Residual Gamma is defined in Table 3.2 as the component of total gamma not predictable by 
price, shares outstanding, or volume.  Cumulative Momentum is cumulative sum of the 𝛽𝑘 with 
inferences accounting for covariances. 
  
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Days After 
Cumulative Momentum in Equities 
164 
3.5.3 OLS Interaction Regression 
Instead of just looking at momentum in subsamples, we can be more 
rigorous and quantify the effect in a regression setting.  There are multiple natural 
ways to accomplish this.  If identification comes completely from the cross 
section, then one strategy is a Fama-MacBeth estimation in which 𝛽𝑖  from 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is estimated for each equity, and then a second cross 
regression 𝛽𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝜆𝐺𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 can be run.  This paper does not use the Fama-
Macbeth strategy due to a desire to identify off of both time series and cross 
sectional properties – after all there is no fundamental reason to believe that as 
companies progress and change through multiple years that they should be seen as 
one observation.  
This paper uses the strategy of having one regression that decomposes the 
momentum coefficient into a linear function of Residual Gamma and other 
controls.  This motivates the estimation equation using interactions: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + �𝛽 + 𝜆𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1�𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡    (3) 
𝛽 is the momentum constant, while 𝜆 is the variable of interest as it 
represents the sensitivity of momentum to our predictor factor Residual Gamma.  
Note that this unexpanded equation is identical to the expanded form: 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 +
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𝜖𝑖,𝑡.  The expanded form makes it clear that the coefficient of interest is on the 
interaction of Residual Gamma and past returns, and motivates the addition of a 
first-order term 𝛾𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 since 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 shows up 
as an interaction.  If Residual Gamma does cause extra momentum, we expect 
higher values of Residual Gamma to mean that when yesterday experiences a high 
positive return that tomorrow’s return will be higher as well.  The interaction with 
lagged return is necessary for covariates and other factors that affect momentum.  
Non-interaction terms should be added only to the extent they are believed to 
directly affect tomorrow’s returns. 
We would like to consider for the baseline lags of more than a single day.  
After all there’s no fundamental reason to believe that hedging must happen 
within a day.  In fact conversations with practitioners suggest that rebalancing 
with options often takes a few days.  This is in contrast with leveraged ETFs 
which Cheng and Madhaven (2009) explain must contractually rebalance at the 
end of the day.  To consider multiple days of momentum we add additional lags to 
our fundamental specification: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘�𝛽1,𝑘 + 𝜆1,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘�+ Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝛾1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
It is this equation that we will actually estimate.  Again, in the regression, the key 
estimated parameters of interest are the 𝜆𝑘 variables.  These variables represent 
additional momentum caused by Residual Gamma.   
166 
The results of this regression are presented in Table 3.4 Regression 1, 
which show the coefficients of interest 𝜆𝑘 as k varies from 1 to 10 inclusive.  
Baseline values of momentum 𝛽𝑘 are also shown.  𝜆𝑘 can be interpreted as the 
additional return in percent caused by a 1% move in prices as Residual Gamma 
increase by one unit.  This is slightly less than a standard deviation of Residual 
Gamma, which is 1.45.   
Note first that the return drift occurs mostly in the first few days.  After the 
fourth day or so, there is minimal additional momentum.  However, the 
momentum does not revert away significantly either.   That the reaction mostly 
accumulates within the first day is not surprising.  Conversations with practioners 
reveal that most of the hedging for a stock’s price moves occurs within a couple 
of days.  That the effect does not revert away in any timeframe for which our data 
has power for suggests that the feedback has long-term effects and is not a 
temporary microstructure quirk. 
The magnitude of the momentum is also significant.  The momentum 
prediction provided by Residual Gamma results in an annualized 𝑅2 of about 10%.  
According to Campbell Thompson (2008) formula (14) which assumes log utility, 
this results in 30.6% extra returns.  That is to say, a participant earning 7.6% a 
year previously in an optimal fashion can now earn 10% with this new 
information.  This gain is quite significant.   
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Table 3.4: Momentum in Stocks versus Residual Gamma. 
OLS regressions of equity-date Returns on 10 lags of: net Returns (𝑅𝑖,𝑡) expressed as a fraction; 
Residual Gamma defined in Table 3.2 as the component of Log Gamma not predictable by price, 
shares outstanding, or volume; Residual Gamma multiplied by Return.  All variables besides 
Residual Gamma are defined as in summary statistic Table 3.1. The regressions are run on the 
full sample (Col 1 and Col 2), the top 10 percentile Residual Gamma subsample of the population 
(Col 3), and the bottom 10 percentile Residual Gamma subsample of the population (Col 4).  t-
statistics are clustered by date. 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝛽𝑘 ⋅ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝜆𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 ⋅ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝛾𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
N 10,545,064 11,135,122 1,039,210 1,477,949 
𝑅2 .0011 .0007 .0049 .0018 
Sample Full Full Top 10%tile of 
Residual Gamma 
Bottom 10%ile of 
Residual Gamma 
100*Return 𝜆𝑘:     
(t-1) .15 ( 0.22) -.47 (-0.72) 5.70 (5.78) -2.77 (-3.87) 
(t-2) -.54 (-1.91) -1.75 (-2.33) 1.71 (1.40) -1.83 (-3.12) 
(t-3) -.09 (-0.12) -.37 (-0.55) 3.26 ( 2.78) -1.64 (-2.98) 
(t-4) -.27 (-0.36) -.44 (-0.63) 1.95 ( 1.46) -.91 (-1.73) 
(t-5) -1.36 (-1.78) -1.56 (-2.17) -.51 (-0.39) -1.44 (-2.57) 
(t-6) -.72 (-0.97) -.52 (-0.75) 2.03 ( 1.50) .02 ( 0.03) 
(t-7) -.32 (-0.43) -.35 (-0.50) 2.19 ( 1.56) -.42 (-0.81) 
(t-8) -.09 (-0.14) -.15 (-0.24) 1.92 ( 1.48) -.28 (-0.62) 
(t-9) -.11 (-0.15) -.28 (-0.43) .89 ( 0.70) -.36 (-0.74) 
(t-10) .66 ( 0.91) .64 ( 0.96) 2.56 ( 1.93) .90 ( 1.79) 
     
100*Return* 
Residual Gamma 
𝜆𝑘  
   
(t-1) .78 ( 6.02)    
(t-2) .26 ( 1.97)    
(t-3) .01 ( 0.06)    
(t-4) .08 ( 0.69)    
(t-5) .14 ( 1.07)    
(t-6) -.13 (-1.01)    
(t-7) -.01 (-0.05)    
(t-8) -.09 (-0.73)    
(t-9) .09 ( 0.77)    
(t-10) .03 ( 0.26)    
     
Residual Gamma 
lags 
Yes No No No 
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Table 3.5: The Impact of Residual Gamma on Momentum with Liquidity Controls. 
OLS regressions of equity-date Returns on 10 lags of: Returns (R) expressed as a net fraction; 
Residual Gamma defined in Table 3.2 as the component of total gamma not predictable by price, 
shares outstanding, or volume; Log Dollar Volume, and Log Market Cap, Returns multiplied by 
Residual Gamma, Returns multiplied by Log Dollar Volume, Returns multiplied by Log Market 
Cap.  All variables besides Residual Gamma are defined as in summary statistic Table 3.1.  
Residual Gamma is defined as in Table 3.2.  N = 10,545,064.  R2 =0.0014.  t-stats are clustered 
by dates.  Coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘�𝛽1,𝑘 + 𝜆1,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽2,𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ 𝛽3,𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑘�+ Σ𝑘=1𝐾 �𝛾1,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛾2,𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ 𝛾3,𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑘� + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
Panel A 
  Return (R)  R * Residual 
Gamma 
 R * Log Dollar 
Volume 
 R * Log Market 
Cap 
 
  100𝛽1,𝑘 𝑡(𝛽1,𝑘)  100𝜆1,𝑘 𝑡(𝜆1,𝑘)  100𝛽2,𝑘 𝑡(𝛽2,𝑘)  100𝛽3,𝑘 𝑡(𝛽3,𝑘)  
Date              
t - 1  2.182 (1.19)  .923 (7.05)  .474 (3.17)  .695 (-3.86) 
t - 2  6.115 (3.33)  .223 (1.66)  -.186 (-1.28)  .348 (-1.91) 
t - 3  1.407 (0.84)  -.060 (-0.48)  -.258 (-1.96)  .218 (1.29) 
t - 4  1.357 (0.83)  .155 (1.24)  .208 (1.70)  .354 (-2.10) 
t - 5  1.252 (0.70)  .164 (1.28)  .081 (0.64)  .278 (-1.58) 
t - 6  2.726 (1.56)  -.074 (-0.57)  .171 (1.42)  .447 (-2.64) 
t - 7  .416 (0.22)  .020 (0.16)  .094 (0.68)  .151 (-0.84) 
t - 8  -.081 (-0.05)  -.074 (-0.61)  .058 (0.49)  .064 (-0.4) 
t - 9  -1.109 (-0.58)  .123 (1.05)  .126 (1.08)  .066 (-0.39) 
t - 10  -.230 (-0.12)  .047 (0.41)  .070 (0.58)  .018 (-0.11) 
 
Panel B 
 Residual Gamma  Log Dollar 
Volume 
 Log Market Cap 
 100𝛾1,𝑘 𝑡(𝛾1,𝑘)  100𝛾2,𝑘 𝑡(𝛾2,𝑘)  100𝛾3,𝑘 𝑡(𝛾3,𝑘) 
Date         
t - 1  -.003 (-0.12)  .096 (4.26)  -.510 (-1.64) 
t - 2  .048 (1.91)  .021 (0.94)  .384 (1.02) 
t - 3  -.026 (-1.06)  -.041 (-1.68)  -.211 (-0.66) 
t - 4  -.004 (-0.16)  -.008 (-0.37)  .093 (0.30) 
t - 5  -.042 (-1.81)  -.033 (-1.46)  .013 (0.04) 
t - 6  .029 (1.11)  -.003 (-0.13)  .013 (0.04) 
t - 7  -.017 (-0.76)  -.008 (-0.34)  -.055 (-0.19) 
t - 8  -.007 (-0.28)  -.015 (-0.69)  .154 (0.43) 
t - 9  -.005 (-0.22)  .020 (0.88)  -.081 (-0.22) 
t - 10  .007 (0.35)  -.017 (-0.81)  .185 (0.69) 
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3.5.4 Liquidity and Time Controls 
Recall in our conceptual estimation equation (3) that we are estimating the 
level of momentum as the factor �𝛽 + 𝜆𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1�.  One may be 
concerned that it is not the Residual Gamma that is directly causing momentum, 
but rather a covariate of Residual Gamma. This is dealt with by identifying the 
most likely covariates first and then then adding them as interaction covariates to 
remove omitted variable bias.   
One likely omitted variable is company size.  The numerator of Residual 
Gamma is aggregated gamma over open interest of options, which should scale up 
with the size of the company.   We have already normalized out by volume (see 
subsection A) in our price impact model.  However the relationship between 
volume and market cap may not exactly cancel out.  There may be non-linearities 
in the interaction.  Momentum may simply be expressed differently in larger 
companies than smaller companies.  For that reason, company size represented as 
log market cap would be a key control. 
Similarly, momentum likely would be affected by liquidity.  More liquid 
stocks can be arbitraged more easily, which may reduce momentum effects.  
Likewise a more liquid stock should have less price impact in the first place.  One 
industry standard for measuring liquidity is daily dollar volume, so we use log 
daily dollar volume as a control as well.  This results in the estimation equation:  
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𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘�𝛽1,𝑘 + 𝜆1,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ 𝛽2,𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽3,𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑘�+ Σ𝑘=1𝐾 �𝛾1,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛾2,𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ 𝛾3,𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑘� + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡   (5) 
Comparing Table 3.5 and Table 3.4 shows the results of this regression in 
cumulative 𝜆𝑘 similar to before.  This demonstrates that liquidity and market cap 
effects are not large confounds in our results.   
 We might also be interested in whether the effect might be stronger in 
larger companies.  For one, since Residual Gamma is in logs, a 1% abnormal 
increase is a lot higher for a larger firm than a smaller one.  Also, many market 
anomalies grow substantially stronger with smaller size.  Is this the case for the 
current effect as well?  For that purpose, we run a triple interaction regression 
similar to (5): 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘�𝛽1,𝑘 + 𝜆1,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ 𝜆2,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 ⋅ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ 𝛽2,𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑘�+ Σ𝑘=1𝐾 �𝛾1,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ 𝛾2,𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛾3,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
⋅ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑘� + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡   (5.5) 
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The standard interaction between Residual Gamma and return is given by 
𝜆1,𝑘, but now we have a triple interaction between this term and Demeaned Log 
Market Cap given by 𝜆2,𝑘.  The results of this regression are shown in Table 3.3.  
We see that there is no appreciable interaction between Log Market Cap and the R 
* Residual Gamma term (the third column).  No coefficient out of the ten lags is 
significant at the 5% level.  Thus, the impact of Residual Gamma on momentum 
seems equally strong for large and small equity-dates. 
Another concern we may have is that options behavior may have shifted 
over time.  For one, the number of options has dramatically increased 
exponentially over time (Figure 3.7).  Further, dynamic hedging techniques have 
developed to be more sophisticated and have lower price impact.  The baseline 
momentum in the stock market may have time trends itself.  In fact, it is known 
that for individual stocks at least, there has been an upward trend in volatility until 
1997 (Campbell et al, 2002), which has since reversed, and volatility has impact 
on other market parameters (Campbell and Hentschel 1992).   
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Figure 3.7: Total Gamma Across All Equities over Time. 
Gamma across all options and equities summed for a given date through time.  The sample 
consists of all options in OptionMetrics from the database start date in 1996 until 2013.  Gamma is 
aggregated by taking the sum of open interest for an option contract multiplied by the gamma 
specific to that contract calculated via OptionMetrics using its internal Cox Ross Rubinstein (1979) 
binomial tree model.  A 100 trading-day moving average is given by the dashed black line.   
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To address trend issues, we add two time controls.  The first control, Time 
Serial, is simply an integer number representing the number of trading days from 
the start of the data series in 1996.  To more specifically address the issue of open 
interest increasing over time, we add in a time variable of the log of the total 
amount of open interest over time as well.  This is open interest summed over all 
equities and so it only has a time component to address time effects.  We then 
arrive at the estimation equation:  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘�𝛽1,𝑘 + 𝜆1,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ 𝛽2,𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽3,𝑘𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡−𝑘�+ Σ𝑘=1𝐾 �𝛾1,𝑘𝐺𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛾2,𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−𝑘�+ 𝛾3−1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡     (6) 
Table 3.6 presents results from this regression, which is again very similar 
to the baseline Table 3.4 regression (1) both qualitatively and quantitatively.  
Further, combining controls from (5) and (6) and adding other transformations 
(e.g. square log daily volume) produce similar results, the output of which is not 
shown here.   
 Overall the baseline regression equation (4) has shown remarkable 
robustness to factors known to potentially affect momentum and be covariates of 
Residual Gamma.  The controls added in (5) and (6) give strong evidence that it is 
not liquidity or time trend effects driving the main results. 
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Table 3.6: The Impact of Residual Gamma on Momentum with Time Controls. 
OLS regressions of equity-date Returns on: Time Serial is an integer that starts with 1 and is 
incremented by 1 per trading day, and then 10 lags of: Returns (R) expressed as a net fraction; 
Residual Gamma defined in Table 3.2 as the component of total gamma not predictable by price, 
shares outstanding, or volume; Log Total Open Interest is the natural log of the total open interest 
of all options across all stocks on that day; Returns multiplied by Residual Gamma; Returns 
multiplied by Log Total Open Interest, Returns multiplied by Time Serial.  10 lags of Time Serial 
are not taken due to collinearity.  All variables besides Residual Gamma are defined as in 
summary statistic Table 3.1.  Residual Gamma is defined as in Table 3.2.  N = 10,641,326.  R2 
=0.0011.  T-stats are clustered by dates.  Coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘�𝛽1,𝑘 + 𝜆1,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽2,𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−𝑘+ 𝛽3,𝑘𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡−𝑘� + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 �𝛾1,𝑘𝐺𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛾2,𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−𝑘�+ 𝛾3−1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡   
 
Panel A 
  Return (R)  R * Residual 
Gamma 
 R * Log Total 
Open Interest 
 R * Time Serial  
  100𝛽1,𝑘 𝑡(𝛽1,𝑘)  100𝜆1,𝑘 𝑡(𝜆1,𝑘)  100𝛽2,𝑘 𝑡(𝛽2,𝑘)  100𝛽3,𝑘 𝑡(𝛽3,𝑘)  
Date              
t - 1  -16.337 (-0.36)  0.848 (6.32)  1.156 (0.43)  -0.002 (-1.18) 
t - 2  50.462 (0.95)  0.241 (1.77)  -3.165 (-1.02)  0.003 (1.43) 
t - 3  -47.809 (-1.08)  0.029 (0.24)  2.864 (1.10)  -0.002 (-1.32) 
t - 4  -3.601 (-0.08)  0.109 (0.86)  0.218 (0.08)  0.000 (-0.18) 
t - 5  12.972 (0.26)  0.169 (1.34)  -0.761 (-0.26)  0.000 (-0.04) 
t - 6  5.531 (0.11)  -0.134 (-1.04)  -0.395 (-0.14)  0.000 (0.25) 
t - 7  9.478 (0.19)  0.003 (0.03)  -0.560 (-0.19)  0.000 (0.15) 
t - 8  7.886 (0.18)  -0.086 (-0.73)  -0.498 (-0.19)  0.001 (0.30) 
t - 9  8.044 (0.19)  0.084 (0.74)  -0.471 (-0.19)  0.000 (0.16) 
t - 10  54.994 (1.24)  0.002 (0.02)  -3.304 (-1.27)  0.003 (1.77) 
 
Panel B 
   Residual Gamma  Log Total Open 
Interest 
 Time Serial 
   100𝛾1,𝑘 𝑡(𝛾1,𝑘)  100𝛾2,𝑘 𝑡(𝛾2,𝑘)  100𝛾3,𝑘 𝑡(𝛾3,𝑘) 
Date           
t - 1   -0.077 (-4.48)  -0.091 (-0.22)  0.000 (1.03) 
t - 2   0.031 (1.92)  0.052 (0.1)    
t - 3   0.014 (0.84)  -0.351 (-0.61)    
t - 4   0.005 (0.31)  0.216 (0.41)    
t - 5   -0.011 (-0.67)  0.232 (0.44)    
t - 6   0.028 (1.64)  -0.817 (-1.59)    
t - 7   -0.005 (-0.31)  -0.078 (-0.15)    
t - 8   0.008 (0.48)  0.214 (0.43)    
t - 9   -0.026 (-1.68)  -0.029 (-0.06)    
t - 10   0.015 (1.05)  0.554 (1.55)    
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Table 3.7: Using Instrument #1 (Time to Expiration): The Impact of Residual Gamma on 
Momentum. 
IV regressions of equity-date Returns on separate constants for each equity and 10 lags of: Returns 
(R) expressed as a net fraction, with coefficients generated separately for each equity; Residual 
Gamma defined in Table 3.2 as the component of total gamma not predictable by price, shares 
outstanding, or volume; Returns multiplied by Gamma Residual.  Residual Gamma is 
instrumented by the following exogenous variables: indicator variables for each day of the month, 
generated separately for each equity.  Residual Gamma is defined as in Table 3.2.  N = 
10,132,923.  R2 =0.0010.  T-stats are clustered by dates.  The IV estimator is two-stage least-
squares.  Coefficients are multiplied by 100. Instruments:  Σk=131 𝑏𝑖,𝑘𝐼(𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ = 𝑘) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝛽𝑖,𝑘𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝜆𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝐼𝑉,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+  Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝛾𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝐼𝑉,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
  R * Residual 
Gamma (IV) 
 Residual Gamma 
(IV) 
 Returns (Per 
Equity) 
 Constants 
(Per Equity) 
 
  100𝜆𝑘 𝑡(100𝜆𝑘)  100𝛾𝑘 𝑡(100𝛾   𝛽𝑖,𝑘  𝛼𝑖  
Date        YES  YES  
t - 1  1.299 (6.23)  -0.078 (-4.27)        
t - 2  -0.043 (-0.23)  0.035 (2.02)        
t - 3  -0.072 (-0.39)  0.014 (0.82)        
t - 4  0.122 (0.65)  0.003 (0.19)        
t - 5  0.363 (1.84)  -0.012 (-0.72)        
t - 6  0.184 (0.97)  0.029 (1.57)        
t - 7  -0.213 (-1.07)  -0.013 (-0.82)        
t - 8  -0.052 (-0.27)  0.006 (0.35)        
t - 9  0.008 (0.04)  -0.027 (-1.66)        
t - 10  -0.192 (-1.00)  0.022 (1.47)        
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3.6 Instrumental Regressions 
We move on to identify the causal effects of Residual Gamma on 
momentum in an instrument setting.  We explain three instruments, illustrate their 
first stages, describe the empirical specifications, and finally discuss the results.   
3.6.1 Instrumental Regressions: Time to Expiry 
Residual Gamma may vary endogenously across equities and dates with 
respect to momentum.  Reverse causality could occur in many possible stories.  
One such story could be that expected momentum for a stock affects the cost of 
issuing options.  Thus, stocks with exogenously more momentum might have end 
users who most want to hedge volatility risk, resulting in more options issued and 
more Residual Gamma.  Exogenous factors could affect both momentum and 
Residual Gamma as well.  For example, during earnings announcement season 
end-users might purchase unusually high amounts of options to lever up their 
opinions or insider information.  At the same time, news regarding earnings and 
its impact on the company’s future could be slowly integrating into the market, 
causing momentum (Hong Stein 1999).     
We can bypass these endogeneity issues if can find exogenous variation of 
Residual Gamma.  The exogenous sources of variation that we will present will be 
a large portion of this paper’s contribution.  All three instruments will exploit the 
various idiosyncratic institutional structure of options issuances. 
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The first instrument we use is the monthly expiration and roll-off of 
options.  This expiration causes a monthly cycle in options outstanding as end-
users put on orders throughout the month, and then at one single instant, a 
significant fraction of options expire.  Generally the roll-off date is around the 
18th of each month.  Figure 3.1 shows the cyclical nature of Residual Gamma 
through the month.  The options expiration dates are not lined up with the start of 
months, earnings releases, or other natural cycles.  Therefore, options expiration 
provides a potential instrument for Residual Gamma.   
The empirical exogenous instruments we are using for the first stage 
regression is: 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡 =   Σk=131 𝑏𝑖,𝑘𝐼(𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ = 𝑘)    (7) 
 
In other words, for each equity we run dummies for each day of month.  This 
creates 31 dummies (no constant) that fully capture any variation in that equity’s 
Residual Gamma as part of the monthly cycle.  As can be observed in Figure 3.1, 
the growth in Residual Gamma seems linear over the month, with a strong drop 
within the last two days of the expiration cycle. 
The second stage is the direct instrumental analogue of (4): 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝛽𝑖,𝑘𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝜆𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝐼𝑉,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+  Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝛾𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝐼𝑉,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡     (8) 
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Note that the estimated 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝐼𝑉,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 has cross sectional variation, 
but within a given stock only cyclic variation over time.  There is no quarterly 
variation or time trends.  Identification is purely off of the monthly expiration 
cycle. 
 The output of the regression is given in Table 3.7.  We see good agreement 
with the general price path 𝜆𝑘 in this regression and the baseline OLS regression 
in Table 3.4.  Namely, the cumulative coefficient magnitudes are nearly the same.  
This validates our baseline regression. 
  
3.6.2 Instrumental Regressions: Options Issuance and Past Price 
The second instrument we exploit is the fact that options tend to be struck 
around current stock prices, and options purchasers have lag in rebalancing the 
strikes of options when the stock price moves.  As an illustration, Figure 3.2 shows 
a hypothetical Residual Gamma as a function of the underlying stock price if the 
underlying stock price has been more or less around 100 in the past month.  The 
underlying principle behind the illustration is that the price of the stock being 
around 100 results in most options being struck around this price. 
Figure 3.3 demonstrates this phenomenon empirically, plotting the 
Residual Gamma against the price move the last 20 trading days.  When large 
movements are seen, the shift away from past prices reduces Residual Gamma.  
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Figure 3.5 shows suggestive evidence of tapering of options away from current 
prices as well. 
One possible objection is that using price movements has confounds with 
volatility.  If a stock experiences a sharp drop, volatility will increase, market 
makers may sell due to risk limits, mechanically reducing Residual Gamma.  This 
can be ruled out via two methods.  First, we can control for volatility, which we 
do in our empirical specification.  The shape of Figure 3.3 is maintained even with 
volatility controls.  Second, if there is a volatility story, one would expect that 
downward movement of prices increases volatility more than upward movement 
of prices, leading to asymmetry (Chacko Viceira 2005).  Note however that Figure 
3.3 is symmetrical suggesting against the volatility story, but in line with the 
theory of options clustering around old prices.  
By using a simple volatility control, we ensure that we are comparing 
between stocks with the same day-to-day volatility.  One stock by chance just 
happens to have a long string of negative moves, and another has a 50%-50% 
balance of negative and positive moves. 
The fact that end-users do not immediate rebalance strikes has foundations 
in much of financial economics and behavioral economics of defaults (Beshears et 
al 2009, Carroll et al 2009, Choi et al 2003; 2004, Kamenica 2012, Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008). 
Since options are struck around past prices, if current equity prices are 
around past prices, Residual Gamma will be higher than otherwise.  For example, 
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if over the course of two months, the price of Exxon Mobile (XOM) stock goes 
from 100 to 90 and then to 80, the Residual Gamma will be lower than if XOM 
goes from 100 to 90 and then to 100.  This past-price-level dependency of 
residual gamma provides our second instrument to identify the effect of residual 
gamma on momentum. 
The empirical specification we will use in our first stage IV regression for 
this instrument will be:  
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑏𝑖�𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 20 𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡� + 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡       (9) 
 
�𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 20 𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡� specifies the absolute value of the stocks return for the 
past 20 calendar days.  The absolute value is used instead of a squared value due 
to descriptive data suggesting that the relationship is not quadratic, such as seen in 
Figure 3.3.   
The second stage is similar to (8) but with 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 20 𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 
placed in as a volatility control – since we expect the instrument 
�𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 20 𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡� to have omitted variable effects through volatility.  
𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 20 𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 refers to the volatility of the stock in the last 20 day 
calendar days expressed in the square root of variance.  The second stage is: 
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𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘�𝛽𝑖,𝑘 + 𝜆𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝐼𝑉,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ 𝛿𝑘𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 20 𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦20,𝑖,𝑡�+  Σ𝑘=1𝐾 �𝛾1,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝐼𝑉,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+ 𝛾2,𝑘𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 20 𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦20,𝑖,𝑡� + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  (10) 
 
The results are presented in Table 3.8, which again is qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar to our baseline Table 3.4.   
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Table 3.8: Using Instrument #2 (Past Price Path): The Impact of Residual Gamma on 
Momentum. 
IV regressions of equity-date Returns on separate constants for each equity and 10 lags of: Returns 
(R) express as a net fraction, with separate coefficients for each equity; Residual Gamma defined 
in Table 3.2 as the component of total gamma not predictable by price, shares outstanding, or 
volume; Last 20 Day Volatility calculated as the square root of the sum of the last 20 days of 
returns; Returns multiplied by Residual Gamma; Returns multiplied by Last 20 Day Volatility.   
Residual Gamma is instrumented by the following exogenous variables: the sum of the last 20 
days of returns, generated separately for each equity.  All variables besides Residual Gamma are 
defined as in summary statistic Table 3.1.  Residual Gamma is defined as in Table 3.2.  N = 
10,351,259.  R2 =0.0012.  T-stats are clustered by dates.  The IV estimator is two-stage least-
squares.  Coefficients are multiplied by 100.  Controls for returns per equity and constants per 
equity are included in the results shown below even though they are not explicitly shown. 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠: 𝑏𝑖�𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 20 𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡� 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘(𝛽𝑖,𝑘 + 𝜆𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝐼𝑉,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛿𝑘𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 20 𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦20,𝑖,𝑡)+  Σ𝑘=1𝐾 (𝛾1,𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝐼𝑉,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛾2,𝑘𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 20 𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦20,𝑖,𝑡)+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 R * Residual 
Gamma 
 R * Last 20 Day 
Volatility 
 Residual 
Gamma 
 Last 20 Day 
Volatility 
 100𝜆𝑘 𝑡(𝜆𝑘)  100𝛿𝑘 𝑡(𝛿2,𝑘)  100𝛾1,𝑘 𝑡(𝛾1,𝑘)  100𝛾2,𝑘 𝑡(𝛾2,𝑘) 
Date            
t - 1 1.630 (5.90)  1.049 (0.28)  -0.077 (-4.13)  -0.021 (-0.02) 
t - 2 0.175 (0.56)  -10.881 (-2.62)  0.036 (2.10)  0.026 (0.02) 
t - 3 -0.296 (-1.14)  -1.568 (-0.43)  0.011 (0.65)  0.499 (0.49) 
t - 4 0.177 (0.58)  -5.003 (-1.24)  0.008 (0.50)  1.128 (1.17) 
t - 5 0.531 (1.79)  -6.155 (-1.56)  -0.003 (-0.20)  -1.746 (-1.93) 
t - 6 0.174 (0.60)  -0.444 (-0.12)  0.023 (1.32)  -0.206 (-0.23) 
t - 7 0.025 (0.08)  -0.965 (-0.27)  -0.017 (-1.00)  -0.254 (-0.26) 
t - 8 -0.003 (-0.01)  -2.154 (-0.65)  0.004 (0.22)  1.072 (1.06) 
t - 9 -0.010 (-0.03)  0.088 (0.03)  -0.024 (-1.49)  -1.147 (-1.17) 
t - 10 -0.246 (-0.88)  0.415 (0.13)  0.018 (1.20)  0.809 (1.05) 
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3.6.3 Instrumental Regressions: Options Issuance and Round Numbers 
Finally, we use a third instrument, the round number clustering of option 
strikes.  Option exchanges only issue options at prices that are round (e.g. 40, 50, 
60, etc).  Further, the more round a price is, the more market makers and end 
users will coordinate to issue at that strike and increase liquidity.  Even though 
strikes exist at both 50 and 45, the strike at 50 will be a stronger coordination 
point and see more options issued.  This instrument is particularly clean.  There 
are relatively few a priori reasons to believe that stocks should otherwise behave 
differently around round numbers.  There are however some previous research of 
round number effects: Harris (1991) models round numbers as simplifying 
negotiations; Donaldson and Kim (1993) show some market actors attach special 
meaning to the DJIA exceeding multiples of 100 inducing non-continuity; 
Christie and Schultz (1994) famously uncovered that market makers collude by 
coordinating on round prices.  None of these effects seem like they would add an 
obvious confound to our IV analysis.  As an institutional artifact there are few 
reasons to believe in serious fundamental reasons round prices should otherwise 
be special.   
The issuance of options at round numbers causes essentially exogenous 
variation in Residual Gamma.   In the few days before options expiration, if the 
stock’s price is in line with a round number (e.g. 50), then Residual Gamma will 
be much higher than if the stock’s price is not round (e.g. 53).  For an illustration, 
Figure 3.4 shows a hypothetical example one day before all options expiration in 
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which all options are issued at the round numbers ending in 0.  Residual Gamma 
would cluster around these values.  Figure 3.5 shows an empirical example of 
option strikes clustering at round numbers, with more clustering near numbers 
that are more round. 
Whether the stock price hits a round number is essentially exogenous.  
Only a very weak version of the random walk model needs to hold for this 
variation to be both random and unpredictable. 
To develop our first stage for the instrument, we need to have a measure 
for how round a price is.  A few issues come to play here.  First is institutional 
convention for what counts as a round price.  We would like to identify prices that 
1) the exchange has issued strikes at and 2) actually trade with high volume and 
open interest.  We could dive into first-level options level data to see for each 
equity exactly what the strike grid looks like every day.  This level of analysis 
would be complex if it is to be complete.  We would find that closeness to the 
nearest $10 matters, but for some stocks, so does closeness to the nearest $5 or 
$2.5, albeit less.  Sometimes this can depend on time of month too or the year of 
the observation.  The complexity would inhibit an easy interpretation and 
cleanness of the analysis.   
Instead we opt for a simple and robust measure of roundness.  We first 
normalize prices to have two digits before the decimal point: so for example $4.33, 
$43.30 and $433.02 all map to $43.30.  Then we look at the distance of this 
normalized price to the nearest $10, $5, $2.5, $1, $.50, and $.25.  These divisions 
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of tenths and halves tend to be empirically the round prices around which options 
are struck.  We run an empirical regression for each equity on how much 
roundness to each of the six increments matter.   In particular, we regress Residual 
Gamma on instruments below: Residual Gammai,t=   𝑏𝑖,1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 10+ 𝑏𝑖,2𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 5+ 𝑏𝑖,3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 2.5+ 𝑏𝑖,4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 1+ 𝑏𝑖,5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 0.5+ 𝑏𝑖,6𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 .25 + 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
The advantage of this empirical method is that we do not need to take a stance on 
how much each level of roundness matters – this is estimated by the model.   
 By way of example, if AAPL has a price around $500, we would 
normalize its price by dividing by 10 to get its prices fluctuating around $50.  
Then, we observe how much Residual Gamma goes up when AAPL price is near 
round $10s ($40,$50,$60), and similarly for $5 ($45, $50, $55), and $2.5 
($47.5,$50,$52.5), and soforth,  and estimate an empirically determined model for 
that as our instrument for exogenous Residual Gamma.   
 This measure of roundness, while not perfect, is easy to understand.  
Further, it is less likely that this instrument is weak due to its empirical estimation.  
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The second stage is again the standard equation below.  Results are presented in 
Table 3.9  
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝛽𝑖,𝑘𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝜆𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝐼𝑉,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+  Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝛾𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝐼𝑉,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
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Table 3.9: Using Instrument #3 (Distance to Round Numbers): The Impact of Residual 
Gamma on Momentum. 
IV regressions of equity-date Returns on separate constants for each equity and 10 lags of: Returns 
(R) express as a net fraction, with separate coefficients for each equity; Residual Gamma defined 
in Table 3.2 as the component of total gamma not predictable by price, shares outstanding, or 
volume; Returns multiplied by Residual Gamma; Returns multiplied by Last 20 Day Volatility.   
Residual Gamma is instrumented by the following exogenous variable: first the Price of an equity-
date is multiplied or divided by 10 to form a Normalized Price that has exactly two digits before 
the decimal point; then 6 variables are generated by taking the distance of this Normalized Price to 
the nearest multiple of 10, 5, 2.5, 1, .5, and .25 respectively.  All variables besides Residual 
Gamma are defined as in summary statistic Table 3.1.  Residual Gamma is defined as in Table 
3.2.  N = 10,545,064.  R2 =0.0009.  T-stats are clustered by dates.  The IV estimator is two-stage 
least-squares.  Coefficients are multiplied by 100. Instruments:  𝑏𝑖,1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 10+ 𝑏𝑖,2𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 5+ 𝑏𝑖,3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 2.5+ 𝑏𝑖,4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 1+ 𝑏𝑖,5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 0.5+ 𝑏𝑖,6𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 .25 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝛽𝑖,𝑘𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝜆𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝐼𝑉,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+  Σ𝑘=1𝐾 𝛾𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝐼𝑉,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
  R * Residual 
Gamma (IV) 
 Residual Gamma 
(IV) 
 Returns (R 
Per Equity) 
 Constants (Per 
Equity) 
 
  100𝜆𝑘 𝑡(100𝜆𝑘)  100𝛾𝑘 𝑡(100𝛾)𝑘  𝛽𝑖,𝑘  𝛼𝑖  
Date        YES  YES  
t - 1  1.342 (6.61)  -0.078 (-4.27)        
t - 2  -0.154 (-0.83)  0.034 (2.00)        
t - 3  -0.134 (-0.70)  0.014 (0.82)        
t - 4  -0.036 (-0.19)  0.003 (0.18)        
t - 5  0.312 (1.66)  -0.012 (-0.71)        
t - 6  0.197 (1.05)  0.029 (1.58)        
t - 7  -0.190 (-1.00)  -0.013 (-0.81)        
t - 8  -0.127 (-0.68)  0.006 (0.35)        
t - 9  0.005 (0.03)  -0.027 (-1.65)        
t - 10  -0.182 (-0.95)  0.022 (1.48)        
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3.6.4 Interpretation 
In our analysis above, we first ran a baseline (OLS) regression of the 
impact of Residual Gamma on momentum.  We then controlled for possible 
confounds by adding covariates.  Then we moved on to identify the causal effects 
of Residual Gamma on momentum in an instrument setting using three 
instruments: time to expiry, past price paths, and round numbers. 
All the different variations of analysis above resulted in the quantitatively 
and qualitatively similar impacts of Residual Gamma on momentum.  This is 
particularly substantial because the driving forces behind the regressions above 
vary widely.  For example, time and liquidity effects that make the OLS 
regression problematic should not be an issue for the time-to-expiration 
instrument.  Similarly, monthly cycle variations that may pose problems for time-
to-expiration should not affect whether prices are round or not.  But regardless of 
how the effect is generated or cut, the effect still remains the same.  This provides 
strong evidence that the Residual Gamma and hence hedging feedback demand of 
options does indeed cause extra momentum. 
3.7 Extensions 
3.7.1 In what other ways are options destabilizing? 
 We have measured destabilization in this paper through momentum, but 
under a purely rational expectations world, one might expect that prices would be 
impounded not after a few days, but on the very day of the stock move.  Cheng 
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and Madhaven (2009) capture this intuition by looking at price movements until 
3:00PM, and then designate the period between 3:00PM and 4:00PM as the 
momentum period.  Taken to the extreme, the price should actually move 
contemporaneously.  In a purely rational Kyle (1985) model, market makers 
should anticipate the hedging and simply reduce liquidity to compensate. 
 These already provide two alternate measures of destabilization: volatility 
as measured by variance of future returns, and liquidity as measured by price 
impact or bid-ask spread.  Other measures of stock destabilizing should exist as 
well. 
 
3.7.2 Why do end-users purchase options? 
In general equilibrium it would be useful to have an explanation of why 
end users purchase options in the first place, which gives non-linear exposure to 
the underlying equity.  One theory perhaps could be that options mechanically 
bundle leverage and concavity together.  End-users purchase options for the 
leverage factor, and purchase along with that concavity, an unintended add on.  
End-users do not pay attention every period, which both explains why end-users 
do not simply create their own options through BSM, and also why they do not 
rebalance away their concavity when prices change.   
 
3.7.3 What relationship does this have with time-varying returns? 
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Another theory for the purchase of options can reflect the inherent 
preference by end-users or end users to hold more equities when the price is 
higher, and less when the price is lower.  Numerous studies show that equity 
returns are time-varying, and in particular households hold less risky assets in bad 
times driving up returns (Zhang 2013).  Could it be possible that investor 
heterogeneity creates a class of agents that prefer to take risk in good states of the 
world only?  If so, then options seem like the optimal instrument with which to 
take on the risk.  In that case, options can be seen as more than a simple dynamic 
hedging instrument, but an indicator of who and to what extent different agents 
hold risk in different states of the world. 
Also, to the extent that bad fundamental news can cause feedback selling, 
then perhaps this can be one channel through which bad cashflow news induces 
bad discount rate news, in the Campbell Shiller (1988) decomposition sense.   
3.8 Conclusion 
This paper presents empirical evidence to show that the options create 
hedging feedback demand.  This hedging feedback demand, measured empirically 
as Residual Gamma in our paper, causes market makers to purchase stocks 
exactly after prices rise, and sell stocks exactly after prices fall.  In a frictional 
world, this should cause destabilization through momentum. 
The paper exhibits this momentum effect.  The effect is large in magnitude, 
with a one standard deviation increase in Residual Gamma causing 1.5% extra 
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momentum in stocks.  The momentum occurs within one to four days and does 
not dissipate for a significant period of time, at least 10 days.   
This effect on stock prices is robust to liquidity controls, market cap 
controls, open interest controls, and time trend controls.  Instruments including 
option expiration cycle, past price effects, and round price effects are also used to 
identify the destabilization.  The remarkable robustness of the results gives strong 
evidence that Residual Gamma indeed increases stock momentum.  This feedback 
of options shows that derivative structure does indeed have effect on stock prices.   
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics. 
The summary statistics below covers all 243 quarters from the beginning of the Federal Reserve 
Flow of Funds series in 1951 to 2012.  All data on sectors and their holdings are collected from 
the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds: Household equities is the series on households and nonprofit 
organizations, corporate equities, asset (FL153064105.Q); Household Equity Mutual Funds is the 
series on households and nonprofit organizations, mutual fund shares, asset (FL153064205.Q); 
Household Credit Markets is the series on households and nonprofit organizations, total currency 
and deposits including money market fund shares, asset (FL154000025.Q); Household Deposits is 
the series on households and nonprofit organizations, credit market instruments, assets 
(FL154004005.Q).  
 
Household risky ratio is calculated as the sum of the first two series above divided by the sum of 
the second two series.  Total risky ratio is calculated as the analogously except for the series 
corresponding to all sectors.  Change in household risky ratio is the current period household risky 
ratio minus a one quarter lag.  Log household risky ratio is the natural log of household risky ratio.  
Log total risky ratio is the natural log of the total risky ratio.   
 
In future tables, R denotes the excess return calculated as the difference between the value-
weighted CRSP minus the one-month Treasury bill rate from Ibbotson’s in percentage points.  S 
denotes the equity share in new issues as defined in Baker Wurgler (2000). CAPE denotes the ten 
year cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio, defined as in Campbell Shiller (1988);  Term 
Spread denotes the yield premium of ten year (from Robert Shiller’s website) over one-month 
treasury bill rates.  CAY is the consumption wealth ratio proxy defined by Lettau Ludvigson 
(2001).  Risky valuation is the projection of CAPE on the household risky ratio.  Risky Issuance is 
the residual from this projection.   
 1951-2012  1951-1981  1982-2012 
Variable Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
                                                             Panel A: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Data Series 
Household Equities ($trillions) 4.289 5.356  .567 .258  8.009 5.445 
Household Equity Mutual Funds 
($tn) 
2.441 3.443  .104 .090  4.776 3.579 
Household Credit Market 
($trillions) 
1.437 1.593  .214 .099  2.525 1.459 
Household Deposits ($trillions) 1.552 1.592  .226 .117  2.646 1.461 
                                                             Panel B: Other Primary Data Series 
Excess Return R (%) 1.829 8.399  1.652 8.138  2.001 8.676 
Lettau-Ludvigson CAY .000 0.017  -0.004 0.01  0.004 0.021 
Term Spread 2.275 1.231  1.794 0.941  2.743 1.302 
Baker-Wurgler Equity Share of 
Issuance 0.186 0.095  0.224 0.082  0.143 0.090 
Campbell-Shiller CAPE 18.887 7.534  15.735 4.597  21.963 8.525 
                                                             Panel C: Derived Data Series 
Household risky ratio 2.509 0.815  2.540 .761  2.470 .866 
Change in Household risky ratio 0.007 0.240  0.001 0.239  0.012 0.243 
Log Household risky ratio 0.869 0.321  0.888 0.305  0.850 0.337 
Total risky ratio 0.501 0.162  0.492 0.141  0.509 0.181 
Log Total risky ratio -0.747 0.340  -0.754 0.311  -0.740 0.367 
Risky Valuation -0.747 0.301  -0.865 0.243  -0.632 0.310 
Risky Issuance .000 0.157  0.111 0.096  -0.108 0.126 
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Table 4.2: Values of Percentiles of the Household risky ratio. 
The table displays values of select percentiles of the household risky ratio variable.  The 
household risky ratio is the ratio of household high risk over household low risk assets as reported 
by the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data.  Percentiles are selected to be approximately 1/6 of 
the distribution.   95% confident intervals are given by the Thiel-Sen method. 
 
 
Percentile Value 95% Conf Interval 
17% 1.685 (1.62 , 1.77) 
33% 1.996 (1.87 , 2.09) 
50% 2.304 (2.20 , 2.52) 
67% 2.866 (2.73 , 3.03) 
83% 3.352 (3.23 , 3.55) 
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